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ABSTRACT
While network problems have been addressed using a central administrative domain
with a single objective, the devices in most networks are actually not owned by a single
entity but by many individual entities. These entities make their decisions independently
and selfishly, and maybe cooperate with a small group of other entities only when this form
of coalition yields a better return. The interaction among multiple independent decision-
makers necessitates the use of game theory, including economic notions related to markets
and incentives.
In this dissertation, we are interested in modeling, analyzing, addressing network
problems caused by the selfish behavior of network entities. First, we study how the selfish
behavior of network entities affects the system performance while users are competing for
limited resource. For this resource allocation domain, we aim to study the selfish routing
problem in networks with fair queuing on links, the relay assignment problem in coopera-
tive networks, and the channel allocation problem in wireless networks. Another important
aspect of this dissertation is the study of designing efficient mechanisms to incentivize net-
work entities to achieve certain system objective. For this incentive mechanism domain,
we aim to motivate wireless devices to serve as relays for cooperative communication, and
to recruit smartphones for crowdsourcing. In addition, we apply different game theoretic
approaches to problems in security and privacy domain. For this domain, we aim to an-
alyze how a user could defend against a smart jammer, who can quickly learn about the
user’s transmission power. We also design mechanisms to encourage mobile phone users
to participate in location privacy protection, in order to achieve k-anonymity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network problems have been addressed using a central administrative domain with a single
objective. The users in the network are always assumed to be obedient. However, the
devices in most networks are not own by a single entity but by many individual entities.
These entities make their decisions independently and selfishly, and maybe cooperate with
a small group of other entities only when this form of coalition yields a better return.
The interaction among multiple independent decision-makers necessitates the use of game
theory, including economic notions related to markets and incentives.
Game theory is the study that analyzes the strategic interactions among autonomous
decision-makers, whose actions have mutual, probably conflicting, consequences. Origi-
nally developed to model problems in the field of economics, game theory has recently
been applied to network problems, in most cases to solve the resource allocation prob-
lems in a competitive environment. The reason that game theory is an appropriate choice
for studying network problems is multifold. First, entities in the network are autonomous
agents, making decisions only for their own interests. Game theory provides us sufficient
theoretical tools to analyze the network users’ behaviors and actions. Second, game theory
primarily deals with distributed optimization, which often requires local information only.
Thus it enables us to design distributed algorithms. Finally, auction, a market game of in-
complete information, allows us to design mechanisms to provide incentives for network
entities participating in tasks, which would not be achieved without sufficient participation.
1
1.1 Game Theory 101
Game theory [46] is a discipline aimed at modeling scenarios where individual
decision-makers have to choose specific actions that have mutual or possibly conflict con-
sequences. A game consists of three major components:
• Players: The decision makers are called players, denoted by a finite setN = {1,2, . . . ,n}.
• Strategy: Each player i ∈ N has a non-empty strategy set Si. Let si denote the
selected strategy by player i. A strategy profile s consists of all players’ strategies,
i.e., s= (s1,s2, . . . ,sn). Obviously, we have s∈ S=×i∈N Si, where× is the Cartesian
product.
• Utility/Payoff: The utility of player i is a measurement function, denoted by ui : S 7→
R, on the possible outcome determined by the strategies of all players, where R is
the set of real numbers.
The players of the game are assumed to be rational and selfish, which means each
player is only interested in maximizing its own utility without respecting others’ and the
system’s performance. Let s−i denote the strategy profile excluding si. As a notational con-
vention, we have s = (si,s−i). We say that player i prefers si to s′i if ui(si,s−i)> ui(s′i,s−i).
When other players’ strategies are fixed, player i can select a strategy, denoted by bi(s−i),
which maximizes its utility function. Such a strategy is called a best response of player
i. A strategy is called a dominant strategy of player i if, regardless of what other players
do, the strategy earns player i a larger utility than any other strategy. In order to study the
interactions among players, the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) is introduced. A strat-
egy profile constitutes an NE if none of the players can improve its utility by unilaterally
deviating from its current strategy.
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Definition 1.1. [Nash Equilibrium] A strategy profile sne = {sne1 ,sne2 , . . . ,sneN } is called a
Nash Equilibrium (NE), if for every player i, we have:
ui(sne)≥ ui(sne−1,s′i)
for every strategy s′i ∈ S. 
To characterize and quantify the inefficiency of the system performance due to the
lack of cooperation among the players, we use the concept of price of anarchy (POA) [77].
Definition 1.2. [Price of Anarchy] The price of anarchy (POA) of a game is the ratio of the
total utility achieved in a worst possible NE over that of the social optimum. 
The POA in game theory is an analogue of the approximation ratio in combinatorial
optimization. If a game has a POA lower bounded by α ≤ 1, it means that for any instance
of the game, the system performance in any NE is at least α times the system performance
in the optimal solution.
Games can be classified into two categories, strategic form game (or static game)
and extensive form game (or dynamic game). The strategic form game is a one-shot game.
In this game, the players make their decisions simultaneously without knowing what others
will do. On the contrary, the extensive form game represents the structure of interactions
between players and defines possible orders of moves. The repeat game is a class of the
extensive form game, in which each stage is a repetition of the same strategic game. At
the beginning of each stage, players observe the past history of strategies before making
decisions. The number of stages may be finite or infinite. The utility of each player is
the accumulated utility through all the stages. Therefore, players care not only the current
utility but also the future utilities.
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The Stackelberg game is an extensive form game, which is used to model the com-
petition between one player, called the leader, and a set of players, called the followers.
In this game, the leader takes action first and then the followers take actions. The leader
knows ex ante that the followers observe its action and take actions accordingly. The NE
in the Stackelberg game is called Stackelberg Equilibrium.
Player B
L R
Player A
U 3,2 6,5
D 4,3 8,2
Table 1.1: Utility matrix: the first number in each cell is the utility of Player A, while the
second is the utility of Player B.
We illustrate these concepts using a simple example given in Table 1.1. Note that
this example is just for the illustration of an SE and not an instance of the problem studied.
Assume that Player A is the leader, and Player B is the follower. If A plays strategy U , B
would play strategy R, as it gives player B a utility of 5 (as opposed to a utility of 2 should
B play strategy L). This leads to a utility of 6 for player A. If A plays strategy D, B would
play strategy L, as it gives player B a utility of 3 (as opposed to a utility of 2 should B play
strategy R). This leads to a utility of 4 for player A. Hence A would play strategy U , since
doing so would result in a utility of 6 compared to 4 by playing strategy D. As explained
before, B would play R if A plays U . Therefore the Stackelberg Equilibrium of this game
is (U , R).
As game theory studies interactions between rational and intelligent players, it can
be applied to the economic world where people interact with each other in the market. The
marriage of game theory and economic models yields interesting games and fruitful the-
oretical results in microeconomics and auction theory. Auction is a decentralized market
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mechanism for allocating resources. The essence of auction is a game of incomplete infor-
mation, where the players are the bidders, the strategies are the bids, and both allocations
and payments are functions of the bids. In an auction mechanism, each bidder i has some
private information ti, called its type, and its strategy is the bid bi. A mechanism then
computes an output o = o(b1,b2, . . . ,bn) and a payment vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), where
pi = pi(b1,b2, . . . ,bn) is the money given to the participating agent i. For each possible
output o, bidder i’s valuation is vi(ti,o). The utility of bidder i is ui(ti,o) = vi(ti,o)+ pi.
Based on the number of objects auctioned on the market, auctions can be catego-
rized into single-object auction and multi-object auction. Two basic single-object auction
schemes are the first-price auction and the second-price auction. In the first-price auction,
the auctioneer grants the item to the highest bidder and charges the highest bid. In the
second-price auction, also known as Vickrey auction, the auctioneer grants the item to the
highest bidder, but charges the second highest bid. Multi-object auction can be homoge-
neous auction or heterogeneous auction, depending on whether the objects are identical.
There are four desirable properties while designing an auction scheme:
• Computation Efficiency: The outcome of the auction can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
• Individual Rationality: Each agent can expect a non-negative profit.
• System Efficiency: An auction is system-efficient if the sum of valuations of all
bidders is maximized.
• Truthfulness: An auction is truthful if revealing true private valuation is the dom-
inant strategy for each bidder. In other words, no bidder can improve its utility by
submitting a bid different from its true valuation, no matter how others submit.
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For double auction, one more property is desirable, Budget Balance. An auction is
budget-balanced if the payment collected from the buyers is at least as much as the payment
paid to the sellers.
1.2 Overview and Contributions
This dissertation studies and addresses a number of important network problems.
It focuses on three problem domains: resource allocation, incentive mechanism design,
and security and privacy. The common thread throughout the research on these different
domains is applying game theory to modeling, analyzing, and solving problems caused by
the selfish behavior from network entities.
In general, for the resource allocation domain, we analyze how the selfish behav-
ior of users affect the system performance while users are competing against each other
for limited resource. In this domain, we consider three problems: 1) Selfish Routing in
Networks with Fair Queuing [161, 162]; 2) Relay Assignment for Cooperative Networks
[156, 159]; and 3) Channel Allocation in Non-Cooperative Multi-Radio Multi-Channel
Wireless Networks [158].
Contributions:
• We model the studied problem as a non-cooperative game.
• We prove the existence of Nash Equilibria. If an NE does not exist, we design a
charging scheme to influence users to converge to an NE.
• We quantitatively measure the degradation of the system performance caused by the
selfish behavior from users.
• For Problem 2), we design efficient schemes to induce users to converge an NE,
which meanwhile is also the optimal solution.
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For the second domain, we design incentive mechanisms to stimulate network enti-
ties to achieve certain objective, which may not be possible otherwise. In this domain, we
consider two problems: 1) Motivating Wireless Devices for Cooperative Communications
[157]; and 2) Recruiting Smartphones for Crowdsourcing [163].
Contributions:
• We design auction-based incentive mechanisms to motivate network entities.
• We prove that the design incentive mechanisms satisfy several desirable economic
properties.
For the security and privacy domain, we adopt different game theoretic approaches
to either help the user defend against the attacker or protect users’ privacy. In this domain,
we consider two problems: 1) Coping with A Smart Jammer [164]; and 2) Motivating
Mobile Users for K-Anonymity Location Privacy [160].
Contributions:
• We derive an optimal strategy for the user to defend against a smart jammer.
• We design mechanisms to incentivize mobile users to achieve k-anonymity.
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Part I
Resource Allocation
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Chapter 2
Selfish Routing in Networks with Fair Queuing
Routing is the process of selecting paths in a network along which to send data packets.
In communication networks, the choice of a route between a source-destination pair has a
significant bearing on the resulting bandwidth. For example, in peer-to-peer networks, there
may be several pairs of peers sharing volumes of data between each other. The objective
of each pair of peers, considered as a user, is to send as many packets as possible through
the network while competing for network resources against other users. With this selfish
objective, a user will change its path if the new path provides a larger bandwidth value
even at the cost of other users. Since multiple users may compete for the bandwidth on the
same link, it is necessary to have a congestion control scheme to allocate bandwidth among
competing users. Hence max-min fair bandwidth allocation has been widely adopted as a
congestion control scheme at the link level [21, 34, 69, 89, 92, 105, 125]. The max-min fair
bandwidth allocation scheme treats all paths passing through a link equally and assigning
an equal share of bandwidth to each of them unless a path receives less bandwidth at another
link.
2.1 Introduction
In this work, we model the network using a directed graph, and present a game
theoretic study of non-cooperative routing under max-min fair congestion control, where
the goal of each user is to maximize the bandwidth of its chosen path. We call this prob-
lem the Maximal-Bandwidth Routing problem. Two questions arise while addressing this
problem: How can a user efficiently find a path with maximum bandwidth under max-min
fair congestion control, when the paths of all other users are given? and Will the network
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oscillate or converge to a stable state? The first question is critical to our convergence
analysis, since it directly affects the convergence speed. It is also an independent prob-
lem to study, as we will point out later that the strong correlation among competing paths
makes the calculation of available bandwidth on each link challenging. The second ques-
tion is important because oscillation among different paths introduces dramatic overhead,
consuming network resources. This work answers both questions.
In answering the first question, we introduce the concept of observed available
bandwidth and prove that it can accurately predict the bandwidth of a path. In answering
the second question, we model the routing problem as a non-cooperative game and employ
game theoretic tools to analyze the interaction among users. This question boils down to the
existence of Nash Equilibria and the convergence of the game. One major challenge arises
while answering these questions. While selecting a new path, the available bandwidth
of a link may depend on the bandwidth of existing paths of other users. However, the
bandwidths of these paths in turn depend on the bandwidth of the new path. Therefore
the problem is significantly more involved than the traditional maximum capacity path
problem.
The major contributions of this work are as follows:
• We formulate the Maximal-Bandwidth Routing problem (MAXBAR) as a non-cooperative
strategic game where each player makes the routing decision selfishly to maximize
its bandwidth. In Section 2.5, we generalize it to the case where each user has a
bandwidth demand.
• We prove the existence of Nash Equilibria in the MAXBAR game, where no player
has any incentive to deviate from its chosen path. We also prove a lower bound
and an upper bound on the price of anarchy of the MAXBAR game, which is a
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concept quantifying the system degradation due to selfish behavior of users. As
a byproduct, this also gives an approximation to the social optimal solution to the
MAXBAR problem.
• We introduce a novel concept of observed available bandwidth to compute the avail-
able bandwidth on each link. It empowers the efficient computation of the best re-
sponse strategy for each user. This is non-trivial, as the traditional widest path algo-
rithm cannot be directly applied due to the mutual influence between paths sharing
common links [89].
• We investigate the behavior and incentives of the players in the game and present
a game based algorithm to compute an NE. We prove that by following the natural
game course, the MAXBAR game converges to an NE.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present a brief
overview of related work. In Section 2.3, we describe our system model, present the
MAXBAR problem where each user would like to have as much bandwidth as possible,
and formulate it as a non-cooperative game. In Section 2.4, we prove the existence of
Nash Equilibria and quantify the inefficiency incurred by the lack of cooperation via price
of anarchy, present an efficient algorithm to select a path with maximum bandwidth in a
max-min fair network with multiple users, and provide a comprehensive analysis of the
MAXBAR game and prove the convergence to an NE. In Section 2.5, we study a gener-
alization of the MAXBAR problem where each user has a bandwidth demand, instead of
aiming to have as much bandwidth as possible. In Section 2.6, we present numerical re-
sults on randomly generated networks. These results show that the game converges to an
NE rapidly (within 7 iterations on average and 10 iterations at worst) and achieves better
fairness compared with other algorithms. We conclude this work in Section 2.7.
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2.2 Related Work
Congestion control is a critical task in communication networks to address the is-
sue of fairly and optimally allocating resources, bandwidth in particular, among multiple
competing users. Max-min fair bandwidth allocation has been proposed as one of the con-
gestion control schemes [11, 69]. This scheme was first presented in [69]. The author also
proved the optimality and the uniqueness of the allocation. In [34], Demers proposed a
fair queuing scheduler, which is employed on each gateway, to implement a max-min fair
network. In [89], Ma et al. studied how to route in max-min fair networks to improve the
total throughput of the network. To calculate the max-min fair bandwidth for each path,
they also presented a centralized algorithm. Note that the information used by the routing
algorithm is abstract and only an estimate of the accurate available bandwidth. Showing
that computing the max-min fair bandwidth requires global information, Mayer et al. [92]
designed a local distributed scheduling algorithm to approximate max-min fair bandwidth
allocation.
Chen and Nahrstedt [21] extended the concept of max-min fairness to the routing
level, since the max-min fair bandwidth allocation scheme was proposed to achieve fairness
at link level. They defined the fairness-throughput and introduced a new set of relational
operators to compare two different feasible bandwidth allocations at routing level. The
fairness-throughput performance of the bandwidth allocation is maximized if and only if
such an allocation is the largest under the relational operator. They also proposed a max-
min fair routing algorithm to select a path for the new user to maximize the minimum
bandwidth allocated to all users. In [105], Nace considered a model, where the routing is
splittable, and gave a linear programming based algorithm to compute the optimal max-min
fair bandwidth allocation. Schapira et al. [125] and Godfrey et al. [54] studied the effi-
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ciency and incentive compatibility of different congestion control schemes in the network
where users’ paths are fixed. They also presented a family of congestion control proto-
cols called Probing Increase Educated Decrease and showed that by following any of these
protocols, the network converges to a fixed point.
All the previous works mainly focused on either the case where paths are fixed [34,
69, 92] or the case where routing aims to improve the total performance [21, 54, 89, 105,
125]. In contrast, the objective of our work is to investigate the scenario where each user
in the network is able to adapt its routing decision based on the current environment and
driven by its own selfish objective. The game formulation of this scenario falls into the
category of bottleneck game [8]. There are also important works on stable routing in the
literature [48, 58, 59]. However, these works do not consider max-min fair bandwidth
allocation in their models.
2.3 Network Model and Problem Formulation
We first describe the network model and discuss the well known max-min fair con-
gestion control scheme. We then formulate the problem studied in this work.
2.3.1 Network Model
We model the network by a directed edge-weighted graph denoted by G = (V,E,b), where
V is the set of n nodes, E is the set of m links, and b is a weight function such that b(e) =
b(v,w) > 0 is the bandwidth of link e = (v,w) ∈ E. In the network, there is a collection
U = {1,2, . . . ,N} of users. User i ∈ U needs to transmit packets from a source node
si ∈ V to a destination node ti ∈ V over an si–ti path. An s–t path in the network consists
of an ordered sequence of vertices s=v0, v1, . . ., vq=t, where (vl,vl+1) ∈ E for 0 ≤ l < q.
We denote such a path by v0-v1-· · · -vq. We are only interested in simple paths–for which
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the nodes in the sequence are distinct. Although there may be multiple si–ti paths, at any
given time, user i uses only one path, which is denoted by Pi. We denote the set of paths
currently used by the users as P = {P1,P2, . . . ,PN}. We denote the set of users currently
sharing link e by Ue(P), i.e., Ue(P) = {i|i ∈U and e ∈ Pi}.
For routing approach, we will use link-state source routing algorithms as in [89].
In such routing schemes, each node knows the network topology and the state information
on each link [9, 134]. Thus it is possible for the node to select its path. In this work, we
consider best-effort flows [89] and assume that every source node always has sufficient data
to transmit.
2.3.2 Congestion Control
Since multiple users are competing for bandwidth resources, congestion control is neces-
sary for the management of bandwidth. The employed congestion control needs to satisfy
two requirements: 1) the bandwidth allocation is fair and 2) the bandwidth is fully allo-
cated. A simple way to allocate the bandwidth of a link to multiple competing paths is to
share it equally among them. However, some paths can use only less than the equal share
(due to some bottlenecks), while some can use more. Hence, equal allocation is not desir-
able. In this work, we assume that at the link level, max-min fair bandwidth allocation (also
known as fair queuing) [34, 69] is used for congestion control. Max-min fair bandwidth
allocation has been recognized as the optimal throughput-fairness definition [69, 92]. Intu-
itively, if there are multiple users sharing a common link, each user will get a “fair share”
of the link’s bandwidth. If some user cannot use up its fair share bandwidth because it has
a lower share assigned on another link, the excess bandwidth is “fairly” split among all
other users of this link. Such a network with max-min fair congestion control at the link
level is called a max-min fair network. We denote the bandwidth allocated to user i in a
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max-min fair network by bi(P) (how to compute the value of bi(P) will be shown later).
Since user i will use only one path at any given time, we will say the bandwidth of user i
instead of the bandwidth of user i’s path when the path is clear from the context. We use
b(P) = (b1(P),b2(P), . . . ,bN(P)) to denote the Max-min Fair Bandwidth Allocation
(MFBA) given users’ pathsP . The uniqueness of MFBA has been proved in [125]. While
assigning the bandwidth to each path Pi, there must exist at least one link that keeps the
path from obtaining more bandwidth. We call such link a bottleneck of path Pi. Note that
there could be more than one bottleneck for a path. We useBi(P) to denote the set of all
bottlenecks of path Pi. Each bottleneck e of path Pi has two important properties, which can
be mathematically expressed as follows:
1. ∑ j∈Ue(P) b j(P) = b(e),
2. bi(P)≥ b j(P),∀ j ∈Ue(P).
Property 1) means that link e is saturated. We call a link saturated if its bandwidth is fully
allocated. This property is obvious as otherwise e is not a link that keeps Pi from obtaining
more bandwidth. Property 2) states that there is no path being allocated more bandwidth
than Pi on link e. The reason is that if there exists another path Pj allocated more bandwidth,
Pi could equally share the bandwidth with Pj due to max-min fair bandwidth allocation and
obtain more bandwidth. These two properties have also been proved in Lemma 3 of [21]
and Lemma 3 of [69].
Algorithms for calculating the bandwidth allocation for each path in a max-min fair
network have been proposed in [69, 89]. To make our work self-contained, we illustrate
the pseudo code in Algorithm 1. For detailed description and correctness proof, we refer
the readers to [69, 89].
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Algorithm 1: ComB(G,b,P,U )
input : Network G, path setP and user set U
output: bi(P) for all i ∈U
1 bi(P)← 0, ∀i ∈U ;
2 repeat
3 Let e¯ := argmine∈E b(e)|Ue¯(P)| in G(V,E,b);
4 btemp← b(e¯)|Ue¯(P)| ;
5 foreach player i ∈Ue¯(P) do
6 bi(P)← btemp;
7 foreach e ∈ Pi do
8 b(e)← b(e)−bi(P);
9 if b(e) = 0 then E← E \{e};
10 end
11 P ←P \{Pi};
12 end
13 untilP = /0;
14 return bi(P) for all i ∈U ;
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Figure 2.1: Example with 3 users. P1 = s1-v1-v2-t1 (red solid), P2 = s2-v1-v2-v4-t2 (blue
dotted), and P3 = s3-v1-v2-v4-t3 (green dashed).
The basic idea of Algorithm 1 is that in each iteration, we find a global bottleneck
e¯, which is defined as the link having the least equal share, i.e., e¯ = argmine∈E b(e)|Ue(P)| .
We allocate the equal share of b(e¯) to all users in Ue¯(P). Then all the paths of users in
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Ue¯(P) are removed from the network. The link bandwidths are reduced by the bandwidth
consumed by the removed users. The above procedure is repeated until all the paths have
been assigned bandwidth and removed from the network.
To illustrate the idea of Algorithm 1, we compute the bandwidth for the example in
Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1(a), (v4, t2) is the e¯ selected in the first iteration and
b(v4,t2)
|U(v4,t2)(P)|
= 3.
Since user 2 (blue dotted) is the only one using link (v4, t2), we set b2(P) = 3, remove
path P2 from the network and subtract the bandwidth from all the links along path P2 (blue
dotted). In the resulting network shown in Figure 2.1(b), (v1,v2) is selected as e¯. There are
two paths, P1 (red solid) and P3 (green dashed), sharing link (v1,v2). Each of them obtains
bandwidth b(v1,v2)|U(v1,v2)(P)|
= 4. We set b1(P) = b3(P) = 4, and remove path P1 and path P3.
Since there is no more paths left, the algorithm terminates.
2.3.3 Problem Formulation
In this work, we study the problem of routing in a max-min fair network with multiple
selfish users, where each user selects its path to maximize its bandwidth. We call this
problem the MAXimal-BAndwidth Routing (MAXBAR) problem. We are interested in
the following questions:
Q1. How does each user select the path to maximally increase its bandwidth?
Q2. Will the routing oscillate forever or converge to a stable state, where no user can
increase its bandwidth by unilaterally changing its path?
Q3. If the answer to Q2 is converging to a stable state, how is the social welfare in the
stable state compared to that in the optimal solution with centralized control?
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The MAXBAR problem can be formulated as a non-cooperative game, called MAXBAR
game, as follows. Each user is a player in this game. We define the strategy of player i
as its path Pi. A strategy profile of all players is then P . We denote the strategies except
player i’s by P−i. We define the utility of player i as the bandwidth bi(P) of path Pi.
Since players are selfish but rational, each player makes independent routing decisions to
maximize its own utility. When player i’s path is not in the network, we use b(P−i) to
denote the MFBA and b j(P−i) to denote the bandwidth of path Pj, where bi(P−i) = 0 as
a technical convention. LetP|iP′i denote the path profile where player i changes its path to
P′i and others remain the same. When the context is clear, we useP|i instead ofP|iP′i for
notational simplicity. Let b(P|i) and b j(P|i) denote the MFBA and the new bandwidth of
user j’s path. It is clear that Ue(P|i) =Ue(P−i)∪{i} if e ∈ P′i and Ue(P|i) =Ue(P−i)
otherwise.
An important subproblem of the MAXBAR problem, which is of independent in-
terest, is how to select a path to maximize the allocated bandwidth, given the network and
other users’ paths. This is known as best response in game theory.
Definition 2.1. [Best Response Routing] Given other users’ paths P1, · · · ,Pi−1,Pi+1, · · · ,PN ,
the best response routing for user i is a path Pi such that bi(P) is maximized over all si–ti
paths. 
Finding a best response path for a user is not straightforward. As we learned from
previous discussions, the allocated bandwidth for each path can be computed after con-
sidering the whole network topology and all path selections. Thus how to compute the
available bandwidth on each link before the routing is known has not been solved yet. This
problem was also studied in [89]. However, the authors only gave estimated information
for each link and their algorithm is approximate. We will present an efficient solution to
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this problem in Section 2.4.2.
In order to study the strategic interactions of the players, we first introduce the
concept of Nash Equilibrium [46].
Definition 2.2. [Nash Equilibrium] A strategy profile Pne = {Pne1 ,Pne2 , . . . ,PneN } is called
a Nash Equilibrium (NE), if for every player i, we have:
bi(Pne)≥ bi(Pne|iP′i )
for every strategy P′i , where P′i is an si–ti path. 
In other words, in an NE, no player can increase its utility by unilaterally changing
its strategy.
The social optimum in the MAXBAR game is a strategy profile P∗ such that the
total utility, i.e. ∑i∈U bi(P∗), is maximized among allP . We use the concept of price of
anarchy defined in [77] to quantify the system inefficiency due to selfishness.
Definition 2.3. [Price of Anarchy] The price of anarchy (POA) of a game is the ratio of the
total utility achieved in a worst possible NE over that of the social optimum. 
Table 2.1 lists frequently used notations.
2.4 Analysis of the MAXBAR Game
2.4.1 Existence of Nash Equilibria
As a crucial step in proving the existence of NE, we show that every time a player changes
its path, the minimum bandwidth of the players, whose bandwidths change, increases
strictly.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that player i unilaterally changes its path from Pi to P′i , such that
bi(P) < bi(P|i). We have min j∈U↓∪U↑ b j(P|i) > min j∈U↓∪U↑ b j(P), where U= = { j ∈
19
Table 2.1: Frequently used Notations
Notation Description
G graph representing the network
V , E node set, link set
v,w node
e, e¯ link and global bottleneck
b(e) bandwidth of link e
U , N user (player) set, number of users (players)
i, j,k,u user (player)
si, ti source node and destination node of user i
Pi path (strategy) of user i
P path (strategy) set of users
P−i path (strategy) set of users except i
P|iP′i path (strategy) set with user i’s path changed to P′i
P|i abbreviation ofP|iP′i when P′i is clear from the context
Ue(P) set of users whose paths share link e for givenP
bi(P) bandwidth (utility) of user i for givenP
b(P) bandwidth (utility) vector of all users for givenP
U |b j(P) = b j(P|i)}, U↑ = { j ∈ U |b j(P) < b j(P|i)} and U↓ = { j ∈ U |b j(P) >
b j(P|i)}. 
Proof. It is clear that i ∈U↑, since bi(P)< bi(P|i). First we claim that, for any j ∈U↓,
there exists k ∈ U↑, such that b j(P|i) ≥ bk(P|i). Let e ∈B j(P|i) be a bottleneck of Pj
after player i changes its path. By Property 2) of bottleneck, we have b j(P|i)≥ bk(P|i),
∀k ∈Ue(P|i). Therefore, we only need to prove that there exists a player k ∈Ue(P|i)∩
U↑. If i ∈Ue(P|i), then we can take k = i. Next, we consider the case where i 6∈Ue(P|i).
Note that Ue(P) \ {i} = Ue(P|i) \ {i}, since only player i changes its path. Therefore
i 6∈ Ue(P|i) implies that Ue(P|i) ⊆ Ue(P). Assuming to the contrary that bk(P) ≥
bk(P|i), ∀k ∈Ue(P|i), the total bandwidth usage on link e in b(P|i) is
b j(P|i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P|i)\{ j}
bk(P|i)< b j(P)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P)\{ j}
bk(P)≤ b(e),
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where the first inequality follows from j ∈U↓ andUe(P|i)⊆Ue(P), the second inequal-
ity follows from the feasibility of b(P). This contradicts the fact that e is a bottleneck, and
proves the existence of player k in the case where i 6∈Ue(P|i).
In summary, for any j ∈U↓, there exists k ∈U↑ such that
b j(P)> b j(P|i)≥ bk(P|i)> bk(P). (2.1)
Following inner pair of (2.1), we know that
min j∈U↓∪U↑ b j(P|i) = bk1(P|i)
for some player k1 ∈U↑. Following outer pair of (2.1), we know that
min j∈U↓∪U↑ b j(P) = bk2(P)
for some player k2 ∈ U↑. Since k1 ∈ U↑, we know that bk1(P|i) > bk1(P) ≥ bk2(P).
Hence this lemma holds.
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Figure 2.2: Example for Lemma 2.1.
We use the example in Figure 2.2 to illustrate the meaning of Lemma 2.1. In this
example, we have three players: player 1 (red solid), player 2 (blue dotted) and player 3
21
(green dashed). From Figure 2.2(a) to Figure 2.2(b), player 2 changes its path from P2 = s2-
v1-v2-v3-t2 to P′2 = s2-v1-v2-t2. Before the change, b1(P) = 4, b2(P) = 2, and b3(P) = 4.
After the change, b1(P|2)= 4, b2(P|2)= 4, and b3(P|2)= 6. In this example,U== {1},
U↑ = {2,3}, and U↓ = /0. We have min{b2(P|2),b3(P|2)}> min{b2(P),b3(P)}.
We now prove the existence of NE in the MAXBAR game.
Theorem 2.1. There exists at least one NE in the MAXBAR game. 
Proof. At every stage of the game, we arrange the bandwidth values of the paths lexi-
cographically in a non-decreasing order, resulting in a vector~bl = (b1,b2, . . . ,bN). In this
vector, the minimum bandwidth b1 is at the most significant coordinate. We have bκ ≤ bκ+1
for 1≤ κ < N. For any two vectors~bl = (b1,b2, . . . ,bN) and~b′l = (b′1,b′2, . . . ,b′N),~bl <~b
′
l
in lexicographic order if and only if:
1) b1 < b′1, or
2) ∃ 1 < τ ≤ N s.t. bκ = b′κ for 1≤ κ < τ and bτ < b′τ .
By Lemma 2.1, we conclude that every time a player changes its path, the ordering~bl in-
creases lexicographically. We know that there are a finite number of paths for each player.
Thus the number of different strategy profiles is finite as well. As each strategy profile cor-
responds to one vector, we pick the one corresponding to the largest vector as the strategies
for the players. We conclude that such strategy profile is an NE as no player can improve
its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy.
While we know the existence of NE, there are still open questions to answer. How
to efficiently find a path with maximum bandwidth in a max-min fair network? Will the
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MAXBAR game converge to an NE? We will answer these questions in Sections 2.4.2
and 2.4.3, respectively.
Now, we quantify the worst-case “penalty” incurred by the lack of cooperation
among the players in this game using the concept of price of anarchy (POA). Recall that
POA is the ratio of the total bandwidth of the worst NE to the total bandwidth of the social
optimum among all strategies.
Theorem 2.2. For the MAXBAR game, 1N ≤ POA≤ 2N . 
Proof. We prove this theorem by proving the lower bound in Lemma 2.2 and the upper
bound in Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.2. For the MAXBAR game, POA≥ 1N . 
Proof. Let Pne = {Pne1 ,Pne2 , . . . ,PneN } be any NE of the MAXBAR game. Let P∗ =
{P∗1 ,P∗2 , . . . ,P∗N} be the social optimum. We first claim that bi(Pne) ≥ bi(P
∗)
N for any
player i, where bi(P∗) is the bandwidth of P∗i in the social optimum. Since Pne is an
NE, no player has any incentive to change its path, i.e.,
bi(Pne)≥ bi(P|iP∗i )≥
b(e∗)
N
, (2.2)
where e∗ is a bottleneck of P∗i after player i unilaterally changes its path from Pnei to P
∗
i . The
second inequality follows from the fact that each link can be shared by at most N players.
In the social optimum, we have bi(P∗) ≤ b(e) for any e ∈ P∗i . Plugging it into (2.2), we
proved our claim. Based on the claim, the total utility is
∑i∈U bi(Pne)≥ ∑i∈U bi(P
∗)
N =
b(OPT )
N (2.3)
for any NE, where b(OPT ) is the total bandwidth in the social optimum. Since (2.3) holds
for any NE, we have POA≥ 1N .
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(b) Players’ strategies
Figure 2.3: Example where the POA is 2N .
Lemma 2.3. For the MAXBAR game, POA≤ 2N . 
Proof. We prove this lemma with the help of an example. Figure 2.3 depicts (partly) a
network with N players. In this network, the bandwidth of each link is 1. As shown in
Figure 2.3(a), all the source-destination pairs with odd indices are located counterclockwise
on a ring topology, while those with even indices are located clockwise. The source and
destination for the same player are next to each other. Clearly, there are only two si–ti paths
for each player i with odd index (resp. even index), the clockwise (resp. counterclockwise)
path si-si+1-ti+1-. . .-sN-tN-t1-s1-. . .-ti and the counterclockwise (resp. clockwise) path si-ti.
As shown in Figure 2.3(b), if each player i with odd index chooses the clockwise si–ti path
and each player i with even index chooses the counterclockwise si–ti path, the resulting
strategy profile is an NE with bi(P) = 2N for each player i. Because if any player i deviates
from the current strategy and chooses the clockwise si–ti path, it results in the bandwidth
2
N+2 . The total utility in this NE is 2.
Next, we consider the social optimum, where players with odd indices choose the
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counterclockwise paths and players with even indices choose the clockwise paths. The total
utility is N. Hence the POA of the MAXBAR game is at most 2/N.
2
3
2
4
1 1
s1 v1
v2s2
t1
t2
(a) Social optimum
2
3
2
1 1
s1
v2s2 t2
v1 t14
(b) Nash Equilibrium
Figure 2.4: A social optimum is not necessarily an NE.
Remark 1. Note that the social optimum in Figure 2.3 is also an NE. However, the
example in Figure 2.4 shows that a social optimum is not necessarily an NE.
Remark 2. Efficient algorithms to compute a social optimum are still open. Simple
brute fore algorithms may take exponential time, since the number of s-t paths for a single
player is exponential in the size of the network.
Remark 3. We do not know whether the bounds for the POA are tight. Either prov-
ing the tightness of these bounds or deriving tighter bounds is a topic for future research.
Remark 4. We also studied the MAXBAR game under an undirected model [161].
The POA is proved to be exactly 1N .
2.4.2 Best Response Routing in Max-min Fair Networks
An important step in the MAXBAR game is for a player to decide whether it has any incen-
tive to change its strategy unilaterally. Intuitively, it is natural for the player to unilaterally
change its strategy to one that would give it the maximum utility. However, the utility of
the chosen path depends on other players’ strategies due to the competition among players
sharing links with this chosen path. Obviously, the player can try all its strategies and pick
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the one giving it the maximum utility. However, this may take exponential time as the
number of strategies of the user may not be polynomially bounded.
In this section, we introduce the novel concept of observed available bandwidth
(formally defined later in this section) and prove the following facts: 1) the observed avail-
able bandwidth on all links can be computed in O(Nm+N logN) time; 2) the widest si-ti
path with regard to the observed available bandwidth is a best response routing for player
i. Hence, player i can compute its best response routing in polynomial time. Therefore,
player i has an incentive to change its strategy if and only if the utility corresponding to its
best response strategy is larger than that corresponding to its current strategy. Given the
challenges outlined at the beginning of this section, our results are significant. Although
the facts are seemingly simple, the proofs are quite involved, which are the subjects of the
rest of this section.
?
11
7
3
1Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Player 4
Figure 2.5: Link e with max-min fair bandwidth allocation, where there are three players
before player 4 joins.
To get an intuition for calculating the available bandwidth, we take the link in Fig-
ure 2.5 as an example. In this example, we assume that player i = 4 needs to find a path.
Further assume thatUe(P−i) = {1,2,3} and b(e) = 11. Also, b1(P−i) = 1, b2(P−i) = 3,
and b3(P−i) = 7. After player i joins, it is clear that player 1 would not lose its bandwidth
share, since it has less than the equal share, i.e., b1(P−i) = 1 < 114 . If player i competes
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the bandwidth with players 2 and 3 for the residual bandwidth of 10, each of them gets
bandwidth of 103 . We know before i joins, player 2 only uses bandwidth of 3, which is
less than 103 . Therefore, only i and 3 will compete for the residual bandwidth of 7 and get
bandwidth of 72 each.
To capture the process we conducted above, we introduce the concept of observed
available bandwidth. Assume that all players except i have their paths chosen. Now player
i needs to find a path with maximum bandwidth in the current network. For any link e and
player j ∈Ue(P−i), let
Uˆe(P−i, j) = {k|k ∈Ue(P−i) and bk(P−i)< b j(P−i)}
denote the set of players who are using less bandwidth than player j on link e. Let
U˜e(P−i) = { j| j ∈Ue(P−i) and
b j(P−i)≥
b(e)− ∑
k∈Uˆe(P−i, j)
bk(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− |Uˆe(P−i, j)|+1
}
denote the set of players such that for any player j in this set, the new bandwidth b j(P|i)
is at least as large as the bandwidth of the new path P′i of player i. The observed available
bandwidth bo(e) of link e ∈ E is
bo(e) =
b(e)−∑ j∈Ue(P)\U˜e(P−i) b j(P−i)
|U˜e(P−i)|+1
. (2.4)
If we first sort the paths according to their bandwidth values, then for each link e we can
compute Uˆe(P−i,1),Uˆe(P−i,2), . . . ,Uˆe(P−i,N), and U˜e(P−i) in O(N) additional time.
Thus we can compute bo(e) for all links e ∈ E in O(Nm+N logN) time. Accordingly, the
observed bandwidth of the new path P′i is
boi (P|i) = mine∈P′i bo(e), (2.5)
27
and the set of observed bottlenecks of path P′i is
Boi (P|i) = argmin
e∈P′i
bo(e).
Considering the example in Figure 2.5, we have Uˆe(P−i,1) = /0, Uˆe(P−i,2) =
{1}, and Uˆe(P−i,3) = {1,2}. The set U˜e(P−i) is {3}. Therefore, bo(e) = 11−1−31+1 = 72 .
The properties of the observed available bandwidth are summarized in the following
four lemmas, which will be used in later proofs in the rest of this section.
Lemma 2.4. Assume that j ∈ U˜e(P−i). For all u∈Ue(P−i), bu(P−i)≥ b j(P−i) implies
u ∈ U˜e(P−i). 
Proof. It is obvious that if bu(P−i) = b j(P−i), then u ∈ U˜e(P−i). Next, we prove that if
bu(P−i)> b j(P−i), then u ∈ U˜e(P−i). LetK = Uˆe(P−i,u)\ Uˆe(P−i, j). We have
bu(P−i)−
b(e)−∑k∈Uˆe(P−i,u) bk(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− |Uˆe(P−i,u)|+1
= bu(P−i)−
b(e)− ∑
k∈Uˆe(P−i, j)
bk(P−i)− ∑
k∈K
bk(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− (|Uˆe(P−i, j)|+ |K |)+1
> b j(P−i)−
b(e)− ∑
k∈Uˆe(P−i, j)
bk(P−i)−|K |b j(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− (|Uˆe(P−i, j)|+ |K |)+1
(2.6)
≥ 0, (2.7)
where (2.6) follows from the fact that k∈Ue(P−i)\Uˆe(P−i, j) implies bk(P−i)≥ b j(P−i),
and (2.7) follows from the fact that j ∈ U˜e(P−i). Hence we have u ∈ U˜e(P−i).
Lemma 2.5. If j ∈ U˜e(P−i), then b j(P−i) ≥ bo(e). If j ∈ Ue(P−i) \ U˜e(P−i), then
b j(P−i)< bo(e). 
Proof. Let x be the player whose path has the minimum bandwidth in U˜e(P−i). Thus we
have Uˆe(P−i,x) ⊆ Ue(P−i) \ U˜e(P−i). For all j ∈ Ue(P−i), if b j(P−i) ≥ bx(P−i),
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it follows from Lemma 2.4 that j ∈ U˜e(P−i). Thus we have Uˆe(P−i,x) ⊇ Ue(P−i) \
U˜e(P−i). Therefore Uˆe(P−i,x) =Ue(P−i)\ U˜e(P−i). Since x ∈ U˜e(P−i), we have
bx(P−i) ≥
b(e)− ∑
j∈Uˆe(P−i,x)
b j(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− |Uˆe(P−i,x)|+1
(2.8)
=
b(e)− ∑
j∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
b j(P−i)
|U˜e(P−i)|+1
= bo(e). (2.9)
Therefore bx(P−i) ≥ bo(e). This implies the first part of the lemma, since b j(P−i) ≥
bx(P−i) for any j ∈ U˜e(P−i).
Next, we prove the second part of the lemma. If j 6∈ U˜e(P−i), we know that
b j(P−i)< bx(P−i). Now assume that y is the player whose path has the maximum band-
width in Ue(P−i) \ U˜e(P−i). Then, we have b j(P−i) = by(P−i), ∀ j ∈ Uˆe(P−i,x) \
Uˆe(P−i,y). LetJ = Uˆe(P−i,x)\ Uˆe(P−i,y). We have
by(P−i)−bo(e)
= by(P−i)−
b(e)−∑ j∈Uˆe(P−i,x) b j(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− |Uˆe(P−i,x)|+1
(2.10)
= by(P−i)−
b(e)− ( ∑
j∈Uˆe(P−i,y)
b j(P−i)+ ∑
j∈J
b j(P−i))
|Ue(P−i)|− (|Uˆe(P−i,y)|+ |J |)+1
= by(P−i)−
b(e)−∑ j∈Uˆe(P−i,y) b j(P−i)−|J |by(P−i)
|Ue(P−i)|− (|Uˆe(P−i,y)|+ |J |)+1
< 0, (2.11)
where (2.10) follows from (2.8) and (2.9), (2.11) follows from the fact that y 6∈ U˜e(P−i).
In addition, we know that b j(P−i)≤ by(P−i)< bo(e), ∀ j ∈Ue(P−i)\ U˜e(P−i).
We now prove that the observed available bandwidth defined above accurately cal-
culates the bandwidth on each link in the sense that after we choose a path with the max-
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imum observed bandwidth and reallocate the bandwidth for each path using Algorithm 1,
the new allocated bandwidth of the path is equal to its observed bandwidth.
We use proof by contradiction. The sketch of our proof is as follows. If the new
allocated bandwidth of the path is not equal to its observed bandwidth, two cases may
happen: 1) the path is allocated more bandwidth than the observed bandwidth, or 2) the
path is allocated less bandwidth than the observed bandwidth. For each case, we show that
it will lead to a chain reaction, which results in a contradiction. We analyze two phenomena
that may occur and cause the chain reaction after a player chooses its new path based on the
observed available bandwidth. In Lemma 2.6 (resp. Lemma 2.7), we show that the decrease
(resp. increase) of the bandwidth of one path must be directly related to the increase (resp.
decrease) of that of another path. More importantly, the relation between new bandwidth
values of these two paths satisfies certain rules. In order to facilitate the understanding of
these lemmas, an example is presented in Figure 2.6.
Lemma 2.6. Let P′i be the new si-ti path chosen by player i based on the observed available
bandwidth. We have the following:
1. If bi(P|i)< boi (P|i), then ∃k ∈Ue(P|i)\{i}, such that
1a) bk(P|i)> bk(P−i) and 1b) bk(P|i)≤ bi(P|i),
where e ∈Bi(P|i) is a bottleneck of path P′i .
2. If b j(P|i)< b j(P−i) for some j ∈U , then ∃k ∈Ue(P|i)\{ j}, such that
2a) bk(P|i)> bk(P−i) and 2b) bk(P|i)≤ b j(P|i),
where e ∈B j(P|i) is a bottleneck of path Pj after player i changes its path. 
Proof. We prove 1) and 2) separately:
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We first prove 1). Assume that bi(P|i)< boi (P|i).
By Property 2) of bottleneck, we know that bi(P|i) ≥ b j(P|i), ∀ j ∈ Ue(P|i).
Thus it suffices to prove that ∃k ∈ Ue(P|i) \ {i}, such that 1a) holds. We prove this by
contradiction. Assume that b j(P|i)≤ b j(P−i), ∀ j ∈Ue(P|i)\{i}. The total bandwidth
usage on link e in b(P|i) is
∑ j∈Ue(P|i) b j(P|i)
= bi(P|i)+ ∑
j∈U˜e(P−i)
b j(P|i)+ ∑
j∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
b j(P|i)
≤ (|U˜e(P−i)|+1)bi(P|i)+ ∑
j∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
b j(P|i) (2.12)
< (|U˜e(P−i)|+1)boi (P|i)+ ∑
j∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
b j(P−i) (2.13)
≤ b(e), (2.14)
where (2.12) follows from Property 2) of bottleneck, (2.13) follows from the condition
bi(P|i)< boi (P|i) and the assumption b j(P|i)≤ b j(P−i), and (2.14) follows from (2.5)
and (2.4). This contradicts the fact that e∈Bi(P′i ), because e should be saturated in b(P|i)
according to Property 1) of bottleneck. This completes the proof of 1).
We now prove 2). Assume that b j(P|i)< b j(P−i).
By Property 2) of bottleneck, we know that b j(P|i) ≥ bk(P|i), ∀k ∈ Ue(P|i).
Thus it suffices to prove that ∃k ∈ Ue(P|i) \ { j} such that 2a) holds. The condition
b j(P|i) < b j(P−i) implies that i 6= j. If i ∈ Ue(P|i), we can take k = i and bi(P|i) >
0 = bi(P−i). Next, we consider the case where i 6∈Ue(P|i). We prove 2a) by contradic-
tion. Assume that bk(P|i)≤ bk(P−i), ∀k ∈Ue(P|i)\{ j}. Note that i 6∈Ue(P|i) implies
Ue(P−i) =Ue(P|i). The total bandwidth usage on e in b(P|i) is
b j(P|i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P|i)\{ j}
bk(P|i)< b j(P−i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P−i)\{ j}
bk(P−i)≤ b(e),
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where the first inequality follows from b j(P|i)< b j(P−i) and the assumption bk(P|i)≤
bk(P−i), ∀k ∈ Ue(P|i) \ { j}, and the second inequality follows from the feasibility of
b(P−i). This contradicts the fact that e ∈B j(P|i). Therefore, 2) holds.
We have finished the proof of this lemma.
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Figure 2.6: Example for Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7.
Figure 2.6 illustrates Part 2) of Lemma 2.6 with i = k = 2 and j = 1. From Fig-
ure 2.6(a), we observe that b1(P−2) = 5. From Figure 2.6(b), we observe that b1(P|2) = 4
and b2(P|2) = 4. We note that the bandwidth of player 1 (red solid) decreases from 5
to 4 and the bandwidth player 2 (blue dotted) increases from 0 to 4. We also note that
b2(P|2)≤ b1(P|2).
Lemma 2.7. Let P′i be the new si-ti path chosen by player i based on the observed available
bandwidth. We have the following:
1. If bi(P|i)> boi (P|i), then ∃k ∈Ue(P|i)\{i}, such that
1a) bk(P|i)< bk(P−i) and 1b) bk(P|i)< bi(P|i),
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where e ∈Boi (P|i) is an observed bottleneck of path P′i .
2. If b j(P|i)> b j(P−i), then ∃k ∈Ue(P−i)\{ j}, such that
2a) bk(P|i)< bk(P−i) and 2b) bk(P|i)< b j(P|i),
where e ∈ B j(P−i) is a bottleneck of path Pj when player i’s path is not in the
network. 
Proof. We prove Part 1) and 2) separately:
We first prove 1). Assume that bi(P|i)> boi (P|i).
We prove 1) by contradiction. Assuming to the contrary that bk(P|i) ≥ bk(P−i)
or bk(P|i)≥ bi(P|i), ∀k ∈Ue(P|i)\{i}, we have the following two claims:
Claim 1: For all k ∈ U˜e(P−i), we have bk(P|i)≥ boi (P|i).
When bk(P|i)≥ bk(P−i) is true, we have
bk(P|i)≥ bk(P−i)≥ bo(e) = boi (P|i),
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.5 and the equality follows from the
fact that e ∈Boi (P|i). When bk(P|i) ≥ bi(P|i) is true, we have bk(P|i) ≥ bi(P|i) >
boi (P|i), due to the condition bi(P|i)> boi (P|i).
Claim 2: For all k ∈Ue(P−i)\ U˜e(P−i), we have bk(P|i)≥ bk(P−i).
Let k be any player in Ue(P−i) \ U˜e(P−i). We need to prove that bk(P|i) ≥
bk(P−i). According to the contrary assumption at the beginning of this proof, we only
need to prove for the case where bk(P|i)≥ bi(P|i) is true. In this case, we have
bk(P|i)≥ bi(P|i)> boi (P|i) = bo(e)> bk(P−i),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.5.
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Note thatUe(P|i)=Ue(P−i)∪{i}. The total bandwidth usage on link e in b(P|i)
is
∑
k∈Ue(P|i)
bk(P|i) (2.15)
= bi(P|i)+ ∑
k∈U˜e(P−i)
bk(P|i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
bk(P|i)
> (|U˜e(P−i)|+1)boi (P|i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
bk(P−i) (2.16)
= (|U˜e(P−i)|+1)bo(e)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P−i)\U˜e(P−i)
bk(P−i)
= b(e), (2.17)
where (2.16) follows from the condition of 1) and the two claims, and (2.17) follows from
(2.4). This contradicts the feasibility of b(P|i). Thus we have proved 1).
We now prove 2). Assume that b j(P|i)> b j(P−i).
We prove 2) by contradiction. Assume to the contrary that bk(P|i) ≥ bk(P−i) or
bk(P|i)≥ b j(P|i), ∀k ∈Ue(P−i)\{ j}. When bk(P|i)≥ b j(P|i) is true, we have
bk(P|i)≥ b j(P|i)> b j(P−i)≥ bk(P−i),
where we used the condition of 2) and the fact that e∈B j(P−i). Thus we have bk(P|i)≥
bk(P−i), ∀k ∈ Ue(P−i) \ { j}. Then, considering the fact that Ue(P−i) ⊆ Ue(P|i), the
total bandwidth usage on link e in b(P|i) is
b j(P|i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P|i)\{ j}
bk(P|i)> b j(P−i)+ ∑
k∈Ue(P−i)\{ j}
bk(P−i) = b(e),
where the equality follows from the fact that e ∈B j(P−i). This violates the feasibility of
b(P|i). We have proved 2).
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Figure 2.6 illustrates Part 2) of Lemma 2.7 with i = 2, j = 3, and k = 1. From
Figure 2.6(a), we observe that b3(P−2) = 5 and b1(P−2) = 5. From Figure 2.6(b), we
observe that b3(P|2) = 6 and b1(P|2) = 4. We note that the bandwidth of player 3 (green
dashed) increases from 5 to 6, but the bandwidth of player 1 (red solid) decreases from 5
to 4. We also note that b1(P|2)< b3(P|2).
Based on Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7, we prove in the following an important the-
orem, which states that the bandwidth of the new path is equal to its observed bandwidth.
Theorem 2.3. Let P′i be the new si-ti path chosen by player i based on the observed avail-
able bandwidth. Then bi(P|i) = boi (P|i). 
Proof. First, we prove that bi(P|i) ≥ boi (P|i). To the contrary, assume that bi(P|i) <
boi (P|i). We will derive a contradiction. By Part 1) of Lemma 2.6, we know that
∃ j,s.t.,b j(P|i)> b j(P−i) and b j(P|i)≤ bi(P|i). (2.18)
By the first inequality of (2.18) and Part 2) of Lemma 2.7, we know that
∃k,s.t.,bk(P|i)< bk(P−i) and bk(P|i)< b j(P|i). (2.19)
By the first inequality of (2.19) and Part 2) of Lemma 2.6, we know that
∃ j1,s.t.,b j1(P|i)> b j1(P−i) and b j1(P|i)≤ bk(P|i). (2.20)
By the first inequality of (2.20) and Part 2) of Lemma 2.7, we know that
∃k1,s.t.,bk1(P|i)< bk1(P−i) and bk1(P|i)< b j1(P|i). (2.21)
Repeating (2.20) and (2.21), we obtain a sequence i, k, k1, k2, . . ., such that bi(P|i)>
bk(P|i)> bk1(P|i)> bk2(P|i)> · · · . Since the number of users is finite, there must be a
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user that is repeated an infinite number of times in the above sequence of users. This is a
contradiction, since the corresponding sequence of bandwidth values is strictly decreasing.
This contradiction proves that bi(P|i)≥ boi (P|i).
Using a similar logic, we can prove that bi(P|i) ≤ boi (P|i). This implies that
bi(P|i) = boi (P|i).
Remark 5. As a direct consequence of Theorem 2.3, player i has an incentive to
change its strategy if and only if boi (P|i) > bi(P). Also, P′i is the best response strategy
for player i.
2.4.3 Converging to Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we present a game based algorithm, listed in Algorithm 2, to compute an
NE of the MAXBAR game. The idea of the algorithm is as follows. In the initialization
stage (Line 2), each player i chooses an initial si–ti path regardless of the paths of other
players. Without loss of generality, each player chooses a path with maximum bandwidth
using an algorithm denoted by WP(G,si, ti,b). Then Algorithm 2 proceeds in a round-robin
fashion. At every stage, there can be only one player changing its path. Such assumption
is common in game theory and essential to avoid oscillation.
When a player plans to change its path, it follows the following steps:
1. Compute its current bandwidth (Line 5).
2. Calculates the observed available bandwidth for each link in the resulting network
(Lines 6 and 7).
3. Finds a path with the maximum observed bandwidth (Line 8).
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4. If the observed bandwidth of the new path is greater than its current bandwidth, it
switches to the new path; otherwise, it keeps the same path (Line 9).
The process stops when no player can improve its bandwidth by changing to another path.
Algorithm 2: Game Based Algorithm
input : Network G(V,E,b) and set U of players {1, . . . ,N}
output: A Nash EquilibriumP
1 P ← /0;
2 Pi←WP(G,si, ti,b),P ←P ∪{Pi}, ∀i ∈U ;
3 repeat
4 foreach player i ∈U do
5 (b1(P), . . . ,bN(P))←ComB(G,b,P,U );
6 (b1(P−i), . . . ,bN(P−i))←ComB(G,b,P−i,U );
7 Compute bo(e) for all e ∈ E using (2.4);
8 P′i ←WP(G,si, ti,bo);
9 if bo(P′i )> bi(P) thenP ←P|iP′i ;
10 end
11 until there is no path changed;
12 returnP;
In Algorithm 2, WP(G,si, ti,b) returns a path with maximum bandwidth from si to
ti in graph G with bandwidth function b. The basic idea of Algorithm 2 is as follows. First
(Line 2), each player i chooses an initial si–ti path regardless of other players. Next, in a
round-robin fashion (Lines 3-11), each player changes its path to improve its utility, when
possible. This is referred to as the best-response move in [106]. The process stops when
no player can improve its bandwidth by changing to another path.
The correctness and an upper on the convergence speed of Algorithm 2 are captured
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4. For every instance of the MAXBAR game, Algorithm 2 converges to a setP
of paths in O((Nm+n logn+N logN)(Nm)N) time, where N is the number of players, m is
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the number of links, and n is the number of nodes. Moreover,P is an NE of the MAXBAR
game. 
To prove this theorem, we need the following lemma, which shows an important
property of the global bottleneck.
Lemma 2.8. LetP be a path set of the users and b(P) be the corresponding MFBA. Let
e¯ be a global bottleneck. We then have b j(P) =
b(e¯)
|Ue¯(P)| , ∀ j ∈Ue¯(P). 
Proof. First, we claim that for any e ∈Bi(P) for some i, we have bi(P)≥ b(e)|Ue(P)| . Con-
sidering both Properties 1) and 2) of bottleneck e, we have
b(e) = ∑
j∈Ue(P)
b j(P)≤ |Ue(P)| ·bi(P).
Thus the claim is proved. Based on this claim and the fact that e¯ is a global bottleneck, we
have
b j(P)≥ b(e¯)|Ue¯(P)| ,∀ j ∈Ue¯(P). (2.22)
Assume that ∃k ∈ Ue¯(P) such that bk(P) > b(e¯)|Ue¯(P)| . The total bandwidth usage on e¯ is
∑ j∈Ue¯(P) b j(P)> b(e¯), contradicting the feasibility of b(P). Hence we have proved that
b j(P) =
b(e¯)
|Ue¯(P)| , ∀ j ∈Ue¯(P).
Proof of Theorem 2.4: By Lemma 2.1, we conclude that every time a player
changes its path, the ordering~bl increases lexicographically. Now we prove an upper bound
on the number of times the ordering can increase. By Lemma 2.8, we know that a global
bottleneck must be equally shared by all paths using it. As a result, the number of different
possible values of b1 is bounded by O(Nm). For each possible value of b1, there are at most
N players whose paths correspond to this value. If the value of b1 and the corresponding
path Pi stay the same, the number of different possible values of b2 is O(Nm). The reason
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is that we can subtract b1 from the bandwidth of each link along Pi, and remove i from the
player set. This resulting graph is a smaller instance and all the lemmas still hold. Re-
peating this analysis for all the coordinates, we conclude that the number of times that the
lexicographic ordering can increase is bounded by O((Nm)N). The time complexity of Al-
gorithm 1 is O(Nm). Recall that computing bo(e) for all e∈ E takes O(Nm+N logN) time.
In addition, the time complexity of WP(G,b,P) is O(m+n logn) by using a variant of Di-
jkstra’s shortest path algorithm [36, 44]. Therefore the time complexity of Algorithm 2 is
O((Nm+ n logn+N logN)(Nm)N). By Theorem 2.3, the returned P is an NE, since no
player can improve its utility by changing its path unilaterally.
Remark 6. Our extensive simulations in Section 2.5 show that the MAXBAR
game converges to an NE within 10 iterations. This indicates that our theoretical bound
O((Nm)N) on the number of iterations is quite conservative.
Remark 7. As shown in the example in Section 2.4, there could be more than
one NE. If the initial set of strategies were different from the one computed in Line 2 of
Algorithm 2, Lines 3–12 may lead to a different NE. However, Lines 3–12 of the algorithm
will always lead to some NE.
Remark 8. In our algorithm, we require that only one player can change its path
each time. This is essential to the convergence of the algorithm. We use an example to
show that oscillation may occur when this requirement is violated. As shown in Figure 2.7,
assume that player 1’s path is s1-v1-v2-v3-t1 and player 2’s path is s2-v1-v2-v3-t2 at certain
point of the game. If the players are allowed to change their paths simultaneously, player
1 and player 2 would change their paths to s1-v1-v4-v3-t1 and s2-v1-v4-v3-t2, respectively.
Because both of them expect that they can increase their bandwidth from 1 to 2. Since
two players change their paths simultaneously, the allocated bandwidth for each player is
actually 1.5. Now both players would change their paths back to the previous ones because
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they expect to increase their bandwidth from 1.5 to 2. Therefore the network will oscillate
between Figure 2.7(a) and Figure 2.7(b) if simultaneous path change is allowed.
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Figure 2.7: Oscillation when simultaneous path change is allowed
One way to enforce the users in the network to follow the game course is to use a
token-based protocol, where a token is circulated among the users in a round-robin fashion–
only the user with the token has the opportunity to change its path. This token-based
protocol can guarantee the convergence of Algorithm 2. A distributed implementation
of ComB(G,b,P,U ) were proposed by [19, 69]. The information needed by (2.4) to
compute the observed available bandwidth is sent to each user by the link-state algorithm
for determining the new path.
2.5 Generalization of MAXBAR
We have studied the MAXBAR problem where users have infinite bandwidth de-
mand. In this section, we generalize the MAXBAR problem and consider the case where
each user has a bandwidth demand of γi > 0. We denote this generalized problem as
MAXBARγ . The difference between the MAXBARγ problem and the MAXBAR problem
is that we need to consider user’s bandwidth demand while allocating bandwidth. Each
user i will only use up to γi bandwidth and is not interested in switching to a path with
more bandwidth as long as its bandwidth demand is met. The MAXBAR problem is a
special case of the MAXBARγ problem, as we can consider that γi = ∞ in the MAXBAR
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problem. It is seemingly necessary for us to redesign the ComB algorithm, and analyze
the existence of NEs and convergence of routing again. However, we will show that we
can transform any instance of the MAXBARγ problem to a corresponding instance of the
MAXBAR problem, and study the MAXBAR problem using the algorithms and analysis
in previous sections.
Let Iγ = ((V,E,b),U ,γ) be an instance of the MAXBARγ problem, where G =
(V,E,b) is the edge-weighted graph for the network. We build a corresponding instance
I = ((V ′,E ′,b′),U ′) of the MAXBAR problem (where G′ = (V ′,E ′,b′) is the edge-
weighted graph for the corresponding network) as follows. Corresponding to each node
v ∈V , V ′ contains a node v. Corresponding to each link (v,w) ∈ E, E ′ contains a link (v,w)
and b′(v,w) = b(v,w). Corresponding to each source si ∈V , V ′ contains an additional node
s′i and E ′ contains an additional link (s′i,si) with bandwidth b′(s′i,si) = γi. Corresponding
to each user i ∈U , U ′ contains a user i, who needs to transmit packets from s′i to ti in G′.
Figure 2.8 illustrates this transformation.
si
··· 
sisi
··· 
Figure 2.8: Transforming an instance of the MAXBARγ problem to a corresponding in-
stance of the MAXBAR problem
Note that although we allow users to have as much bandwidth as possible in the
MAXBAR problem, the special link (s′i,si) ensures that user i will only compete for band-
width up to the demand γi. It is clear that the MFBA for Iγ can be obtained by computing
the MFBA for I . Therefore all the lemmas and theorems for the MAXBAR problem still
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hold for the MAXBARγ problem.
2.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance and verify the convergence analysis of
Algorithm 2 (denoted as GBA) on network topologies generated by BRITE [15].
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Figure 2.9: Total bandwidth
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Figure 2.10: Disparity ratio
Simulation Setup
We compared GBA with two other routing algorithms. In the first algorithm, each
user acts independently and attempts to maximize its bandwidth as much as possible. We
denote this algorithm by IMA (Independent Maximization Algorithm). In the second al-
gorithm, the bandwidth allocation for the users is done sequentially. A user is chosen
randomly from the set of users that have not been allocated bandwidth. It then chooses
a widest path in the residual network, and has a bandwidth equal to that of the chosen
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Figure 2.11: Convergence speed. For (a) and (c), n = 120 and N = 100. For (b) and (d),
n = 120 and µ = 4.
path. This procedure is repeated until all users are considered for bandwidth allocation.
This technique is similar to the Resource reSerVation Protocol (RSVP) [119], with the dif-
ference being that each user is allocated the maximum possible bandwidth in the residual
network. We denote this scheme by SRA (Sequential Reservation Algorithm).
BRITE [15] is a widely used Internet topology generator. We used the Waxman
model [145] with default values for α = 0.15 and β = 0.2. According to the Waxman
model, if dvw denotes the Euclidean distance between two nodes v and w, the probability
of having a directed link (v,w) from v to w is given by β × exp
(
dvw
α·L
)
, where L is the
maximum distance between two nodes. The nodes of the graph were deployed randomly in
a square region of size 1000×1000 m2. We varied the number of nodes n from 40 to 320
with increment of 40 and set the number of links to m= µn, where µ is the link density and
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was varied from 3 to 8. We varied the number of users N from 100 to 200 with increment
of 20. For each network size, we used BRITE to generate different network topologies,
where the link bandwidth was drawn from a uniform distribution in the range [1,10]. For
each setting, we randomly generated 100 test cases and averaged the results.
Performance Metrics:
• Total bandwidth: the sum of the bandwidth of all users.
• Bandwidth disparity ratio: the ratio of the highest bandwidth over the lowest band-
width among the users.
• Convergence speed: the number of the round-robin iterations (Lines 3–11 in Algo-
rithm 2) or the number of path changes (Line 9 in Algorithm 2).
Results Analysis
Total Bandwidth: Figure 2.9 shows the total bandwidth obtained by SRA, IMA
and GBA. We observe that GBA always outperforms IMA. This is as expected, because
IMA uses less information in decision making. SRA and GBA have similar performance,
because some users can reserve most of the bandwidth resources in SRA. We also notice
that the total bandwidth in Figure 2.9(c) increases first and almost remains the same after
n = 240. This is because the bandwidth of some users has reached the maximum value at
n = 240.
Disparity Ratio: Figure 2.10 shows the bandwidth disparity ratio obtained by SRA,
IMA and GBA. We observe that GBA is the fairest. SRA has the worst disparity ratio with
the value of ∞ for all settings. This is because some users will be blocked and have zero
bandwidth in SRA, as other users have reserved all the bandwidth on the links connecting
their sources and destinations. We also see that the disparity ratios of IMA and GBA
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are independent of n, as shown in Figure 2.10(c), but decrease when the user density, Nm ,
becomes lower, as shown in Figure 2.10(a) and Figure 2.10(b). The reason is that when
the user density is low, users have a low probability of sharing common links and hence
competing the bandwidth. These results are not unexpected, as SRA and IMA are not
designed to achieve small disparity ratios.
Convergence Speed: Figure 2.11(a) and Figure 2.11(b) show the number of itera-
tions before GBA converges. We observe that the number of iterations is within 10 in all
cases. Figure 2.11(c) and Figure 2.11(d) show the number of path changes before GBA con-
verges. The theoretical bound on the number of path changes is O((Nm)N) in Theorem 2.4.
However, as we can see, the number of path changes in the simulations is significantly less
than the theoretical bound. Another observation is that GBA converges slower when the
link density µ is high, as shown in Figure 2.11(c). The reason is that when each node has
more links, a user is highly likely to find a path with higher bandwidth if the current path
results in low bandwidth, due to the competition from newly joined paths. According to
Theorem 2.4, the number of path changes is independent of n. Our simulation results also
confirm this proof and thus are omitted due to the space limitations.
To summarize, extensive simulations show that our algorithm converges to an NE
rapidly and achieves very good fairness as well as total bandwidth.
2.7 Conclusions
In this work, we formulated the problem of routing in networks with max-min fair
bandwidth allocation as a non-cooperative game, where each user aims to maximize its own
bandwidth. We proved the existence of Nash Equilibria, where no user has any incentive
to unilaterally change its path. We derived both a lower bound and an upper bound of the
system degradation, due to the selfish behavior of users. Finding a path with maximum
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bandwidth in the max-min fair network is both a key step for our main analysis and of
independent interest. To this end, we introduced a novel concept of observed available
bandwidth to accurately predict the available bandwidth on each link. We next presented
a game based algorithm to compute an NE and proved that the network converges to an
NE if all users follow the natural game course. Note that the theoretical convergence speed
proved in this work does not change even when an approximate Nash Equilibrium [31] is
considered. Deriving a tighter bound on the time complexity of the convergence speed is
a future research direction. Through extensive simulations, we showed that the network
can converge to an NE within 10 iterations and also achieve better fairness compared with
other algorithms.
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Chapter 3
HERA: An Optimal Relay Assignment Scheme for Cooperative Networks
Through cooperative relaying from wireless devices (generally called relay nodes), cooper-
ative communication (CC) [83] has been shown to have the potential to increase the channel
capacity between two wireless devices. The essence of CC is to exploit the nature of broad-
cast and the relaying capability of other nodes to achieve spatial diversity. Two primary CC
modes have been commonly used, Amplify-and-Forward (AF) and Decode-and-Forward
(DF) [83], depending on how the relay node processes the received signal and transmits to
the destination. Because an improper choice of the relay node for a source-destination pair
can result in an even smaller capacity than that under direct transmission, the assignment
of relay nodes plays a critical role in the performance of CC [12, 17, 37, 127, 168].
3.1 Introduction
In this work, we consider the following scenario. In a wireless network, there are a
number of source nodes and corresponding destination nodes. Other wireless devices can
function as relay nodes. We are interested in designing a relay assignment scheme, such
that the total capacity under the assignment is maximized.
We call the network with CC the cooperative network. Designing a relay assign-
ment scheme for cooperative networks is very challenging for the following reasons.
• System Performance: A relay assignment scheme should provide a relay assignment
algorithm, which appropriately assigns relay nodes to source nodes such that the
system capacity is maximized. The system capacity is the sum of the capacity of all
source nodes.
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• Selfish Behavior: Usually, wireless devices in cooperative networks are not owned
by a single entity, but by many profit-maximizing independent entities. Therefore,
even if an optimal relay assignment algorithm is developed, an individual source
node may not want to follow the assignment, given the fact that it can improve its
own capacity by selecting a different relay node. This selfish behavior can result in
system performance degradation.
• Potential Cheating: As to relay nodes, most of the protocols in cooperative networks
assume that all the wireless devices are cooperative, and in particular willing to par-
ticipate in cooperative communications as relay nodes. However, the voluntary coop-
erativeness assumption may not be true in reality as relaying data for other network
nodes can consume energy and other resources of the relay node. A naive solution
is to make payments to the participating relay nodes as an incentive. The question
arising from this naive solution is how much a relay node should be paid for helping
with the cooperative communication. A simple payment mechanism is vulnerable to
the dishonest behavior of relay nodes, in the sense that a relay node can profit from
lying about its true relaying capability, e.g. transmission power.
In this work, we design an integrated optimal relay assignment scheme for cooper-
ative networks, called HERA, named after the Goddess of Marriage in Greek Mythology.
To the best of our knowledge, HERA is the first relay assignment scheme for coopera-
tive networks, which considers both selfish and cheating behavior of network entities while
guaranteeing socially optimal system performance. HERA is composed of three com-
ponents: 1) an optimal relay assignment algorithm, 2) a payment mechanism for source
nodes, and 3) a payment mechanism for relay nodes. HERA is a centralized scheme,
where a system administrator is responsible for collecting the payment from the source
nodes and paying the relay nodes.
48
HERA provides the following key features:
• HERA guarantees to find a relay assignment for the source nodes, such that the total
capacity is maximized. The system model considered in this paper allows a relay
node to be shared by multiple source nodes. Hence it is more general compared
with the model in [127], where each relay node is restricted to be assigned to only
one source node. Our assignment algorithm works regardless of which CC mode is
used in the network. It is also independent of the relation between the number of
source nodes and that of the relay nodes. In addition, our algorithm can guarantee
that the achieved capacity of each source node under the assignment is no less than
that achieved by direct transmission.
• HERA provides a payment mechanism to charge source nodes for using relaying
service from the relay nodes. To cope with the selfish behavior of source nodes, our
payment mechanism is designed in a way such that the system possesses a Strictly
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (SDSE), where each selfish source node plays the
strategy that brings the maximum utility regardless of others’ strategies. Further-
more, the SDSE achieves the socially optimal system capacity.
• HERA also provides a payment mechanism to pay relay nodes for providing re-
laying service. To prevent relay nodes from lying about their relaying ability (e.g.
transmission power) to gain profits, the payment mechanism uses a VCG-based pay-
ment formula to calculate the payment. Under this payment mechanism, reporting
true relaying ability is the dominant strategy for each relay node. In other words,
the relay node can maximize its payment received from the system administrator by
reporting its true relaying ability.
• Finally, from the perspective of the system administrator, HERA assures that the
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system administrator will not run the system with any loss. In other words, the total
payment collected from source nodes is at least as much as the total payment paid to
relay nodes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we give a brief
review of the related work in the literature. In Section 3.3, we describe the system model
considered in this paper. In Section 3.4, we present a polynomial time optimal algorithm to
solve the relay assignment problem, study the selfish behavior of source nodes and design
a payment mechanism to charge source nodes for using relaying service, and consider the
potential cheating relay nodes in the system, design another payment mechanism to pay
relay nodes for providing relaying service and prove the desired properties of the designed
mechanism. We present our extensive experimental results in Section 3.5. We conclude
this paper in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
In [12], Bletsas et al. proposed a novel scheme to select the best relay node for
a single source node from a set of available relays. However, this cannot be extended to a
network consisting multiple source nodes, which is the model studied in this work.
Some efforts have been made on the relay assignment or relay selection problem
in cooperative networks. In [17], Cai et al. studied the problem of relay selection and
power allocation for AF wireless relay networks. They first considered a simple network
with only one source node, and then extended it to the multiple-source case. The proposed
algorithm is an effective heuristic, but offers no performance guarantee. Xu et al. [152]
studied a similar problem with a different objective, which is to minimize the total power
consumption of the network. In [109], Ng and Yu jointly considered the relay node se-
lection, cooperative communication and resource allocation for utility maximization in a
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cellular network. However, the algorithm is heuristic and not polynomial, as pointed out
by Sharma et al. [127].
In [127], Sharma et al. studied the relay assignment problem in a network environ-
ment, such that the minimum capacity among all source nodes is maximized. Following
this work, Zhang et al. [167] considered the relay assignment problem with interference
mitigation. In both models in [127] and [167], a relay node is restricted to be assigned to
at most one source node. In contrast, our model is more general in the sense that it allows
multiple source nodes to share the same relay node. In addition, different from [127], our
objective is to maximize the total capacity of all pairs. Although Zhang et al. [167] had
the same objective as ours, they only provided a heuristic algorithm.
There are few studies on the scheme design for cooperative communications in
the networking literature, among which the works in [66, 128, 141, 157] are most related
to our work. In [128], Shastry and Adve proposed a pricing-based system to stimulate
the cooperation via payment to the relay nodes. The goal in their scheme is to ensure
both the access point and the relay nodes benefit from cooperation. In [141], Wang et al.
employed a buyer/seller Stackelberg game, where a single buyer tries to buy services from
multiple relays. The buyer announces its selection of relays and the required transmission
power, then the relays ask proper prices to maximize their profits. In [66], Huang et al.
proposed two auction mechanisms, which are essentially repeated games. In each auction
mechanism, each user iteratively updates its bid to maximize its own utility function with
the knowledge of others’ previous bids. With a common drawback, none of the above works
guarantees the optimal system capacity or considers truthfulness of relay nodes. In [157],
Yang et al. designed a truthful auction scheme for cooperative communications, which
satisfies truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance properties. Similarly, the
scheme cannot guarantee the optimal system capacity.
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3.3 System Model
We consider a static wireless network. There is a set S = {s1,s2, · · · ,sn} of n
source nodes and a set D = {d1,d2, · · · ,dn} of corresponding destination nodes, where si
transmits to di. Other nodes in the network function as relay nodes. We assume that there is
a collectionR = {r1,r2, . . . ,rm} of m relay nodes. As in [127], we assume that orthogonal
channels are available in the network (e.g. using OFDMA) to mitigate interference. We
further assume that each node is equipped with a single transceiver and can either transmit
or receive at a time. Let Psi denote the transmission power of source node si and P
r
j denote
the transmission power of relay node r j. Let Ps = (Ps1 ,P
s
2 , . . . ,P
s
n) and P
r = (Pr1 ,P
r
2 , . . . ,P
r
m).
When node u transmits a signal to node v with power Pu, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at
node v, denoted as SNRuv, is SNRuv = PuN0·||u,v||α , where N0 is the abient noise, ||u,v|| is the
Euclidean distance between u and v, and α is the path loss exponent which is between 2
and 4 in general.
For the transmission model, we assume that each source node has an option to use
cooperative communication (CC) with the help of a relay node. A recent work by Zhao et
al. [168] showed that it is sufficient for a source node to choose the best relay node even
when multiple relay nodes are available to achieve full diversity. Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that each source node will either transmit directly or use CC with the help of
only one relay node. When source node s transmits to destination node d directly, the
achievable capacity is cDT (s,d) = W log2(1+ SNRsd), where W is the bandwidth of the
channel. There are two different CC modes, Amplify-and-Forward (AF) and Decode-and-
Forward (DF) [83]. Let r denote the relay node and Pr be the transmission power of r. The
achievable capacity from s to d under the AF mode is
cAF(s,r,d) =
W
2
log2
(
1+SNRsd +
SNRsr ·SNRrd
SNRsr +SNRrd +1
)
.
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The achievable capacity from s to d under the DF mode is
cDF(s,r,d) =
W
2
min{log2(1+SNRsr), log2(1+SNRsd +SNRrd)}.
Note that, for given s and d, both cAF and cDF are functions of Pr, ||s,r|| and ||r,d||.
Thus whether a source node can obtain larger capacity by using CC than it can by trans-
mitting directly depends on the relay node assigned. The scheme designed in this work is
independent of the CC mode. We use cR to denote the achievable capacity under CC. Let
S¯ =S ∪{s0} and R¯ =R ∪{r0}, where s0 is a virtual source node and r0 is a virtual re-
lay node. LetA = {(s1,r j1),(s2,r j2), . . . ,(sn,r jn)} ⊆S ×R¯ denote a relay assignment. If
(si,r j)∈A , relay node r j is assigned to source node si under assignmentA . If (si,r0)∈A ,
si transmits to di directly under the relay assignment A . Note that it is possible to have
(si,r j),(sk,r j) ∈ A , for si 6= sk. This is a major difference between our model and the
model in [127], where a relay node is assigned to at most one source node. Since we do
not enforce such constraints, our model is more general.
r
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d1 d2
(a)
r
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Figure 3.1: Multi-source cooperative communication
Now let us consider the case where the same relay node is assigned to multiple
source nodes. In this case, we use S j to denote the set of source nodes being assigned r j,
i.e.,S j = {si|(si,r j) ∈A }. Note thatS j is dependent on relay assignmentA . We assume
that r j equally provides service to all the source nodes employing it. This can be achieved
for example by using a reservation-based TDMA scheduling. The relay node serves each
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source node in a round-robin fashion. Each frame is dedicated to a single source node for
CC. Each source node gets served every n j frames, where n j = |S j|. Therefore, the average
achievable capacity for each source node si ∈S j is cR(si,r j,P
r
j ,di)
n j
. Let c(si,r j,A ,Pr) denote
the achievable capacity of si under relay assignment A , where (si,r j) ∈A . Hereafter we
also omit di in the capacity expression. Thus we have
c(si,r j,A ,Pr) =

cR(si,r j,Prj )
n j
, if r j 6= r0,
cDT (si), if r j = r0.
In the expressions above, we take Pr (or Prj ) as a parameter, because a relay node may
lie about its transmission power. We will explain it in detail later. We define the system
capacity, denoted by C(S ,R,A ,Pr), corresponding to relay assignmentA and transmis-
sion power Pr, as the total capacity of all the source nodes in S , i.e., C(S ,R,A ,Pr) =
∑si∈S ,(si,r j)∈A c(si,r j,A ,P
r).
The ultimate goal in the design of the relay assignment scheme can be defined as
the following optimization problem.
Definition 3.1. (Relay Assignment Problem (RAP)): Given S , D , R, and Pr, the Relay
Assignment Problem seeks for a relay assignment A such that C(S ,R,A ,Pr) is maxi-
mized among all possible relay assignments. 
RAP is different from the problem studied in [127], whose objective is to maxi-
mize the minimum capacity among all source nodes. Let A ∗(S ,D ,R,Pr) be the opti-
mal solution to RAP. For notational simplicity, we use A ∗ to denote A ∗(S ,D ,R,Pr)
and C to denote C(S ,R,A ,Pr) when the context is clear. Correspondingly, C∗ denotes
C(S ,R,A ∗,Pr).
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3.4 Design of HERA
In this section, we design an integrated optimal relay assignment scheme for coop-
erative networks, called HERA, named after the Goddess of Marriage in Greek Mythology.
To the best of our knowledge, HERA is the first relay assignment scheme for coopera-
tive networks, which considers both selfish and cheating behavior of network entities
while guaranteeing socially optimal system performance. HERA is composed of three
components: 1) an optimal relay assignment algorithm, 2) a payment mechanism for source
nodes, and 3) a payment mechanism for relay nodes. HERA is a centralized scheme, where
a system administrator is responsible for collecting the payment from the source nodes and
paying the relay nodes. HERA provides the following key features:
• HERA guarantees to find a relay assignment for the source nodes, such that the total
capacity is maximized. The system model considered in this work allows a relay
node to be shared by multiple source nodes. Hence it is more general compared
with the model in [127], where each relay node is restricted to be assigned to only
one source node. Our assignment algorithm works regardless of which CC mode is
used in the network. It is also independent of the relation between the number of
source nodes and that of the relay nodes. In addition, our algorithm can guarantee
that the achieved capacity of each source node under the assignment is no less than
that achieved by direct transmission.
• HERA provides a payment mechanism to charge source nodes for using relaying
service from the relay nodes. To cope with the selfish behavior of source nodes, our
payment mechanism is designed in a way such that the system possesses a Strictly
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (SDSE), where each selfish source node plays the
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strategy that brings the maximum utility regardless of others’ strategies. Further-
more, the SDSE achieves the socially optimal system capacity.
• HERA also provides a payment mechanism to pay relay nodes for providing re-
laying service. To prevent relay nodes from lying about their relaying ability (e.g.
transmission power) to gain profits, the payment mechanism uses a VCG-based pay-
ment formula to calculate the payment. Under this payment mechanism, reporting
true relaying ability is the dominant strategy for each relay node. In other words,
the relay node can maximize its payment received from the system administrator by
reporting its true relaying ability.
• Finally, from the perspective of the system administrator, HERA assures that the
system administrator will not run the system with any loss. In other words, the total
payment collected from source nodes is at least as much as the total payment paid to
relay nodes.
Due to the possibility of sharing a common relay node among multiple source
nodes, solving RAP becomes a challenging task. Nonetheless, we can design a polyno-
mial time optimal algorithm to solve RAP by exploiting some special properties of the
problem.
3.4.1 Optimal Relay Assignment
We start with an example consisting of 5 source-destination pairs and 2 relay nodes. Each of
the five subtables in Table 3.1 represents a relay assignment. More specifically, the number
in the cell of column si and row r j is the achievable capacity for source node si, when relay
node r j is exclusively assigned to it. The symbol φ represents direct transmission to the
corresponding destination. For example, in Table 3.1(a), the numbers in the first column
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represent cR(s1,r1,Pr1) = 10, cR(s1,r2,P
r
2) = 4 and cDT (s1) = 4. Each highlighted cell
represents the current assigned relay node for the corresponding source node. For example,
in Table 3.1(b), A2 = {(s1,r1),(s2,r2),(s4,r2),(s5,r2)}. From Table 3.1(a) to 3.1(d), we
illustrate an iterative procedure to improve the total capacity. Let Ci = C(S ,R,Ai,Pr).
In each iteration, we change the relay assignment of the underlined source node from its
currently assigned relay node to transmitting directly. For example, in Table 3.1(b), we
change the relay assignment of s3 from r1 to φ and improve the total capacity from 17 to
20. Note that during this procedure, it seems that we can improve the total capacity by
changing the assignment of the source node with minimum cR among all the source nodes
sharing the same relay node and letting it transmit directly to its destination. Later, we will
prove that this is not a coincidence but an inherent property.
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
r1 10 7 6 6 8
r2 4 8 4 10 9
φ 4 2 1 3 1
(a) C1 = 10+62 +
8+10+9
3 = 17
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
r1 10 7 6 6 8
r2 4 8 4 10 9
φ 4 2 1 3 1
(b) C2 = 10+ 8+10+93 +1 = 20
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
r1 10 7 6 6 8
r2 4 8 4 10 9
φ 4 2 1 3 1
(c) C3 = 10+ 10+92 +2+1 = 22.5
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
r1 10 7 6 6 8
r2 4 8 4 10 9
φ 4 2 1 3 1
(d) C4 = 10+10+2+1+1 = 24
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
r1 10 7 6 6 8
r2 4 8 4 10 9
φ 4 2 1 3 1
(e) C∗ = 8+10+4+2+1 = 25
Table 3.1: Example with 5 source-destination pairs and 2 relays
The design of the optimal algorithm for RAP is based on Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. Let A be a relay assignment, where relay node r j ∈R is assigned to n j > 1
source nodes. Let si ∈ S j be the source node with the minimum cR, i.e., cR(si,r j,Prj ) =
minsk∈S j cR(sk,r j,P
r
j ). If we let si transmit to the destination di directly, instead of using r j,
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while keeping others the same, the total capacity will be increased. That is C(S ,R,A ′,Pr)>
C(S ,R,A ,Pr), where A ′ =A \{(si,r j)}∪{(si,r0)}. 
Proof. LetS ′j =S j \{si}. If si transmits to di directly, we have
C(S ,R,A ′,Pr)>C(S ,R,A ,Pr)
= cDT (si)+ ∑
sk∈S ′j
(cR(sk,r j,Prj )
n j−1 −
cR(sk,r j,Prj )
n j
)
− cR(si,r j,P
r
j )
n j
= cDT (si)+
 ∑
sk∈S ′j
cR(sk,r j,Prj )
n j(n j−1) −
cR(si,r j,Prj )
n j

≥ cDT (si)+
cR(si,r j,Prj ) ∑
sk∈S ′j
1
n j(n j−1) −
cR(si,r j,Prj )
n j

= cDT (si)+
(
cR(si,r j,Prj )(n j−1) ·
1
n j(n j−1) −
cR(si,r j,Prj )
n j
)
= cDT (si)> 0.
Therefore, we complete the proof.
According to Lemma 3.1, we can always improve the system capacity if there exists
a relay node shared by more than one source node in the current relay assignment. Unfor-
tunately, the example in Table 3.1 shows that this procedure may lead to a local optimum.
Nonetheless, Lemma 3.1 implies a nice property pertaining to the optimal relay assignment
for RAP.
Lemma 3.2. LetA ∗ be an optimal solution to RAP. Each relay node is assigned to at most
one source node in A ∗. 
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a relay node r j ∈R that is assigned to more
than one source nodes, i.e. n j > 1. By Lemma 3.1, we can obtain a new relay assignment
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with strictly higher total capacity by changing one of the source nodes in S j to transmit
to the destination node directly. This contradicts the optimality of the relay assignment
A ∗. Therefore, each relay node is assigned to at most one source node in the optimal
solution.
Surprisingly, although our model allows multiple source nodes to share a common
relay node, an optimal relay assignment preferably assigns a relay node to at most one
source node to achieve the maximum system capacity. On the other hand, we know that
each source node will either employ a relay node for CC or transmit to the destination
directly, but not both at the same time. This one-to-one matching relation in the optimal
solution indicates that we can transform any instance of RAP into that of the Maximum
Weighted Bipartite Matching (MWBM) problem [146] and solve it using corresponding
algorithms.
Now we are ready to present our optimal algorithm for RAP. The pseudo-code is
illustrated in Algorithm 3.
The correctness and the computational complexity of Algorithm 3 are guaranteed
by Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. Algorithm 3 guarantees to find an optimal relay assignmentA ∗(S ,R,D ,Pr)
for RAP in time bounded by O(n2m).
Proof. We prove the correctness and the running time separately.
Correctness Analysis: First, Lemma 3.2 assures that each relay node is assigned to at most
one source node in the optimal relay assignment. In other words, each source node either
transmits directly to its destination or use cooperative communication with the help of a
relay node that is not shared with any other source nodes. Therefore, each optimal relay
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Algorithm 3: ASGMNT(S ,R,D ,Pr)
1 Construct a set U of n vertices corresponding toS ;
2 Construct a set V of n+m vertices corresponding to D ∪R;
3 Construct a set E of edges, where (si,v) ∈ E if v = di or v ∈R;
4 for i = 1 to n do
5 w(si,di)← cDT (si);
6 end
7 for ∀si ∈U and ∀r j ∈R do
8 w(si,r j)← cR(si,r j,Prj );
9 end
10 Apply an MWBM algorithm to find a maximum weighted matchingM ∗ in graph
G = (U ,V ,w);
11 A ∗← /0;
12 for (si,v) ∈M ∗ do
13 if v ∈R then A ∗←A ∗∪{(si,v)};
14 else A ∗←A ∗∪{(si,r0)};
15 end
16 return A ∗.
assignment can be mapped to a matching in the graph G constructed from Line 1 to Line
9. Assume that there exists another relay assignment A ′ resulting in a higher capacity
than A ∗ returned by Algorithm 3. If we map it back to a matching in graph G, we obtain
a matching M ′ with higher weight than that of M ∗ corresponding to A ∗. It contradicts
the fact that M ∗ is a maximum weighted matching in G. Hence, A ∗ is an optimal relay
assignment.
Running Time: Note that the most time consuming component in Algorithm 3 is the MWBM
algorithm in Line 10. Thus we focus our analysis on this algorithm. The MWBM prob-
lem can be solved using a modified shortest path search in augmenting path algorithm. If
the Dijkstra algorithm with Fibonacci heap is used, the running time is O(min{|U |, |V |} ·
((|U |+ |V |) log(|U |+ |V |)+ |E |)) [25]. Since |U |= n, |V |= n+m and |E |= nm+n=
O(nm), the running time of Algorithm 3 is bounded by O(n(n+m) log(n+m)+ n2m) =
O(n2m).
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3.4.2 Mechanism Design for Selfish Users
System capacity maximization is only desirable from a global point of view, not from the
point of view of an individual selfish user. Yet most wireless devices in the network are
owned by independent profit-maximizing entities. In this section, we use the term selection
instead of assignment, because selection is from the user’s point of view while assignment
is from the system’s point of view. When selfish users have their own preferences on
relay selection, several questions may arise: Is there a stable state, where no user has the
incentive to deviate from its current selection? How can users reach such a state? If the
system performance is not optimized in the stable state, how can the system administrator
exert influence on the relay selection to achieve social optimum? These questions will be
the focus of this part.
To study the relay selection problem with selfish entities, we model it by a game,
called Relay Selection Game (RSG). In this game, the source nodes are players, because
they make relay selections. The strategy of each player is its relay selection γi ∈ R¯.
The strategy profile γ = (γ1,γ2, . . . ,γn) is a vector of all players’ strategies. Let γ−i =
(γ1, . . . ,γi−1,γi+1, . . . ,γn) denote the strategy profile excluding player si’s strategy. Hence,
γ = (γi,γ−i) is a strategy profile where si plays γi and others play γ−i. Given a strategy pro-
file γ , we can construct the corresponding relay assignmentA = {(s1,γ1),(s2,γ2), . . . ,(sn,γn)}.
Given a relay assignment A = {(s1,r j1),(s2,r j2), . . . ,(sn,r jn)}, we have the correspond-
ing strategy profile γ , where γi = r ji for each si ∈ S . In this game, each player si se-
lects a strategy γi to maximize its own utility, which is defined as its achieved capacity
usi (γ) = c(si,γi,A ,P
r). If usi (γi,γ−i) > u
s
i (γ
′
i ,γ−i), we say that player si prefers γi to γ ′i
when others play γ−i .
As a motivation to the design of our payment mechanism, we show that an NE of
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RSG is not necessarily social optimal. Note that RSG is closely related to the Congestion
Game introduced by Rosenthal [123]. Specifically, RSG can be reduced to the Congestion
Game with Player-specific Payoff Function, which was studied by Milchtaich [96]. Due to
space limitations, we make reference to [96] for the existence proof of NE and the algorithm
for computing an NE.
Recall that C∗ is the optimal system capacity. A simple example in Table 3.2 shows
that the selfishness of players can degrade the system performance by half.
s1 s2 s3 · · · sn
r0 1 1 1 · · · 1
r1 10 1 1 · · · 5
r2 10 10 1 · · · 1
r3 1 5 10 · · · 1
r4 1 1 5 · · · 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
rm 1 1 1 · · · 10
(a) Cne = 10+5(n−1)
s1 s2 s3 · · · sn
r0 1 1 1 · · · 1
r1 10 1 1 · · · 5
r2 10 10 1 · · · 1
r3 1 5 10 · · · 1
r4 1 1 5 · · · 1
...
...
...
...
...
...
rm 1 1 1 · · · 10
(b) C∗ = 10n
Table 3.2: Example with POA = 10+5(n−1)10n ≈ 12
To achieve the optimal relay assignment, we need to exert influence on players’
selection of relay nodes. Here we require players to make payments for using relaying
service.
As in many existing scheme designs, we assume virtual currency exists in the sys-
tem. Each source node (player) needs to pay certain amount of currency to the adminis-
trator based on its relay node selection. In particular, given the strategy profile γ and the
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corresponding A , we define the payment of player si as
psi =

c(si,γi,A ,Pr)+
(
g(γi,γ∗i )− 1n−1∑
k 6=i
g(γk,γ∗k )
)
, if γi 6= r0,
g(γi,γ∗i )− 1n−1 ∑k 6=i g(γk,γ∗k ), if γi = r0.
Here g(γi,γ∗i ) = l · |x− y|, where γi = rx and γ∗i = ry, l = maxsi∈S cDT (si)+ ε and ε > 0 is
a constant. In other words, g(γi,γ∗i ) is equal to l times the difference between the indices of
the relay node selected by si and the relay node assigned in the optimal solution. Intuitively,
a source node needs to pay for using relaying service if it selects a relay node. Each source
node also pays (or receives) a penalty (resp. bonus) depending on how much more (resp.
less) it deviates from the optimal strategy γ∗ than others. Here γ∗ is the strategy profile
corresponding to the optimal solution A ∗ of RAP computed by Algorithm 3. The utility
of player si is then defined as
usi (γi,γ−i) = c(si,γi,A ,P
r)− psi . (3.1)
A similar payment mechanism was also used by Wu et al. to solve a different prob-
lem [150]. We call the Relay Selection Game with utility function (3.1) the Incentive-added
Relay Selection Game (IRSG). Next we prove that γ∗ is an SDSE in IRSG.
Theorem 3.2. Let γ∗ be the strategy profile corresponding to the optimal solution A ∗ of
RAP. Then γ∗ is an SDSE for IRSG. Therefore, γ∗ is the unique NE of IRSG. 
Proof. To prove this theorem, it suffices to prove that ∀si ∈ S , ∀γ−i,∀γi 6= γ∗i , we must
have usi (γ
∗
i ,γ−i)> usi (γi,γ−i). Plugging the payment p
s
i into (3.1), we have
usi (γi,γ−i) =

1
n−1 ∑k 6=i g(γk,γ
∗
k )−g(γi,γ∗i ), if γi 6= r0,
cDT (si)−
(
g(γi,γ∗i )− 1n−1∑
k 6=i
g(γk,γ∗k )
)
, if γi = r0.
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Assume player si plays strategies γ∗i and γi 6= γ∗i , respectively. We consider all the possible
cases:
Case 1: γ∗i 6= r0 and γi 6= r0.
usi (γ
∗
i ,γ−i)−usi (γi,γ−i) = g(γi,γ∗i )−g(γ∗i ,γ∗i ) = g(γi,γ∗i )> 0,
where the second equality and the last inequality follow from the definition of g(·, ·) and
the assumption that γi 6= γ∗i .
Case 2: γ∗i 6= r0 and γi = r0.
usi (γ
∗
i ,γ−i)−usi (γi,γ−i) = g(γi,γ∗i )− cDT (si)−g(γ∗i ,γ∗i ) = g(γi,γ∗i )− cDT (si)> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of g(·, ·).
Case 3: γ∗i = r0 and γi 6= r0.
usi (γ
∗
i ,γ−i)−usi (γi,γ−i) = cDT (si)+g(γi,γ∗i )−g(γ∗i ,γ∗i ) = cDT (si)+g(γi,γ∗i )> 0.
We have proved that γ∗ is an SDSE of IRSG. Hence, γ∗ is the unique NE of IRSG.
3.4.3 Mechanism Design to Prevent Relay Nodes from Cheating
Relay nodes involved in the final assignment help source nodes with cooperative com-
munications at the cost of their own energy and other resources. Without an attractive
incentive, a relay node may not be willing to participate in cooperative communications. A
naive solution to this problem is to pay each relay node the achieved capacity of coopera-
tive communications involving it (while the relay assignment A is computed based on the
reported transmission power, the achieved capacity is computed based on the true trans-
mission power and the relay assignment A ). However, such a simple payment mechanism
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could result in relay nodes’ lying about their transmission power. For example, a relay node
would not be selected if it reports its transmission power honestly, but could be selected if
it reports a larger transmission power instead. Likewise, a relay node would be assigned
to cooperate with a source node, resulting in a small capacity, if it reports its transmission
power honestly. But it could cooperate with another source node by lying, resulting in a
larger capacity. These two examples are shown in Figure 3.2. In both examples, the relay
node receives a larger payment by lying about its transmission power.
s1 s2
r3r1 r2
5 5 3
s1 s2
r3r1 r2
5 5 6(3)
(a) r2 increases its payment from 0 to 3. The sys-
tem capacity is decreased from 5 to 3.
s1 s2
r1 r2
4 36 2
s1 s2
r1 r2
4 6(3)6 3(2)
(b) r2 increases its payment from 2 to 3. The sys-
tem capacity is decreased from 8 to 7.
Figure 3.2: Examples showing that a relay node can increase its payment by lying. Solid
links represent the relay assignment. The numbers beside the links represent the achieved
capacities calculated based on reported transmission power (outside the parentheses) and
based on the true transmission power (inside the parentheses) if it is different from the
reported transmission power.
Obviously, the dishonest behavior of relay nodes may influence the relay assign-
ment and further degrade the system performance. Hence it is essential to design a pay-
ment mechanism such that every relay node will report its transmission power truthfully to
maximize its payment.
In our design, we assume that each relay node r j is an agent and the type of r j
is its transmission power Prj . Before the relay assignment, each relay node r j reports a
transmission power Tj, which may or may not be equal to Prj . Let P
r = (Pr1 ,P
r
2 , . . . ,P
r
m)
be the true transmission power profile and T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Tm) the reported transmis-
sion power profile. ASGMNT(S ,D ,R,T ) (illustrated in Algorithm 3) is then applied
to compute an optimal relay assignment A ∗(T ), which is optimal with respect to T . Ac-
cording to Lemma 3.2, each relay node r j is assigned to at most one source node un-
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der A ∗(T ). Under A ∗(T ), let σ j(T ) ∈ S¯ denote the source node, to which r j is as-
signed. If σ j(T ) = s0, it indicates that r j is not assigned to any source node. Let σ(T ) =
(σ1(T ),σ2(T ), . . . ,σm(T )) be the source nodes corresponding to all the relay nodes in R.
Let Ψ(S ,R,T ) denote the optimal capacity of the system consisting of S and R based
on T , i.e., Ψ(S ,R,T ) =C(S ,R,A ∗(T ),T ). LetS−si =S \{si},R−r j =R \{r j}, and
T− j = (T1, . . . ,Tj−1,Tj+1, . . . ,Tm). We define the payment to relay node r j (for a given T )
by the following
prj(T ) =

0, σ j(T ) = s0,
c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr)− (Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)
−Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)), o/w,
(3.2)
where c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr) is the achieved capacity in the cooperative communication,
and Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)−Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j) is a charge determined by the system ad-
ministrator, based on T .
Before proving the properties of the designed payment mechanism, we note the fact
that
c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j) =C(S ,R,A (T
′),T ′), (3.3)
where T ′ = (Prj ,T− j) and A (T ′) is some relay assignment for the RAP instance given by
(S ,D ,R,T ′). The intuition behind this fact is that, after the optimal assignmentA ∗(T ) is
computed, the values of c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr) and Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j) are indepen-
dent of Tj, and only dependent on T ′. In addition, their sum is the system capacity under
A (T ′), which may be different from A ∗(T ′). Similarly, if relay node r j reports its true
transmission power Prj and other relay nodes report T− j, we have
c(σ j(T ′),r j,A ∗(T ′),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ′),R−r j ,T− j) =C(S ,R,A
∗(T ′),T ′). (3.4)
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Theorem 3.3. HERA is individually rational. 
Proof. Let r j be any relay node and T ′ = (Prj ,T− j). Then the payment to relay node r j is
prj(T
′)
= c(σ j(T ′),r j,A ∗(T ′),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ′),R−r j ,T− j)−Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)
= C(S ,R,A ∗(T ′),T ′)−Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j) (3.5)
= C(S ,R,A ∗(T ′),T ′)−C(S ,R−r j ,A ∗(T− j),T− j)
≥ 0,
where (3.5) follows from (3.4). This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.4. HERA is truthful. 
Proof. Assume r j reports a transmission power Tj 6= Prj . Let T ′ = (Prj ,T− j). Then the
difference between its received payment and that when reporting truthfully is
prj(T
′)− prj(T )
= c(σ j(T ′),r j,A ∗(T ′),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ′),R−r j ,T− j)
−
(
c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)
)
= C(S ,R,A ∗(T ′),T ′)−
(
c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr)+Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)
)
(3.6)
= C(S ,R,A ∗(T ′),T ′)−C(S ,R,A (T ′),T ′) (3.7)
≥ 0, (3.8)
where (3.6) follows from (3.4), (3.7) follows from (3.3), and (3.8) follows from the opti-
mality of A ∗(T ′).
We have designed a payment mechanism to charge source nodes for using relaying
service. Now we designed another payment mechanism to pay relay nodes for providing
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relaying service. A question arising naturally is whether HERA is budget-balanced. That
is, whether the payment collected from all the source nodes is enough to pay all the relay
nodes. The following theorem confirms the budget-balance property of HERA.
Theorem 3.5. HERA is budget-balanced. 
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, we know that all the source nodes will follow the optimal relay
assignment. Let T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Tm) be the reported transmission power profile. Let γ∗ be
the strategy profile of source nodes corresponding to A ∗(T ). Therefore, the total payment
collected from all source nodes is
ps = ∑
si∈S
psi = ∑
si∈S ,γ∗i 6=r0
c(si,γ∗i ,A
∗(T ),Pr). (3.9)
The total payment paid to all the relay nodes is
pr = ∑
r j∈R
prj
= ∑
r j∈R,σ j(T )6=s0
c(σ j(T ),r j,A ∗(T ),Pr)
− ∑
r j∈R,σ j(T )6=s0
(
Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)−Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)
)
,
where the second equality follows the fact that
∑si∈S ,γ∗i 6=r0 c(si,γ
∗
i ,A
∗(T ),Pr) = ∑r j∈R,σ j(T )6=s0 c(σ j(T ),r j,A
∗(T ),Pr).
The profit of the administrator is
ps− pr = ∑
r j∈R,σ j(T )6=s0
(
Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)−Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)
)
≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that
Ψ(S ,R−r j ,T− j)−Ψ(S−σ j(T ),R−r j ,T− j)≥ 0.
We finished the proof of the theorem.
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3.5 Performance Evaluation
We considered a wireless network, where wireless nodes are uniformly randomly
distributed in a 1000m× 1000m square. We followed the same parameter settings as in
[127]. The only exception was the transmission power, which in our setting is uniformly
distributed over (0,1], i.e., Psi ,P
r
j ∈ (0,1] Watt for all si ∈ S and r j ∈ R. We set the
bandwidth W to 22 MHz for all channels. For the transmission model, we assumed that the
path loss exponent α = 4 and the abient noise N0 = 10−10. In most of the experiments, we
varied both n and m from 50 to 400 with increment of 50. For each setting, we randomly
generated 100 instances and averaged the results.
Assignment Algorithm
Since this is the first work on the design of relay assignment scheme for cooperative
networks with the objective to maximize the total capacity, we compared our algorithm with
the algorithms listed below.
• Greedy Assignment Algorithm (Greedy): This algorithm proceeds iteratively. In each
iteration, it greedily assigns a relay node to the source node or lets the source node
transmit directly, such that the system capacity under the current assignment is max-
imized.
• Direct Transmission Algorithm (DT): In this algorithm, each source node trans-
mits to its destination directly. The system capacity under this assignment is C =
∑si∈S cDT (si). DT serves as a lower bound of the system capacity of the network
under any relay assignment.
• ORA [127]: The basic idea of ORA is to adjust the assignment iteratively, starting
from any arbitrary initial assignment. In each iteration, ORA identifies the source
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node with currently minimum capacity among all the source nodes and searches a
better relay node for it. Although ORA is not intentionally designed for RAP, we
include it in the comparison for the sake of completeness.
Cheating Report Distribution
We assume that a relay node can cheat by reporting a transmission power larger
than its true transmission power. If Prj is the transmission power of relay node r j, then its
reported transmission power is Prj +δ , where δ is a random number uniformly distributed
over (∆,∆+1] and ∆ is a parameter.
The performance metrics in the experiments include the system capacity and the
number of cooperative communications.
Evaluation of Assignment Algorithms
Figure 3.3 shows the system capacity under the assignments returned by different
algorithms. As expected, HERA has the best performance while DT has the worst. Sur-
prisingly, the performance of Greedy is only slightly worse than that of HERA, especially
when m > n. The reason is that some source nodes may not need to compete with other
source nodes for their best relay nodes. Therefore, we may have the same assignment for
these source nodes in both HERA and Greedy. Another observation is that when the num-
ber of relay nodes exceeds that of the source nodes, the system capacity tends to keep the
same.
Impact of Selfishness on System Performance
We have shown in an example in Table 3.2 that the POA of the Relay Selection
Game can be as small as 12 . We turn to evaluate how the selfish behavior of source nodes
affects the system performance in randomly generated networks. Figure 3.4 plots the ca-
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Figure 3.3: Comparison among relay assignment algorithms. For (a), n = 200. For (b),
m = 200.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of selfish behavior of source nodes on system capacity. For (a), n= 200.
For (b), m = 200. The maximum and minimum values among 100 random instances are
shown as error bars.
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Figure 3.5: Number of source nodes using CC. For (a), n = 200. For (b), m = 200. The
maximum and minimum values among 100 random instances are shown as error bars.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of cheating behavior of relay nodes on system capacity where n = m =
50. For (a), ∆= 4.
pacities of the systems when HERA is applied and when it is not. We note that the degra-
dation of NE over HERA decreases with the increase of m, as shown in Figure 3.4(a). This
is because source nodes do not need to compete with each other for relay nodes when there
are enough relay nodes. Another observation is that the degradation becomes worse with
the increase of n, as shown in Figure 3.4(b). This can be explained by the same reason
above, as source nodes sharing the same relay node can improve the system capacity if one
of them changes to direct transmission. Figure 3.5 illustrates the number of source nodes
using CC in both HERA and NE. We observe that, when the number of relay nodes is more
than that of the source nodes, there are more source nodes competing relay nodes for CC in
NE than there are in HERA. This verifies our analysis on the results shown in Figure 3.4.
Impact of Cheating on System Performance
Next we focus on the impact of cheating behavior of relay nodes on system perfor-
mance. Figure 3.6 shows the system degradation due to the cheating behavior in a network
consisting of 50 source nodes and 50 relay nodes. In Figure 3.6(a), we set ∆= 4. Our first
observation is that when the number of cheating relay nodes is small, the system perfor-
mance is not affected significantly. This is because a small number of cheating relay nodes
will unlikely affect the matching process in the algorithm. Another observation is that the
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degradation increases with the increase of the number of cheating relay nodes, which is as
expected.
We then evaluate the impact of parameter ∆. Intuitively, the larger ∆ is, the more a
relay node can untruthfully report its transmission power. Figure 3.6(b) shows the system
performance degradation in the networks with different values of ∆. We see that the degra-
dation increases when the value of ∆ increases. The reason is that a relay node reporting
a large transmission power has a high probability to be selected in the relay assignment.
However, its true transmission power may be very small. Hence the final system capacity
is degraded.
3.6 Conclusion
In this section, we designed HERA, an integrated optimal relay assignment scheme
for cooperative networks. It is composed of three components: an optimal relay assignment
algorithm, a payment mechanism to charge source nodes for using relaying service, and a
payment mechanism to pay relay nodes for proving relaying service. HERA induces selfish
source nodes to converge to the optimal assignment and prevents relay nodes from reporting
transmission power untruthfully to gain profit. In addition, HERA satisfies budget-balance
property, which means the payment collected from source nodes is no less than the payment
paid to relay nodes.
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Chapter 4
Channel Allocation in Non-Cooperative Wireless Networks
The development of the IEEE 802.11a/b/g standards has spurred the emergence of broad-
band wireless networks. Due to the common transmission media shared by communication
devices, interference arises if communication devices are operating on the same frequency.
It has been shown that interference severely limits the network capacity [62]. Frequency
Division Multiple Access (FDMA) is a widely used technique to enable multiple devices to
share a communication medium. In FDMA, the available bandwidth is divided into multi-
ple sub-bands, named channels. Using multiple channels in multi-radio wireless networks
can greatly alleviate the interference and improve the network throughput [117]. Ideally, if
there are a sufficient number of channels and each device assigns different channels to its
radios, there would be no interference in the network at all. However, since the spectrum
is a scarce resource, we are only allowed to divide the available bandwidth into a limited
number of channels. For example, there are 3 and 12 non-overlapping channels for the
IEEE 802.11b/g standards in 2.4 GHz and the IEEE 802.11a standard in 5 GHz, respec-
tively. A fundamental problem in multi-radio multi-channel (MR-MC) wireless networks is
how to allocate channels to radios, which is commonly referred to as the channel allocation
problem (also known as the channel assignment problem).
While tremendous efforts have been made on the channel allocation problem, most
of them are on cooperative networks where devices are assumed to be cooperative and
unselfish; however this assumption may not hold in practice. Usually, a wireless device
is owned by an independent individual, who is only interested in selfishly maximizing its
own profit without respecting the system performance. There are a few works considering
non-cooperative networks [42, 49, 149, 150]. However, all of these works only consider
74
the problem in a single collision domain, which means all the transmissions will interfere
with each other if they are on the same channel.
4.1 Introduction
In this section, we study the channel allocation problem in non-cooperative MR-
MC networks with multiple collision domains. To characterize the network with multiple
collision domains, we introduce interference models into the network. The results in this
work are independent of the interference model adopted as long as the model is defined on
pairs of communications, for example, the protocol interference model is used in this work.
We model the channel assignment problem in non-cooperative MR-MC wireless networks
as a strategic game. We show that the game may oscillate indefinitely when there are no
exogenous factors to influence players’ behavior. This possible oscillation can result in
significant communication overhead and the degradation of the system performance. To
avoid this undesirable outcome, we develop a charging scheme to induce players’ behavior.
The design of the charging scheme ensures the convergence to a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Players are in an NE if no player can improve its utility by changing its strategy unilaterally.
Although NE is usually not social optimal, we can prove that the system performance in an
NE is guaranteed to be at least a factor of the system performance in the optimal solution.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the channel allocation problem
in non-cooperative MR-MC wireless networks with multiple collision domains. We
model the problem as a strategic game, called ChAlloc.
• We show that the ChAlloc game can result in an oscillation, where players keep
changing their strategies back and force trying to improve their utilities.
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• To avoid the possible oscillation, we design a charging scheme to influence players’
behavior. We prove that, under the charging scheme, the ChAlloc game converges
to an NE. We also prove that the system performance in an NE is guaranteed to be
at least (1− r¯h) of the system performance in the optimal solution, where r¯ is the
maximum number of radios equipped on wireless devices and h is the number of
available channels.
• We design a localized algorithm for players to find an NE and prove that it takes
O(r¯hn3(n+ logh)) time for the ChAlloc game to converge to an NE, where n is the
number of players.
• In order to verify our proof of the system performance in an NE, we give an LP-based
algorithm to derive efficiently computable upper bounds on the optimal solution.
• Through extensive experiments, we validate our analysis of the possible oscillation
in the ChAlloc game lacking the charging scheme and confirm the proof of the con-
vergence of the ChAlloc game with the charging scheme. The results also show that
the system performance in an NE is very close to the optimal solution and thus verify
our proof of the system performance.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we review
the current literature on the channel allocation problem. In Section 4.3, we present the
system model considered in our work and formulate the channel allocation problem as a
game, called ChAlloc. In Section 4.4, we first use an example to show that it is possible for
the ChAlloc game to oscillate endlessly when there are no exogenous factors to influence
players’ behavior. Then we design a charging scheme to induce players to converge to an
NE, compute the price of anarchy of the ChAlloc game, and develop a localized algorithm
for players. In addition, we give an LP-based algorithm to find an upper bound on the
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Table 4.1: Relation to previous work on channel allocation
Single Collision Multiple Collision
Domain Domains
Cooperative none [29, 75, 91, 114, 115, 130, 132, 135]
Non-cooperative [42, 49, 149, 150] our work
optimal solution. In Section 4.5, we evaluate the performance of the ChAlloc game through
extensive experiments. Finally, we form our conclusion in Section 4.6.
4.2 Relation to Previous Work on Channel Allocation
Most previous works on channel allocation can be categorized into two categories,
channel allocation in cooperative networks [29, 75, 91, 114, 115, 130, 132, 135] and chan-
nel allocation in non-cooperative networks [42, 49, 149, 150]. We summarize the related
works in Table 4.1.
Channel Allocation in Cooperative Networks: There is a considerable amount of works
on the channel allocation problem in Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs). In [29], Das et
al. presented two mixed integer linear programming (ILP) models to solve the channel al-
location problem in WMNs with the objective to maximize the number of simultaneously
transmitting links. However, it is known that solving an ILP is NP-hard. In [114], Ra-
machandran et al. proposed a centralized channel allocation algorithm utilizing a novel
interference estimation technique in conjunction with an extension to the conflict graph
model, called the multi-radio conflict graph. In [132], Sridhar et al. proposed a localized
channel allocation algorithm called LOCA, which is a heuristic algorithm. Subramanian et
al. [135] and Marina et al. [91] studied the channel allocation problem where each link
is assigned a channel with the constraint that the number of different channels assigned to
the links incident on any node is at most the number of radios on that node. Subramanian
et al. [135] developed a centralized algorithm based on Tabu search and a distributed
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algorithm based on the Max-K-cut problem. Marina et al. [91] proposed a greedy heuris-
tic channel allocation algorithm, termed CLICA. In [75], Ko et al. studied the channel
allocation problem with a different objective function and proposed a distributed algorithm
without any performance guarantee. In [130], Shin et al. considered the channel allocation
problem to maximize the throughput or minimize the delay, and presented the an allocation
scheme, called SAFE, which is a distributed heuristic.
All the above related works are based on the assumption that wireless devices in the
network cooperate to achieve a high system performance. However, this assumption might
not hold in practice. Usually, a wireless device is owned by an independent individual,
who is only interested in selfishly maximizing its own profit without respecting the system
performance or considering others’ profits.
Channel Allocation in Non-cooperative Networks: Game theory has been widely used
to solve problems in non-cooperative wireless networks, for instance, Aloha networks [90]
and CSMA/CA networks [16, 76]. Based on a graph coloring game model, Halldo´rsson et
al. [64] provided bounds on the price of anarchy of the channel allocation game. However,
their model does not apply to multi-radio networks.
In an earlier work, Fe´legyha´zi et al. [42] formulated the channel allocation prob-
lem in non-cooperative MR-MC wireless networks as a game, analyzed the existence of
Nash Equilibria and presented two algorithms to achieve an NE. Along this line, Wu et al.
[150] introduced a payment formula to ensure the existence of a strongly dominant strategy
equilibrium (SDSE). Furthermore, when the system converges to an SDSE, it also achieves
global optimality in terms of system throughput. In [49], Gao et al. extended the problem
to multi-hop networks and also addressed coalition issues. Most recently, Wu et al. [149]
studied the problem of adaptive-width channel allocation in non-cooperative MR-MC wire-
less networks, where contiguous channels may be combined to provide a better utilization
78
of the available channels. However, all the above results can only be applied to a single
collision domain, without considering multiple collision domains. In this work, we fill this
void and study the channel allocation problem in non-cooperative MR-MC networks with
multiple collision domains.
4.3 Network Model and Game Formulation
The network model in this work closely follows the models in [42, 49, 149, 150].
We consider a static wireless network consisting of a set L = {L1,L2, . . . ,Ln} of n com-
munication links. Each link Li is modeled as an undirected link between two nodes vi and
ui, where vi and ui denote two wireless devices communicating with each other. The use
of the undirected link model reflects the fact that the IEEE 802.11 DCF requires the sender
to be able to receive the acknowledgement message from the receiver for every transmit-
ted packet. Since links are undirected, two nodes are able to coordinate to select the same
channels for communication. As in [42, 49, 149, 150], we assume that the links are back-
logged and always have packets to transmit. Each wireless device is equipped with multiple
radio interfaces. We further assume that each transmission must be between two radios, of
which one functions as a transmitter and the other as a receiver. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that both nodes of Li have the same number of radios, denoted by ri. We assume
the wireless devices have the same maximum transmission power, but each of the devices
adjusts its actual data transmission power according to the length, denoted by li, of the
transmission link. Let R denote the transmission range under the maximum transmission
power. Furthermore, there are h > 1 orthogonal channels available in the network, e.g.
12 orthogonal channels in the IEEE 802.11a protocol. We denote the set of channels by
C = {c1,c2, . . . ,ch}.
To communicate, two nodes of a link have to tune at least one of their radios to
79
the same channel(s). Parallel communications are allowed between two nodes if they share
multiple channels on radios. In order to avoid the co-radios interference in a device [49],
we assume that different radios on a node should be tuned to different channels. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that ri < h for all Li ∈L as it would be straightforward to allocate
channels otherwise. Allocating each channel to at most one radio has also been proved to
be a necessary condition to maximize the device’s transmission data rate [42, 49, 149].
Due to the common transmission medium, wireless transmission along a commu-
nication link may interfere with the transmissions along other communication links, espe-
cially those within its vicinity. While existing works [42, 49, 149, 150] have studied the
channel allocation problem in non-cooperative networks for both single-hop and multi-hop
models, all the results can only be applied to a single collision domain. In other words, they
assume that all transmissions interfere with each other if they share at least one channel.
However, the strength of a wireless transmission signal decays exponentially with respect
to the distance it travels from the transmitter. Therefore the signal from a distant trans-
mission is, if not negligible, not destructive enough to prevent another transmission from
succeeding. In this work, we generalize the channel allocation problem to networks with
multiple collision domains.
To characterize networks with multiple collision domains, an appropriate interfer-
ence model is necessary. Various interference models have been proposed in the literature,
for example, the primary interference model [63], the protocol interference model [62, 70],
and the physical interference model (a.k.a SINR interference model) [62, 70]. The results
in this work are independent of the specific interference model used as long as the inter-
ference model is defined on pairs of communication links. For the sake of presentation, the
protocol interference model is adopted throughout this work. This model has been used by
most of the works on channel allocation problems [1, 6, 91, 117, 135, 136]. In this model,
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L2
Figure 4.1: Network of 5 links, whereL = {L1,L2,L3,L4,L5}, r1 = 3,r2 = 3,r3 = 2,r4 =
2,r5 = 1 and C = {1,2,3,4}.
each node has an interference range γli, which is at least as large as the transmission range
(equal to li), i.e., γ ≥ 1. We assume that li ≤ Rγ , for any Li. Any node u will be interfered
by node v if u is within v’s interference range. We can imagine that, associated with each
Li, there is an interference disk Dui centered at ui, and an interference disk Dvi centered at
vi. The union of Dui and Dvi , denoted by Dui ∪Dvi , constitutes the interference area of Li.
Link Li interferes with link L j if and only if either of v j and u j is in Dui ∪Dvi , and two
links share at least one common channel. Before the channels on the radios are known, we
can only say that Li potentially interferes with L j. As an illustrating example, Figure 4.1
shows a 5-link network, where dashed peanut-shaped curves represent the boundaries of
interference areas (numbers in parentheses will be explained later). In this example, L3
potentially interferes with L1 while L1 cannot interfere with L3.
Conflict graphs are widely used to facilitate the design of channel allocation al-
gorithms [70, 91, 98, 114, 135]. We use a similar concept, called potential interference
graph (PING), to characterize the interfering relationships among the links. Different from
the conflict graph, the edges in the PING are directed due to the heterogeneity of the in-
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Figure 4.2: The PING, MPING and MING for the example in Figure 4.1
terference range. In a PING, Gp = (Vp,Ap), nodes correspond to communication links.
Hereafter, we also use Li to denote the corresponding node in Gp. There is an arc from
Li to L j if Li potentially interferes with L j. Figure 4.2(a) shows a PING of the example in
Figure 4.1. Unfortunately, the above defined PING does not accurately model the devices
with multiple radios. For example, if Li potentially interferes with L j and both links have
two radio pairs, there should be two interference arcs. Therefore, we extend the PING
to model multi-radio networks and call the new model multi-radio potential interference
graph (MPING). An MPING is a directed multigraph, Gm = (Vm,Am), where nodes still
represent transmission links, arcs represent potential interference between links, and par-
allel directed arcs may exist between two vertices. There are min{ri,r j} arcs from Li to
L j if (Li,L j) ∈ Ap. Let A−m(Li) and A+m(Li) be the set of in-arcs and the set of out-arcs,
respectively. The in-arc set A−m(Li) of Li is the set of arcs going into Li and the out-arc set
A+m(Li) of Li is the set of arcs going from Li. The in-arcs in A
−
m(Li) are called the potential
interference arcs of Li. Let N−m (Li) be the set of in-neighbors and N+m (Li) be the set of out-
neighbors in the MPING Gm. The in-neighbor set N−m (Li) of Li is the set of vertices, which
are the tails of in-arcs and the out-neighbor set N+m (Li) of Li is the set of vertices, which are
the heads of out-arcs. The MPING corresponding to Figure 4.1 is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
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We formulate the channel allocation problem in non-cooperative MR-MC wireless
networks as a game, called ChAlloc. In this game, each transmission link is a player, whose
strategy space is the set of all the possible channel allocations on its radios. We assume that
players are selfish, rational and honest. We leave the case where players can cheat for our
future work. Throughout the rest of this work, we will use link and player interchangeably.
The channel allocation of Li is defined to be a vector si = (si1,si2, . . . ,sih), where sik = 1
if Li assigns channel ck to one radio pair and sik = 0 otherwise. To sufficiently utilize the
channel resource, we require that ∑hk=1 sik = ri, which is also proved to be optimal for each
player for the single-collision domain case [42]. The strategy profile s is then an n× h
matrix defined by all the players’ strategies, s = (s1,s2, . . . ,sn)T .
Although previous works in the literature [42, 49, 149, 150] have used achievable
data rate as the utility function, they assume that all the links are in a single collision
domain. Because of the hidden terminal problem, it is unlikely to have a closed-form
expression to calculate the achievable data rate for each player in the network with multiple
collision domains. This difficulty has also been discussed in [42, 150]. An alternative is to
use the interference as a performance metric. As shown in [166, Eq.(4)], the data rate is
approximately a linear function of the interference that the link can overhear. The use of
the interference as a performance metric can also be found in [114, 135, 136].
Given a strategy profile s, we say a communication radio pair interferes with Li if
this radio pair belongs to a link interfering with Li and has been tuned to a channel that is
also allocated by Li. We define the interference number of Li, denoted by Ii(s), to be the
number of communication radio pairs interfering with Li. Mathematically, we have
Ii(s) = ∑L j∈N−m (Li) si · s j,
where the symbol · is the dot product between two vectors. Note that Ii(s) ≤ |A−m(Li)|
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for all Li ∈ L . When s is given, we can construct the multi-radio interference graph
(MING), Gm(s) = (Vm(s),Am(s)), from the MPING by removing corresponding potential
interference arcs. The number of arcs from Li to L j is equal to si · s j.
In this work, we define the utility function of a player to be a function of its inter-
ference number. More specifically, the utility function ui(s) of player Li is defined as
ui(s) = |A−m(Li)|− Ii(s). (4.1)
In other words, the objective of Li is to remove as many of the potential interference arcs
as possible from N−m (Li) by allocating channels to its radios. When the network is given,
|A−m(Li)| is a constant. Hence maximizing (4.1) can achieve the goal of minimizing Ii(s),
which is the interference suffered by Li under the strategy profile s.
Intuitively, the system performance function is defined as
U(s) = |Am|−∑Li∈L Ii(s), (4.2)
which is the total potential interference removed from the MPING under allocation profile
s. Likewise, |Am| is a constant, hence maximizing (4.2) can achieve the goal of minimizing
∑Li∈L Ii(s), which is the overall network interference.
Use the example in Figure 4.1 for illustration. The numbers in the parentheses
associated to each link represent the allocated channels. The corresponding channel al-
location vectors are s1 = (1,1,0,1), s2 = (0,1,1,1), s3 = (0,1,1,0), s4 = (0,1,0,1), and
s5 = (0,0,1,0). The interference graph under s is shown in Figure 4.2(c). Under this strat-
egy profile, we have u1(s) = 2, u2(s) = 0, u3(s) = 0, u4(s) = 1 and u5(s) = 1. The system
performance is U(s) = 4.
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4.4 ChAlloc Game
4.4.1 Possible Oscillation
We first show that players might not converge to any stable status, i.e. NE, according to
the current defined utility function. Consider the network illustrated in Figure4.3(a). Ob-
viously, we have the MPING as shown in Figure4.3(b). Assume that each link is equipped
only one radio pair and there are two channels {c1,c2} available. Due to the special topol-
ogy and the dependency relation, we have the following conclusions.
• If L4 uses c1, both L1 and L2 will use c2.
• If both L1 and L2 use c2, L3 will use c1.
• If L3 uses c1, L4 will use c2.
• If L4 uses c2, both L1 and L2 will use c1.
• . . .
This process turns into an infinite loop.
This possible oscillation is definitely undesirable for two reasons: 1) The channel
switching delays can be in the order of milliseconds [18], an order of magnitude higher
than typical packet transmission time (in microseconds). 2) It can introduce a significant
amount of communication overhead, as two devices need to coordinate to switch channels.
4.4.2 Game Analysis
As we have discussed above, the ChAlloc game can run into an oscillation problem, which
is undesirable from the system’s perspective. In order to induce players to converge to an
NE, we design a charging scheme to influence the players.
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Figure 4.3: Example where players oscillate forever
Charging Scheme Design: Similar approaches have also been used in [149, 150].
Their charging functions are designed based on the globally optimal channel allocation.
Essentially, players who deviate from the optimal channel allocation will be punished ac-
cording to the charging function. Unfortunately, it has been proved that the optimization
problem of maximizing the system performance function (4.2) is NP-hard [135]. Dif-
ferent variations of the channel allocation problem have also been shown to be NP-hard
[1, 91, 114, 117]. Therefore, we focus on designing a charging scheme, which can make
the ChAlloc game converge to an NE and achieve guaranteed system performance.
As in [149, 150, 157], we assume that there exists a virtual currency in the system.
Each player needs to pay certain amount of virtual money to the system administrator based
on the strategy profile s. We define the charge pi of player Li as
pi(s) = ∑L j∈N+m (Li) si · s j, (4.3)
which is the total interference player Li imposes on the others. The charge can be consid-
ered to be the fee for accessing the channels. We then redefine the utility function for each
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player Li ∈L as
ui(s) =
∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− Ii(s)− pi(s), (4.4)
which is equal to the original utility minus its payment to the system administrator.
Existence of Nash Equilibria: Having defined a new utility function for the player, we
next prove the existence of Nash Equilibria with the help of the concept of potential game
[101].
Definition 4.1. [Potential Game] A function Φ : Π 7→ Z∗ is an exact potential function
for a game if the change of any player’s utility can be exactly expressed in the function.
Formally, Φ should satisfy
Φ(si,s−i)−Φ(s′i,s−i) = ui(si,s−i)−ui(s′i,s−i),
for all s−i and si,s′i ∈ Πi. A game is called a potential game if it admits an exact potential
function. 
A nice property of being a potential game is that if Φ is bounded, we can prove
that the game possesses an NE and any improvement path leads to an NE. An improvement
path is a sequence of strategy profiles, each of which (except the first one) is formed from
the previous one by changing a unique player’s strategy to improve the player’s utility.
Therefore we first prove that the ChAlloc game is a potential game and then prove that its
corresponding potential function is bounded.
Lemma 4.1. The ChAlloc game is a potential game. 
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing an exact potential function Φ. Define Φ as
Φ(s) =
1
2 ∑Li∈L
ui(s).
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We next prove that Φ(si,s−i)−Φ(s′i,s−i) = ui(si,s−i)−ui(s′i,s−i) for all s−i and si,s′i ∈Πi.
First, we have
Φ(s) =
1
2 ∑Li∈L
∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · s j− ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · s j

=
|Am|
2
− 1
2 ∑Li∈L
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · s j
 , (4.5)
where the second equality follows from the fact that |Am|= ∑Li∈L |A−m(Li)|. We then have
Φ(si,s−i)−Φ(s′i,s−i)
=
1
2
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
s j · s′i− ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
s j · si+ ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
s j · s′i− ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
s j · si
+ ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
s′i · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
s′i · s j−
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · s j

=
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
s′i · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
s′i · s j−
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · s j

= ui(si,s−i)−ui(s′i,s−i),
where the first equality follows from the fact that the change of player Li’s strategy only
affects players in N−m (Li) and N+m (Li), and the last equality follows from
ui(si,s−i)−ui(s′i,s−i)
= ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
s′i · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
s′i · s j−
 ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · s j + ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · s j
 .
We have proved thatΦ(s) is an exact potential function (Definition 4.1) of the ChAl-
loc game. Hence the ChAlloc game is a potential game.
The bound of Φ(s) is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. For any s ∈Π, Φ(s) is bounded by O(r¯n2). 
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Proof. By (4.5), we have
Φ(s)≤ |Am|
2
≤ ∑Li∈L ri(n−1)
2
≤ 1
2
r¯n2.
This completes the proof.
Now we give the main theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The ChAlloc game possesses an NE. 
Proof. Combining Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, this theorem directly follows from Corol-
lary 2.2 in [101], which states that every finite potential game possesses a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Price of Anarchy: Although we have proved that there exist Nash Equilibria in the ChAlloc
game, we know that NE is usually not socially efficient in the sense that the system per-
formance in an NE is not optimized. Nevertheless, we prove that the POA of the ChAlloc
game is independent of the number of players involved in the game and is lower bounded
by a constant when the number of channels and the number of radios equipped on devices
are fixed.
Theorem 4.2. In the ChAlloc game, POA≥ (1− r¯h). Recall that r¯ is the maximum number
of radios equipped on wireless devices and h is the number of available channels. 
Proof. Before proving the POA of the ChAlloc game, we first find a lower bound of the
utility of any player in an NE. Let sne = (sne1 ,s
ne
2 , . . . ,s
ne
n )
T be any NE of the ChAlloc game.
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Let sopt = (sopt1 ,s
opt
2 , . . . ,s
opt
n )
T be a social optimum. We have
ui(sne)
=
∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
snei · snej − ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
snei · snej
≥ ∑
si∈Πi
∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− ∑
L j∈N−m (Li)
si · snej − ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
si · snej
/|Πi| (4.6)
=
∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− rih (∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣+ ∣∣A+m(Li)∣∣) (4.7)
≥ ∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− r¯h (∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣+ ∣∣A+m(Li)∣∣) , (4.8)
where (4.6) follows from the definition of NE, (4.7) follows from the fact that each arc is
counted
(h−1
ri−1
)
times and |Πi|=
(h
ri
)
, next (4.8) follows from r¯ = maxLi∈L ri.
Then the system performance is
U(sne)
= ∑
Li∈L
ui(sne)+ ∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
snei · snej
 (4.9)
≥ ∑
Li∈L
(∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣− r¯h (∣∣A−m(Li)∣∣+ ∣∣A+m(Li)∣∣)
)
+ ∑
Li∈L
∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
snei · snej (4.10)
= |Am|− 2r¯h |Am|+ ∑Li∈L
∑
L j∈N+m (Li)
snei · snej (4.11)
= |Am|− 2r¯h |Am|+ |Am|−U(s
ne), (4.12)
where (4.9) follows from (4.2) and (4.4), (4.10) follows from (4.8), and (4.12) follows from
the fact that |Am|=U(sne)+∑Li∈L ∑L j∈N+m (Li) snei · snej .
Considering the obvious fact that U(sopt)≤ |Am|, we have
U(sne)≥
(
1− r¯
h
)
U(sopt). (4.13)
Since (4.13) holds for any NE of the ChAlloc game, it is straightforward to prove that
POA≥ (1− r¯h).
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A Localized Algorithm for the ChAlloc Game: Since the ChAlloc game is a potential
game (Lemma 4.1), any improvement path leads to an NE [101]. To form an improvement
path, we need to require the sequential action of the players. Each player takes its best re-
sponse strategy upon its turn. Note that bi(s−i) can be computed just based on the strategies
of the players in N−m (Li) and N+m (Li). Therefore we can design a localized algorithm for
players to find an NE. A localized algorithm needs no information to propagate through the
whole network. Thus it is scalable to the network size and robust to the topology change.
Algorithm 4: A Localized Algorithm for Li
1 Randomly allocate ri channels as si;
2 Wi← i, ctr← 0;
3 while true do
4 if Wi = 0 then
5 Get the current channel allocation;
6 s′i← bi(s−i);
7 if s′i = si then
8 if ctr = n then break; else ctr← ctr+1;
9 else si← s′i, ctr← 0;
10 Wi← n;
11 else Wi←Wi−1;
12 end
The localized algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 4. The implementation issue
will be discussed later. To avoid the simultaneous change in channel allocations of dif-
ferent players, we let each player Li have a counter Wi, which is initially set to i. At the
beginning of the algorithm, each player Li randomly picks ri channels as its initial strategy.
In every iteration, Li checks the value of Wi. If Wi is equal 0, Li gets the current channel
allocations and calculates its best response strategy bi(s−i). If the best response strategy is
the same with its current strategy, it increases another counter ctr by 1. Otherwise, it up-
dates its strategy and resets ctr to 0. The value of ctr indicates how many times its current
strategy has been the best response strategy consecutively. The use of ctr is to avoid early
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termination before the ChAlloc game converges to an NE. If the counter Wi has not reached
0, Li decreases its value by 1.
Lemma 4.3. The best response strategy bi(s−i) can be computed in O(h(n+ logh)) time.

Proof. We prove this lemma by giving an algorithm to compute bi(s−i). For each channel
ck ∈ C , we compute the value of ∑L j∈N−m (Li) ek · s j +∑L j∈N+m (Li) ek · s j, where ek denotes the
vector with a 1 in the kth coordinate and 0’s elsewhere. This can be finished in O(hn)
time. Sort the channels in a nondecreasing order, which can be finished in O(h logh) time.
Since channels are independent, Li selects the first ri channels as bi(s−i). Hence the above
algorithm can be finished in time bounded by O(h(n+ logh)).
Theorem 4.3. For any instance of the ChAlloc game, if all the players follow Algorithm 4,
it takes O(r¯hn3(n+ logh)) time to converge to an NE. 
Proof. According to Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, every time a player changes its strategy
(to one introducing better utility), the potential function Φ(s) will be increased accordingly
and the value of Φ(s) is bounded by O(r¯n2). Therefore the number of strategy updates
is bounded by O(r¯n2). Since there will be at least one strategy update in each round, the
number of rounds is also bounded by O(r¯n2). Using Lemma 4.3 and the fact that n players
take actions sequentially in each round, we can prove that it takes O(r¯hn3(n+ logh)) time
for the ChAlloc game to converge to an NE.
Implementation Issue: Existing works [65, 75, 130, 132] on distributed or localized
channel allocation algorithms all assume that the interference sets are given, but do not
discuss how to find them in a distributed manner. We assume that during the channel
allocation stage, all the players are using the same channel on one of their radios, which
92
is called the control channel, and using the maximum transmission power to send packets.
Because of the assumption that li ≤ Rγ , it is guaranteed that all the links in the interference
range of link Li can overhear the packets. The packet to be exchanged during the channel
allocation stage is of form (i,si). For each player Li, upon its turn, it sends out the packet.
During other time periods, it listens to the control channel and receives packets from others.
For the packet received from L j, Li computes its distance from L j according to the received
signal strength, puts L j in N+m (Li) if L j is within its interference range, and puts L j in
N−m (Li) if it is within L j’s interference range.
4.4.3 Upper Bounds on Optimal Channel Allocation
In this section, we derive efficiently computable upper bounds on the channel allocation
problem, which will be used in Section 4.5 to evaluate the system performance of the
ChAlloc game. We first formulate the channel allocation problem as an integer linear
program (ILP) and then relax the constraints to achieve an upper bound on the optimal
solution.
Let sik ∈ {0,1} denote Li’s allocation on ck, where sik = 1 if Li allocates ck to one
of its radios and sik = 0 otherwise. Let xi jk ∈ {0,1} denote the interference from Li to L j
via ck. Our ILP can be formulated as follows,
max |Am|−
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1, j 6=i
h
∑
k=1
xi jk
s.t.
h
∑
k=1
sik = ri (Li ∈L ) (4.14)
xi jk ≥ sik + s jk−1 ((Li,L j) ∈ Am,ck ∈ C ) (4.15)
sik ∈ {0,1} (Li ∈L ,ck ∈ C )
xi jk ∈ {0,1} (Li,L j ∈L ,Li 6= L j,ck ∈ C ),
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where Constraints (4.14) follow our system model, and Constraints (4.15) guarantee that
xi jk = 1 if and only if both Li and L j have one radio tuned to channel ck.
Unfortunately, solving an ILP is in general NP-hard [51], which means it may take
exponential time to find the optimal solution. Hence we relax the above ILP to an LP
by allowing sik and xi jk to be real values between 0 and 1. The LP has been shown to be
solvable in polynomial time [78]. As the constraints are relaxed, the LP only gives an upper
bound on the ILP’s optimal solution.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
Experiment Setup: In the simulations, links were randomly distributed in a 1000m×
1000m square. The length of each link was uniformly distributed over [1,30]. The inter-
ference range of the node was set to 2 times of the link length. The number of available
channels was varied from 5 to 12 with increment of 1. The number of links was varied from
10 to 100 with increment of 10. The number of radio pairs on each link was uniformly se-
lected over [1,r], where r ∈ {2,3,4,5}. Note that r¯ = r in most cases. For every setting, we
randomly generated 100 instances and averaged the results.
Channel Allocation Algorithms: To evaluate the system performance of the ChAlloc
game, we compare the ChAlloc game with other two algorithms listed as below.
• LP-based Algorithm (LP): This algorithm is based on the LP formulation in Section
4.4.3.
• Random Allocation Algorithm (Rand): In this algorithm, each link Li randomly select
ri channels out of the h channels. To certain extent, Rand serves as a lower bound of
the system performance in any channel allocation.
Performance Metric: The performance metrics include the system performance defined
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by (4.2), the player’s removed interference defined by (4.1), and the convergence speed
defined as the number of rounds before an NE is reached.
Convergence of the ChAlloc Game
We first verify that the ChAlloc game with the charging scheme, denoted by ChAl-
loc, does converge while the one without the charging scheme, denoted by No-Charge, may
oscillate. In this set of simulations, we set n to 50, r to 3, and h to 8. The x-axis represents
the number of runs, each of which is an iteration of the while-loop in Algorithm 4. Using
runs can show the results in at a more granular level than using rounds. Although the algo-
rithm will terminate when the game reaches an NE, we let it keep running for the sake of
comparison. We have the results for 10000 runs, but only show the first 1000 runs due to
the space limitation. Figure 4.4(a) shows the system performance of these two difference
game settings. As expected, ChAlloc converges to an NE after 222 runs, while No-Charge
still oscillates even after 1000 runs. The factors affecting the convergence speed will be
investigated later.
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Figure 4.4: Convergence of the ChAlloc game
Figure 4.4(b) shows the removed interference for a random player (player 44). We
observe that the removed interference of the player stays the same after about 200 runs in
ChAlloc, but oscillates even after 1000 runs in No-Charge. Note that other players have the
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similar results.
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Figure 4.5: Convergence speed
We next verify our analysis of the convergence speed, measured by the number of
rounds. According to Theorem 4.3, the theoretical value is O(r¯n2). We set h to 8 and r to
3 in Figure 4.5(a). We set n to 50 and r to 3 in Figure 4.5(b). We set n to 50 and h to 8
in Figure 4.5(c). Figure 4.5(a) and Figure 4.5(b) show the impact of n and the impact of
r on the convergence speed, respectively. We observe that the convergence speed is much
faster than the theoretical speed, and that all the instances can converge within 10 rounds
on average. Figure 4.5(c) shows that the convergence speed is almost independent of h,
with the varying range of the average being less than 1.
System Performance
We now compare the system performance of the ChAlloc game with those of other
algorithms. Figure 4.6 shows all the results. As expected, LP has the best performance
while Rand has the worst. The first observation is that all the results are consistent with
our performance analysis in Theorem 4.2. In particular, Figure 4.6(a), Figure 4.6(b) and
Figure 4.6(c) show the impact of n, r and h on the system performance, respectively. The
results confirm that the system performance of ChAlloc compared to LP is independent of
n. The less radios or the more channels there are, the closer the performance of ChAlloc
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Figure 4.6: Comparison on the system performance
is to the performance of LP. Another observation is that the gap between the performance
of Rand and the performance of ChAlloc gets narrower when the number of channels in-
creases or the number of radios decreases. The reason is that when the value of r¯h decreases,
the probability that two interfering links share the same channels decreases as well.
4.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have studied the channel allocation problem in non-cooperative
MR-MC networks. Compared with existing works, we removed the single collision do-
main assumption and considered networks with multiple collision domains. We modeled
the problem as a strategic game, called ChAlloc. Via an example, we showed that ChAlloc
may result in an oscillation when no exogenous factors exist. To avoid this possible oscil-
lation, we design a charging scheme to influence players’ behavior. We then proved that
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ChAlloc will converge to an NE in polynomial number of steps. We further proved that the
system performance in any NE is guaranteed to be at least (1− r¯h) of that in the optimal so-
lution, where r¯ is the maximum number of radios equipped on wireless devices and h is the
number of available channels. We also developed a localized algorithm for players to find
an NE strategy. Through extensive experiments, we validated our analysis of the possible
oscillation and the convergence when there is and is not the charging scheme. Finally, the
experiment results also confirmed our proof on the system performance compared to the
upper bounds returned by an LP-based algorithm.
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Part II
Incentive Mechanisms
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Chapter 5
Truthful Auction for Cooperative Communications
Cooperative communication [83] has been shown to have great potential to increase the
channel capacity between two wireless devices. It essentially exploits the nature of broad-
cast and the relaying capability of other nodes to achieve spatial diversity. Yet the appli-
cations of cooperative communication technology are rarely seen in reality, even in some
scenarios where capacity demand continually grows. The cellular network is one of such
examples. The demands for bandwidth-hungry multimedia applications have pushed the
system designers to develop more and more innovative network solutions. This fact is mir-
rored by the exponentially fast growth of 3G/4G wireless networks. Cell phone carrier
companies spend billions of dollars on building the infrastructures. As the second largest
cell phone carrier company in the U.S., AT&T plans to invest 19 billion dollars on the
improvement of 3G networks next year [4]. In contrast to 3G/4G wireless networks, co-
operative communication technology does not require extra infrastructure and offers the
advantage of flexibility. Although this technology is promising, a main obstacle lying be-
tween the potential capability of channel capacity improvement and the wide adoption of
cooperative communication is the lack of incentives for the participating wireless nodes
to serve as relay nodes. Why would a cell phone carrier be willing to relay the traffic of
another carrier at the cost of its own resource? One answer to this question is to let the
relay node have monetary value in return. Therefore there must be a trade between the
wireless node requesting relay service and the one providing such service. Auction is one
of the most popular trading form [79], as it allows competitive price discovery and fair and
efficient resource allocation.
An auction involving both buyers and sellers is called a double auction. To be more
100
Buyer
Buyer
Seller
Seller
Auctioneer
Figure 5.1: Auction for cooperative communications. Relay nodes (sellers) offer prices to
sell their relay services. Source nodes (buyers) bid these services for cooperative commu-
nication. The base station (auctioneer) determines winners and clearing prices.
specific, the double auction scheme designed in this this falls into the category of single-
round multi-item double auction. In this auction scheme, as shown in Figure 5.1, n buyers
are interested in multiple items from m sellers. However, each buyer needs at most one item
at the end of the auction and each seller can sell its item to at most one buyer. The whole
auction procedure processes in a single round fashion. Fairly surprisingly, little work has
been done in either networking literature or economics literature. Existing double auction
schemes [33, 67, 94, 110, 113] cannot be directly applied to the cooperative communication
auction. We will give a brief review on the related work in Section 5.2.
The auction design is a crucial aspect of trading market, because the auction scheme
not only directly defines the trading rules, but also implicitly defines the behaviors of partic-
ipating agents. Specifically, truthfulness (also called strategy-proofness) is the most critical
property of auction scheme. An auction scheme is truthful if revealing the truthful pri-
vate value is every participating agent’s dominant strategy no matter what strategies other
agents are doing. It has been shown both theoretically and practically that an auction could
be vulnerable to market manipulation and produce very poor outcomes if this property is
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not guaranteed [74]. Besides truthfulness, the following properties are also desirable when
designing an auction scheme: 1) Individual Rationality: each agent participating in the
auction can expect a non-negative profit; 2) Budget Balance: the auctioneer should finish
the auction with no profit loss; 3) System Efficiency: the sum of valuations of all agents is
optimized, e.g. the total capacity in this work. Unfortunately, the well-known result from
[104] shows that no double auction mechanism can achieve truthfulness, budget-balance,
and efficiency at the same time, even putting individual rationality to aside. As our goal of
this work is to stimulate the participation of wireless nodes in relay services, we focus our
design on satisfying truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance.
5.1 Introduction
In this work, we design a Truthful Auction Scheme for Cooperative communica-
tions (TASC). The main contributions of this work are as follows. Firstly, we are the first
to design a truthful auction scheme for cooperative communications, named TASC. TASC
implicitly makes it the dominant strategy to bid or ask truthfully for participating agents,
thereby eliminating the fear of market manipulation and the overhead of strategizing over
others. Secondly, besides being truthful, TASC is also individually rational and budget-
balanced. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first truthful multi-item double
auction scheme even in the economic literature. We hope our study can incite more atten-
tion on this type of auction from other researchers. Thirdly, TASC allows the auctioneer to
choose any relay assignment algorithm based on its performance requirement. For exam-
ple, the maximum weighted matching algorithm can be used to maximize the total capacity;
Algorithm ORA [129] can be used to maximize the minimum capacity; and the maximum
matching algorithm can be used to maximize the number of successful trades. Last but
not least, extensive experiments confirm the truthfulness of TASC, and show that TASC
achieves all the required properties with limited degradation on the system efficiency.
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The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, we briefly review exist-
ing related double auction schemes in the economic literature in Section 5.2. Then we pro-
vide an overview of the necessary preliminaries and formulate the problem in Section 5.3.
In Section 5.4, we first discuss the challenges of designing a truthful double auction scheme
with required economic properties. Next we give the detailed design of our auction scheme
TASC. Extensive experiment results are presented in Section 5.5. Finally we conclude this
work in Section 5.6.
5.2 Existing Auction Schemes
We categorize the related work into two groups, of which one is the related auction
schemes from economics literature and the other is specifically for cooperative communi-
cations from networking literature.
Although auction theory has been extensively studied in the economics literature,
the existing auction designs cannot fully satisfy the required properties stated in Section 1.1.
We summarize the most related works in Table 5.1. In this table, we list the major differ-
ences between the existing works and the auction scheme designed in this work. Here the
heterogeneity of trading items plays an important role in the auction design. It makes the
design more challenging as each buyer has preferences on different items from different
sellers. Besides the difference listed in the table, some of the existing schemes are also
multi-round auctions [5, 33, 99]. Multi-round auction is unsuitable for the cooperative
communications, where timeliness is a necessary requirement and large communication
overhead is unfavorable.
There are few studies on the auction design for cooperative communications in net-
working literature, among which the works in [66, 128, 141] are most related to our work.
In [128], Shastry and Adve proposed a pricing-based system to stimulate the cooperation
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Existing Work Heter. Item Double Auction Truthful
[33] 3 7 3
[113] 7 3 7
[94] 7 3 3
[7] 7 3 3
[110] 3 3 7
[35] 3 3 7
[67] 7 3 3
[5] 3 7 −
[99] 3 7 −
This work 3 3 3
Table 5.1: Existing auction schemes. “−” means that the corresponding property is un-
known.
via payment to the relay node. In [141], Wang et al. employed a buyer/seller Stackelberg
game, where a single buyer tries to buy services from multiple relays. The buyer announces
its selection of relays and the required transmission power, then the relays ask proper prices
to maximize their profits. In [66], Huang et al. proposed two auction mechanisms, which
are essentially repeated games. In each auction mechanism, each user iteratively updates its
bid to maximize its own utility function with the knowledge of others’ previous bids. With
a common drawback, none of the above works considered truthfulness, which is critical to
the auction scheme.
5.3 System Model
We use a well-known three-node example in Figure 5.2 to describe the essence
of cooperative communications (CC). In this example, s is the source node that transmits
information, d is the destination node that receives information and r is the relay node that
both receives and transmits information to enhance the communication between the source
and the destination. CC proceeds in a frame-by-frame fashion. Each frame is divided into
two time slots. The source s transmits data to the destination d in the first time slot. Due to
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the broadcast nature, relay node r can overhear this transmission. In the second time slot, r
forwards the data to d using different techniques depending on different CC modes. There
are two CC modes, Amplify-and-Forward (AF) and Decode-and-Forward (DF) [83]. For
details about AF and DF, we refer interested readers to [83]. We use cR(s,r,d) to denote the
achievable capacity under CC and cD(s,d) to denote the achievable capacity without CC.
s d
r
(a)
rs
d dr …r
ds dr
frame 1 frame 2
slot 1 slot 3 slot 4slot 2
(b)
Figure 5.2: Three-node example for CC
In this work, we consider a static ad hoc wireless network consisting of n source-
destination pairs {s1,d1;s2,d2; . . . ;sn,dn} and a set R = {r1,r2, . . . ,rm} of m relay nodes.
We use S = {s1,s2, . . . ,sn} to denote the set of source nodes and D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn}
to denote the set of destination nodes. We assume that there is a base station acting as a
central control and an auctioneer in the auction scheme, e.g. the base station in the cellular
networks, where di is the base station for all si’s, as shown in Figure 5.1.
We design the cooperative communication auction as a single-round multi-item dou-
ble auction. In this auction, source nodes are buyers, relay nodes are sellers, and the base
station is the auctioneer. Throughout this work, we may use source node and buyer, relay
node and seller, and base station and auctioneer interchangeably. For narration conve-
nience, we call both buyers and sellers agents in general. Buyers bid for relay services
for cooperative communication, while sellers offer cooperative services at the cost of re-
sources, e.g. energy, and receive monetary payment in return. For each buyer, it has
different valuations of the relay nodes as it can achieve different capacities by cooperat-
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ing with different relay nodes. Let V ji be buyer si’s true valuation of relay service from
seller r j, which describes the true price that si is willing to pay for the relay service. Let
Vi = (V 1i ,V 2i , . . . ,V mi ) be the true valuation vector of buyer si. Obviously, we have V
j
i > 0
if cR(si,r j,di)> cD(si,di) and V
j
i = 0 otherwise. A buyer has no incentive to buy the relay
service which cannot provide higher capacity than transmitting directly. Similarly, let C j
be seller r j’s true cost of providing relay service, which is for example related to the energy
consumption. A seller does not differentiate among buyers as it uses the same transmission
power. We assume that each buyer wants at most one relay to facilitate the cooperative
communication. A recent work by Zhao et al. [168] shows that it is sufficient for a source
node to choose the best relay node even when multiple are available to achieve full diver-
sity. We also assume that each relay node can be shared by at most one source node as it
would provide different capacity from what the buyer expects otherwise.
The auction is a sealed-bid auction. Following the terminology in auction theory,
we refer the price submitted by a buyer and a seller as bid and ask, respectively. Each buyer
(resp. seller) submits its private bid (resp. ask) to the auctioneer and has no knowledge
about others. We assume that both asks and bids are static and will not change during
the auction. At the beginning of the auction, each buyer si submits a bid vector Bi =
(B1i ,B
2
i , . . . ,B
m
i ), where B
j
i is the bid for seller r j. Bi may or may not be the same as its true
valuation vector Vi. Each seller r j submits its ask A j, which may or may not be its true cost
C j. Let B = (B1;B2; . . . ;Bn) represent the bid matrix consisting of bid vectors submitted
by all buyers. Similarly, let A = (A1,A2, . . . ,Am) represent the set of asks submitted by all
sellers. Let B− ji = (B
1
i , . . . ,B
j−1
i ,B
j+1
i , . . . ,B
m
i ) denote the bid vector of buyer si with bid B
j
i
removed. Let B−i = (B1; . . . ;Bi−1;Bi+1; . . . ;Bn) denote the bid matrix with si’s bid vector
Bi removed. Let B|iB denote the bid matrix with si’s bid vector changed to B. We have A− j
and A| jA defined in similar ways. Given S , R, D , B and A, the auctioneer decides the
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winners, including both winning buyers and winning sellers, allocates the relay nodes to
the source nodes, and determines the clearing price for both winning buyers and winning
sellers according to the designed auction scheme. LetSw⊆S be the set of winning buyers
and Rw ⊆R be the set of winning sellers. Let σ : {i : si ∈Sw} → { j : r j ∈Rw} be the
relay node assignment decided by the auctioneer. Note that σ(·) is actually a one-to-one
mapping from the indices of winning buyers to those of winning sellers. Therefore, σ−1( j)
is the index of the source node that relay node r j is assigned to. Let Pbi be the price that
the winning buyer si needs to pay. Let Psj be the payment the auctioneer pays the winning
seller r j. Then the utility of buyer si ∈S is defined as
Ubi =

Vσ(i)i −Pbi if si ∈Sw,
0 otherwise.
(5.1)
Accordingly, the utility of seller r j ∈R is defined as
U sj =

Psj −C j if r j ∈Rw,
0 otherwise.
(5.2)
5.4 TASC
5.4.1 Challenge of the Auction Design
In this section, we illustrate the challenges of designing a truthful cooperative communica-
tion auction. To better understand these challenges, we show the failures of existing double
auction schemes when directly applied to the cooperative communication auction. There
are two existing double auction schemes, VCG-based double auction and McAfee double
auction. We analyze each of them in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.1, respectively.
VCG-based Double Auction
The most well-known auction scheme is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) scheme
[23, 60, 138], which can guarantee the truthfulness. In the VCG-based double auction
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scheme [110], the winners and the assignment between buyers and sellers are determined
in a way such that the social welfare W = ∑si∈Sw(B
σ(i)
i −Aσ(i)) is maximized. Intuitively,
this can be achieved by finding the maximum weighted matching in the bipartite graph
G = (S ,R,E ,δ ), where (si,r j) ∈ E if B ji > 0 and δ (si,r j) = B ji −A j is the weight on
edge (si,r j). Let W ∗ be the optimal value. Let W ∗−si be the optimal value when buyer si is
removed from the auction. Let W ∗−r j be the optimal value when seller r j is removed from
the auction. The price each buyer si ∈Sw needs to pay is
Pbi = B
σ(i)
i − (W ∗−W ∗−si). (5.3)
The payment each seller r j ∈Rw receives is
Psj = A j +(W
∗−W ∗−r j). (5.4)
Obviously, both W ∗−W ∗−si and W ∗−W ∗−r j are non-negative for all si ∈Sw and r j ∈
Rw. Therefore, the VCG-based double auction satisfies the individual rationality property.
Furthermore, it has been shown that VCG-based auctions are truthful [110]. The proof
closely follows standard Vickrey auction proofs. However, a counter example in Figure 5.3
shows that the VCG-based double auction scheme is not budget balanced. In this example,
W ∗ = 9, W ∗−s1 = 4, W
∗−s2 = 7, W
∗−r1 = 7, and W
∗−r2 = 3. Hence P
b
1 = 10− (9− 4) = 5,
Pb2 = 4− (9− 7) = 2, Ps1 = 2+ (9− 7) = 4 and Ps2 = 3+ (9− 3) = 9. The auctioneer
finishes the auction with a loss of (4+9)− (5+2) = 6.
McAfee Double Auction
In the McAfee double auction [94], items for auction are homogeneous. Buyers
have no preference on these items. Therefore each buyer si only submits one bid Bi and
each seller r j offers one ask A j. The auctioneer starts by sorting the bids in non-increasing
order and the asks in non-decreasing order: Bi1 ≥ Bi2 ≥ . . .Bin and A j1 ≤ A j2 ≤ . . .A jm . The
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Figure 5.3: Example showing the budget imbalance of the VCG-based double auction.
The two numbers associated with link (si,r j) are bid B
j
i and δ (si,r j). The thick blue lines
represent the maximum weighted matching. The number besides each seller is its ask.
auctioneer then finds the largest k such that Bik ≥ A jk and Bik+1 < A jk+1 . Let t =
Bik+1+A jk+1
2 .
The clearing prices are determined as follows:
Pb = Ps = t if A jk ≤ t ≤ Bik ,
Pb = Bik ,P
s = A jk otherwise,
where Pb is the price charged to each winning buyer and Ps is the payment that each win-
ning seller receives. Although McAfee double auction satisfies all three properties desired
in this work [94], the homogeneity of auction items makes it unsuitable for the cooperative
communication auction without further development.
5.4.2 Design of TASC
Now, we present TASC, a truthful and computationally efficient auction scheme for co-
operative communications. We start by giving a brief overview of the design rationale.
We then describe the detailed design consisting of two main stages. Next we show that
TASC satisfies the three properties listed in Section 1.1. Finally, we prove that TASC has
a polynomial time complexity of O(T + l2), where T is the time complexity of the relay
assignment algorithm and l = min{n,m}.
Overview: Although the VCG-based double auction is superficially closest to the auction
we aim to design, the imbalance of the budget is unacceptable to the auctioneer. In contrast,
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TASC is inspired by the design of McAfee double auction. TASC consists of two stages:
Assignment and Winner-Determination &Pricing. To overcome the limitation of McAfee
double auction, we apply an assignment algorithm to find a relay assignment in the assign-
ment stage. In the second stage, we apply McAfee double auction to determine the clearing
price for both sellers and buyers. The auctioneer charges all winning buyers the same price
and pays all winning sellers the same payment.
Design: We now describe the design of TASC in detail. In the assignment stage, we need to
design a new relay assignment algorithm or apply the existing relay assignment algorithms
with the requirement of being independent of the buyers’ bids and the sellers’ asks. The
relay assignment algorithm’s dependency on either the bids or the asks could make the
auction vulnerable to market manipulation. Our procedure for the assignment stage is
shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: TASC-Asgmnt(S ,R, D)
1 Construct a set U of vertices corresponding toS ;
2 Construct a set V of vertices corresponding toR;
3 E ← /0;
4 forall the si ∈S , r j ∈R do
5 if cR(si,r j,di)> cD(si,di) then
6 E ← E ∪{(si,r j)};
7 end
8 end
9 (Sc,Rc,σ)←Φ(U ,V ,E ,cR);
10 return (Sc,Rc,σ);
Depending on the specific scenario, the auctioneer can choose different assignment
algorithms (Φ(·)) for different purposes. For example, to maximize the total capacity,
the maximum weighted matching algorithm can be applied; to maximize the minimum
capacity among all source nodes, Algorithm ORA in [129] can be applied; to maximize
the number of trades, the maximum matching algorithm fulfills the mission. The return
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values include the candidate winning buyers Sc, the candidate winning sellers Rc and the
assignment σ .
In the winner-determination & pricing stage, we tightly integrate the winner deter-
mination and the pricing operation. With the assignment obtained in the previous stage, we
can apply McAfee double auction to determine the winners and the clearing prices. The
detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6: TASC-WD&Pricing(Sc,Rc,σ ,B,A)
1 Sw← /0,Rw← /0;
2 Sort all the buyers inSc to get an ordered list S=< si1,si2, . . . > such that
Bσ(i1)i1 ≥ B
σ(i2)
i2 . . .;
3 Sort all the sellers inRc to get an ordered list R=< r j1,r j2, . . . > such that
A j1 ≤ A j2 . . .;
4 Find the largest k, such that Bσ(ik)ik ≥ A jk ;
5 if k < 2 then return (Sw,Rw,0,0);
6 (x,y)← (ik, jk);
7 // Determine the price and the payment
8 Pb← Bσ(x)x , Ps← Ay;
9 // Sacrifice one buyer and one seller to ensure the truthfulness
10 Sw← Sx \{sx},Rw← Ry \{ry};
11 // Determine the final winners
12 for si ∈Sw do
13 if rσ(i) 6∈Rw then Sw←Sw \{si};
14 end
15 for r j ∈Rw do
16 if sσ−1( j) 6∈Sw then Rw←Rw \{r j};
17 end
18 return (Sw,Rw,Pb,Ps);
For ease of illustration, we introduce more notations and concepts.
• S denotes an ordered list of buyers sorted in non-increasing order according to their
bids on the assigned relay nodes.
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• R denotes an ordered list of sellers sorted in non-decreasing order according to their
asks.
• Sk denotes the sublist of the first k buyers in S.
• Rk denotes the sublist of the first k sellers in R.
• Σ(S,R) denotes the set of matchings induced by S and R, i.e., Σ(S,R) = {(si,r j) :
si ∈ S,r j ∈ R, j = σ(i)}.
• We call the buyer-seller pair, according to which the auctioneer determines the win-
ners and clearing prices, the boundary pair. In McAfee double auction, sik–r jk is
such a pair.
• Since the winning buyer and the winning seller are pairwise determined, we call
(si,rσ(i)) or (sσ−1( j),r j) the winning pair.
The main algorithm of TASC is illustrated in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7: TASC(S ,R, D , B, A)
1 (Sc,Rc,σ)← TASC-Asgmnt(S ,R, D);
2 (Sw,Rw,Pb,Ps)← TASC-WD&Pricing(Sc,Rc,σ ,B,A);
3 return (Sw,Rw,σ ,Pb,Ps);
Properties of TASC: Having given the detailed design of TASC, we now prove the prop-
erties mentioned in Section 1.1.
Theorem 5.1. TASC is individually rational. 
Proof. For each winning buyer si ∈Sw ⊆ Sx, we know that Bσ(i)i ≥ Bσ(x)x = Pb. The same
claim also holds for each seller. This completes our proof.
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Theorem 5.2. TASC is budget-balanced. 
Proof. Note that we have |Sw| = |Rw| based on the assignment assumption. For each
winning buyer si ∈ Sw and its assigned winning seller rσ(i) ∈ Rw, we have Pbi = Pb =
Bσ(x)x ≥ Ay = Ps = Psj . Therefore we have ∑si∈Sw Pbi −∑r j∈Rw Psj = |Sw|(Pb−Ps) ≥ 0,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 5.3. TASC is truthful. 
Before proving Theorem 5.3, we need to prove a series of lemmas. We show that the
auction result of each buyer is partially independent of its bid in Lemma 5.1, the winner-
determination is bid-monotonic [7] (resp. ask-monotonic) for the buyer in Lemma 5.2
(resp. the seller in Lemma 5.3), the pricing is bid-independent for buyers in Lemma 5.4
(resp. ask-independent for the sellers in Lemma 5.5) and TASC is truthful for buyers in
Lemma 5.6 (resp. sellers in Lemma 5.7).
Hereafter, we use tilde to differentiate notations with the same meaning, but dif-
ferent values, e.g., B˜i and Bi are two different bid vectors of si. In addition, we define
several comparison operators: > j,= j,< j. We say B˜i> jBi if B˜
j
i > B
j
i , B˜i= jBi if B˜
j
i = B
j
i
and B˜i< jBi if B˜
j
i < B
j
i .
Lemma 5.1. If buyer si is assigned relay rσ(i) in the assignment stage, then the auc-
tion result for si is independent of its bids B
−σ(i)
i . In other words, the results of Ψ =
(S ,R,D ,B|iBi,A) and Ψ˜= (S ,R,D ,B|iB˜i,A) are the same, if Bi=σ(i)B˜i. 
Proof. The assignment stage is independent of bids and asks. In the winner-determination
and pricing stage (Algorithm 6), it is clear that both the winner determination and the price
charged to the buyer are only dependent on the bid the buyer bids on rσ(i) and the asks A
of sellers. Therefore, our lemma holds.
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Due to the space limitation, we prove the properties for buyers in the following
lemmas and only prove one for sellers. Other properties for sellers can be proved in similar
ways as we prove for buyers.
  
 
     
     
sx  si si 
ry 
Figure 5.4: Illustration for Lemma 5.2
Lemma 5.2. If si winsΨ=(S ,R,D ,B|iBi,A) by biddingBi, it can also win Ψ˜=(S ,R,D ,B|iB˜i,A)
by bidding B˜i>σ(i)Bi. 
Proof. In the assignment stage, since the relay assignment algorithm is independent of bids
and asks, if si is assigned a relay node rσ(i) in Ψ, it is assigned the same relay node in Ψ˜
as well. Let pi and p˜i be si’s positions in S and S˜, respectively. An illustration is shown in
Figure 5.4. Because B˜σ(i)i > B
σ(i)
i , the orders in S and S˜ after pi are exactly the same. In
addition, we know that the values of k (Line 4) are the same in both S and S˜. Therefore,
during the winner determination stage, sx and ry are still selected as the boundary pair in
Ψ˜, which implies that buyer si is also a winner in Ψ˜.
Lemma 5.3. If r j winsΨ=(S ,R,D ,B,A| jA j) by asking A j, it can also win Ψ˜=(S ,R,D ,B,A| jA˜ j)
by asking A˜ j < A j. 
Proof. Since the relay assignment algorithm is independent of bids and asks, r j is assigned
to the same buyer sσ−1( j) in both Ψ and Ψ˜. Let qi and q˜i be r j’s positions in R and R˜,
respectively. An illustration is shown in Figure 5.5. Because A˜ j < A j, the orders in R and
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Figure 5.5: Illustration for Lemma 5.3
R˜ after qi are exactly the same. In addition, we know that the values of k (Line 4) are the
same in both R and R˜. Therefore, during the winner determination stage, sx and ry are still
selected as the boundary pair in Ψ˜, which implies that seller ri is also a winner in Ψ˜.
Lemma 5.4. If si wins both Ψ= (S ,R,D ,B|iBi,A) and Ψ˜= (S ,R,D ,B|iB˜i,A) by bid-
ding Bi and B˜i, it is charged the same price, i.e., Pb = P˜b. 
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, we know that buyer si’s bid B
−σ(i)
i will not change the auction
result nor the charged price if it wins the auction. Hence, without loss of generality, we
assume that B˜i>σ(i)Bi. As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 5.2, sx and ry are selected as
the boundary pair in both Ψ and Ψ˜. According to the pricing strategy, we know that, buyer
si is charged the same price, Pb = P˜b = B
σ(x)
x , in both Ψ and Ψ˜.
Lemma 5.5. If r j wins both Ψ = (S ,R,D ,B,A| jA j) and Ψ˜ = (S ,R,D ,B,A| jA˜ j) by
asking A j and A˜ j, it is paid the same payment, i.e., Ps = P˜s. 
Lemma 5.6. TASC is truthful for buyers. 
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing that no buyer si can improve its utility by bidding
Bi 6=Vi, i.e. U˜bi ≤Ubi for any Bi 6=Vi, where U˜bi and Ubi are the utilities of si when bidding
Bi and Vi, respectively. We examine all the possible cases one by one as shown in Table 5.2.
115
Case Result
Bi=σ(i)Vi U˜bi =Ubi
Bi>σ(i)Vi
Bi: w, Vi: w U˜bi =Ubi
Bi: w, Vi: l U˜bi ≤Ubi
Bi: l, Vi: l U˜bi =Ubi
Bi<σ(i)Vi
Bi: w, Vi: w U˜bi =Ubi
Bi: l, Vi: w U˜bi ≤Ubi
Bi: l, Vi: l U˜bi =Ubi
Table 5.2: Proof logic of Lemma 5.6. w means it wins and l means it loses.
• Case 1: Bi=σ(i)Vi
By Lemma 5.1, we know that buyer si is charged the same price Pb by bidding Bi and Vi
if Bi=σ(i)Vi. Therefore, we have U˜bi =V
σ(i)
i −Pb =Ubi .
• Case 2: Bi>σ(i)Vi
By Lemma 5.2, we know that it is impossible that buyer si wins the auction by bidding
Vi but loses by bidding Bi. Hence there are three subcases: 1) si wins by bidding both Vi
and Bi; 2) si wins by bidding Bi but loses by bidding Vi; and 3) si loses by bidding both
Vi and Bi. For subcase 1), buyer si is charged the same price Pb according to Lemma 5.4.
Hence, we have U˜bi =U
b
i = V
σ(i)
i −Pb. For subcase 3), we have U˜bi =Ubi = 0 because
si loses in both auctions. Now we focus on subcase 2). Since si wins by bidding Bi and
loses by bidding Vi, we know that P˜b = B
σ(x˜)
x˜ ≥ Vσ(i)i , where x˜ is the index of buyer
selected in Line 6 in Ψ˜. Hence, we have U˜bi =V
σ(i)
i − P˜b ≤ 0 =Ubi .
• Case 3: Bi<σ(i)Vi
By Lemma 5.2, we know that it is impossible that the buyer wins the auction by bidding
Bi but loses by bidding Vi. Hence there are three subcases: 1) si wins by bidding both
Vi and Bi; 2) si loses by bidding Bi but wins by bidding Vi; and 3) si loses by bidding
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both Vi and Bi. For subcases 1) and 3), we can prove that U˜bi =U
b
i following the same
analysis as in Case 2. For subcase 2), it is clear that U˜bi = 0 and U
b
i ≥ 0.
We have proved that a buyer cannot improve its utility by submitting a bid vector other than
its true valuation vector. This completes the proof.
Lemma 5.7. TASC is truthful for sellers. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3: Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 5.7 together prove that TASC is truthful.
Theorem 5.4. The time complexity of TASC is O(T + l2), where T is the time complexity
of relay assignment algorithm and l = min{n,m}. 
Proof. For the assignment stage, the time complexity depends on the relay assignment
algorithm used. For example, the maximum weighted matching algorithm has time com-
plexity of O((n+m)2 log(n+m)+ (n+m)nm) [26], Algorithm ORA [129] takes O(nm2)
time, and the maximum matching algorithm has time complexity of O(
√
n+m · nm). We
denote the time complexity of the relay assignment algorithm by T in general. In the
winner determination & pricing stage, since the input is the assignment result, we have the
number of buyers equal to the number of sellers. Obviously, this number, denoted as l, is
not greater than min{n,m}. Sorting both sellers and buyers takes O(l log l) time (Lines 2
and 3). Finding the boundary pair takes O(l) time (Line 4). Determining the final winning
pairs takes O(l2) time (Lines 10 to 17). The time complexity of this stage is thus O(l2).
Therefore the overall time complexity of TASC is O(T + l2).
Theorem 5.5. The time complexity of TASC is O(T + l2), where T is the time complexity
of relay assignment algorithm and l = min{n,m}. 
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Proof. For the assignment stage, the time complexity depends on the relay assignment
algorithm used. For example, the maximum weighted matching algorithm has time com-
plexity of O((n+m)2 log(n+m)+ (n+m)nm) [26], Algorithm ORA [129] takes O(nm2)
time, and the maximum matching algorithm has time complexity of O(
√
n+m · nm). We
denote the time complexity of the relay assignment algorithm by T in general. In the
winner determination & pricing stage, since the input is the assignment result, we have the
number of buyers equal to the number of sellers. Obviously, this number, denoted as l, is
not greater than min{n,m}. Sorting both sellers and buyers takes O(l log l) time (Lines 2
and 3). Finding the boundary pair takes O(l) time (Line 4). Determining the final winning
pairs takes O(l2) time (Lines 10 to 17). The time complexity of this stage is thus O(l2).
Therefore the overall time complexity of TASC is O(T + l2).
5.5 Performance Evaluation of TASC
In this section, we present extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of
TASC and study the economic impact on the system efficiency.
Experiment Setup: We considered a wireless network where nodes are randomly dis-
tributed in a 1000×1000 square. We followed the same parameter settings as in [129]. Let
the bandwidth be 22 MHz for all channels. The transmission power is 1 Watt for all wire-
less nodes. For the transmission model, we assume that the path loss exponent is 4 and the
noise is 10−10. For cooperative communication, DF mode was used. We fixed the number
of buyers (n) at 100 and varied the number of sellers (m) from 50 to 150 with increment of
10. For each setting, we randomly generated 1000 instances and averaged the results. All
the tests were run on a Linux PC with 2.00 GHz Intel Pentium CPU and 1.5 GB memory.
For the auction, we assume the buyers’ bids are randomly distributed over (0,Vmax],
where Vmax is set to 4 in most of experiments and varied in the experiments showing the
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Figure 5.6: The utilities of a buyer ((a)-(c)) and a seller ((d)-(f)) in auctions with different
assignment algorithms, where n = m = 100. In each auction, V is the true valuation of the
buyer and C is the true cost of the seller. Two different values are tested for both buyer’s
true valuation V and seller’s true cost C. For each different true valuation (resp. cost), the
buyer (resp. the seller) cannot improve its utility by submitting bid (resp. offering ask)
different from its true valuation (resp. cost).
impact of bid distribution on the system efficiency. Similarly we assume the sellers’ asks
are randomly distributed over (0,1].
The performance metrics in the experiments include agents’ utilities, auctioneer’s
profit, total capacity, number of successful trades and the minimum capacity among all
buyers. Throughout all the experiments, we denote the maximum weighted matching algo-
rithm by MWM and the maximum matching algorithm by MM.
Truthfulness of TASC
To verify the truthfulness of TASC, we randomly pick one buyer and one seller, and
examine how their utilities change when they bid or ask different values. The results are
shown in Figure 5.6(a)-(c) for the buyer and in Figure 5.6(d)-(f) for the seller. We note that
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Figure 5.7: Profit of the auctioneer
no buyer (resp. seller) can improve its utility by biding (resp. asking) untruthfully.
Impact on Profit
Although making profit is not the goal of designing TASC, it is still necessary to
study the impacts of different assignment algorithms on the profit. Figure 5.7 plots the
profits of the auctioneer when different relay assignment algorithms are applied. The first
observation is that the profits are low for all three different relay assignment algorithms,
with the maximum profit less than 2. Due to the way we determine the price and the pay-
ment, we have Pb = Ps for many instances. Therefore, the profits are 0 in these instances.
Another observation is that the profit decreases with the increase of the number of sellers.
This is because as more and more sellers are involved in the auction, the probability that
Pb = Ps is becoming higher.
Impact on System Efficiency
Depending on the system performance requirement, the system efficiency could be
the total capacity, the number of successful trades, and the minimum capacity among all the
participating buyers. Clearly, since the auctioneer cannot allow all the participating agents
to be winners, it is inevitable to have degradation over the pure relay assignment, except
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for the auction with ORA. When the minimum capacity is the system efficiency, TASC will
not degrade the performance since the winner decision is made upon the optimal results.
To capture the economic impact on the system efficiency, we plot the degradation of TASC
over pure relay assignment algorithms in Figure 5.8(a). Surprisingly, the degradation is
independent of the number of sellers for both MWM and MM.
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Figure 5.8: System degradation of TASC over pure relay assignment algorithms
Next we study the impact of the bid distribution on the system efficiency. Fig-
ure 5.8(b) illustrates the degradation of TASC with both MWM and MM for different val-
ues of Vmax. We observe that when the maximum bid value Vmax increases, the degradation
of TASC over the pure relay assignment algorithms decreases. In other words, when buy-
ers have higher true valuations on the services from relay nodes, TASC can achieve all the
required economic properties without degrading the system efficiency significantly.
Running Time
To confirm our time complexity analysis in Section 5.4.2, we illustrate the running
time of TASC with different assignment algorithms in Figure 5.9. We note that the running
time increases with the increase of the number of sellers for both MWM and ORA. How-
ever, for MM, the running time increases first and then becomes stable after m = n. This is
because the maximum number of matching is limited by n even when m keeps increasing.
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Figure 5.9: The running time of TASC, where n= 100 and m is varying from 50 to 150. (a)
and (b) use the same set of results, while (b) shows the results without MWM for clarity.
5.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have designed TASC, a truthful auction scheme for cooperative
communications. To stimulate the participation of wireless devices in relaying traffic for
others, TASC allows potential relay nodes to offer prices on their relay services and re-
quires interested source nodes to bid on them. With a careful design, TASC explicitly
enforce both sellers and buyers to submit their true valuations, thereby eliminating the fear
of market manipulation and the overhead of strategizing over others for them. Meanwhile,
TASC also satisfies individual rationality and budget balance properties. In addition, TASC
can use any relay assignment algorithm to achieve different system performance require-
ments. Extensive experiment results confirm our theoretic analysis of TASC and show
that TASC can achieve all the required economic properties with limited system efficiency
degradation.
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Chapter 6
Recruiting an Army of Smartphones for Crowdsourcing
The past few years have witnessed the proliferation of smartphones in people’s daily lives.
With the advent of 4G networks and more powerful processors, the needs for laptops in
particular have begun to fade. Smartphone sales passed PCs for the first time in the final
quarter of 2010 [24]. This inflection point occurred much quicker than predicted, which
was supposed to be 2012 [95]. According to the International Data Corporation (IDC)
Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker, it is estimated that 982 million smartphones
will be shipped worldwide in 2015 [68].
Nowadays, smartphones are programmable and equipped with a set of cheap but
powerful embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, GPS, mi-
crophone, and camera. These sensors can collectively monitor a diverse range of human ac-
tivities and surrounding environment. Smartphones are undoubtedly revolutionizing many
sectors of our life, including social networks, environmental monitoring, business, health-
care, and transportation [82].
If all the smartphones on the planet together constitute a mobile phone sensing
network, it would be the largest sensing network in the history. One can leverage millions
of personal smartphones and a near-pervasive wireless network infrastructure to collect and
analyze sensed data far beyond the scale of what was possible before, without the need to
deploy thousands of static sensors.
Realizing the great potential of the mobile phone sensing, many researchers have
developed numerous applications and systems, such as Sensorly [126] for making cellu-
lar/WiFi network coverage maps, Nericell [100] and VTrack [137] for providing traffic
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information, PIER [102] for calculating personalized environmental impact and exposure,
and Ear-Phone [116] for creating noise maps. For more details on mobile phone sensing,
we refer interested readers to the survey work [82].
Smartphone Users
Sensed Data
Sensing Plan
Sensing Task 
Description Cloud
Platform
Figure 6.1: Mobile phone sensing system
As shown in Figure 6.1, a mobile phone sensing system consists of a mobile phone
sensing platform, which resides in the cloud and consists of multiple sensing servers, and
many smartphone users, which are connected with the platform via the cloud. These smart-
phone users can act as sensing service providers. The platform recruits smartphone users
to provide sensing services.
Although there are many applications and systems on mobile phone sensing [100,
102, 116, 126, 137], most of them are based on voluntary participation. While participating
in a mobile phone sensing task, smartphone users consume their own resources such as
battery and computing power. In addition, users also expose themselves to potential privacy
threats by sharing their sensed data with location tags. Therefore a user would not be
interested in participating in mobile phone sensing, unless it receives a satisfying reward to
compensate its resource consumption and potential privacy breach. Without adequate user
participation, it is impossible for the mobile phone sensing applications to achieve good
service quality, since sensing services are truly dependent on users’ sensed data. While
many researchers have developed different mobile phone sensing applications [28, 84],
they either do not consider the design of incentive mechanisms or have neglected some
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critical properties of incentive mechanisms.
6.1 Introduction
To fill the void caused by the lack of incentive mechanisms, we will design several
incentive mechanisms to motivate users to participate in mobile phone sensing applications.
We consider two types of incentive mechanisms for a mobile phone sensing sys-
tem: platform-centric incentive mechanisms and user-centric incentive mechanisms. In a
platform-centric incentive mechanism, the platform has the absolute control over the total
payment to users, and users can only tailor their actions to cater for the platform. Whereas
in a user-centric incentive mechanism, the roles of the platform and users are reversed.
To assure itself of the bottom-line benefit, each user announces a reserve price, the lowest
price at which it is willing to sell a service. The platform then selects a subset of users and
pay each of them an amount that is no lower than the user’s reserve price.
The main contributions of this work include:
• We design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing, a new sensing paradigm
that takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to scale up the sensed data collec-
tion and analysis to a level of what was previously impossible.
• We consider two system models from two different perspectives: the platform-centric
model where the platform provides a fixed reward to participating users, and the user-
centric model where users can have their reserve prices for the sensing service.
• For the platform-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stack-
elberg game. We present an efficient algorithm to compute the unique Stackelberg
Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and none of the users
can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy.
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• For the user-centric model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, which
is computationally efficient, individually-rational, profitable and, more importantly,
truthful.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we briefly
review the state of the art on the incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing
systems. In Section 6.3, we describe the mobile phone sensing system model including
both the platform-centric model and the user-centric model. We then study, design and
analyze the incentive mechanisms for these two models in Section 6.4.1 and Section 6.4.2,
respectively. Next we evaluate the performance of proposed incentive mechanisms through
extensive simulations in Section 6.5. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.6.
6.2 Related Work
In [118], Reddy et al. developed recruitment frameworks to enable the platform
to identify well-suited participants for sensing services. However, they focused only on
the user selection, not the incentive mechanism design. To the best of our knowledge,
there are few research studies on the incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing
[28, 84]. In [28], Danezis et al. developed a sealed-bid second-price auction to motivate
user participation. However, the utility of the platform was neglected in the design of the
auction. In [84], Lee and Hoh designed and evaluated a reverse auction based dynamic
price incentive mechanism, where users can sell their sensed data to the service provider
with users’ claimed bid prices. However, the authors failed to consider the truthfulness in
the design of the mechanism.
The design of the incentive mechanism was also studied for other networking prob-
lems, such as spectrum trading [50, 142, 170] and routing [169]. However none of them can
be directly applied to mobile phone sensing applications, as they all considered properties
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specifically pertain to the studied problems.
6.3 System Model
We use Figure 6.1 to aid our description of the mobile phone sensing system. The
system consists of a mobile phone sensing platform, which resides in the cloud and con-
sists of multiple sensing servers, and many smartphone users, which are connected to the
platform via the cloud. The platform first publicizes the sensing tasks. Assume that there
is a set U = {1,2, . . . ,n} of smartphone users interested in participating in mobile phone
sensing after reading the sensing task description, where n ≥ 2. A user participating in
mobile phone sensing will incur a cost, to be elaborated later. Therefore it expects a pay-
ment in return for its service. Taking cost and return into consideration, each user makes
its own sensing plan, which could be the sensing time or the reserve price for selling its
sensed data, and submits it to the platform. After collecting the sensing plans from users,
the platform computes the payment for each user and sends the payments to the users. The
chosen users will conduct the sensing tasks and send the sensed data to the platform. This
completes the whole mobile phone sensing process.
The platform is only interested in maximizing its own utility. Since smartphones are
owned by different individuals, it is reasonable to assume that users are selfish but rational.
Hence each user only wants to maximize its own utility, and will not participate in mobile
phone sensing unless there is sufficient incentive. The focus of this work is on the design of
incentive mechanisms that are simple, scalable, and have provably good properties. Other
issues in the design and implementation of the whole mobile phone sensing system is out
of the scope of this work. Please refer to MAUI [27] for energy saving issues, PRISM [30]
for application developing issues, and PEPSI [32] and TP [122] for privacy issues.
We study two models: platform-centric and user-centric. In the platform-centric
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model, the sensing plan of an interested user is in the form of its sensing time. A user
participating in mobile phone sensing will earn a payment that is no lower than its cost.
However, it needs to compete with other users for a fixed total payment. In the user-centric
model, each user asks for a price for its service. If selected, the user will receive a payment
that is no lower than its asked price. Unlike the platform-centric model, the total payment is
not fixed for the user-centric model. Hence, the users have more control over the payment
in the user-centric model.
Platform-Centric Model:
In this model, there is only one sensing task. The platform announces a total reward
R > 0, motivating users to participate in mobile phone sensing, while each user decides its
level of participation based on the reward.
The sensing plan of user i is represented by ti, the number of time units it is willing
to provide the sensing service. Hence ti ≥ 0. By setting ti = 0, user i indicates that it will
not participate in mobile phone sensing. The sensing cost of user i is κi× ti, where κi > 0
is its unit cost. Assume that the reward received by user i is proportional to ti. Then the
utility of user i is
u¯i =
ti
∑ j∈U t j
R− tiκi, (6.1)
i.e., reward minus cost. The utility of the platform is
u¯0 = λ log
(
1+ ∑
i∈U
log(1+ ti)
)
−R, (6.2)
where λ > 1 is a system parameter, the log(1+ ti) term reflects the platform’s diminishing
return on the work of user i, and the outer log term reflects the platform’s diminishing return
on participating users.
Under this model, the objective of the platform is to decide the optimal value of
R so as to maximize (6.2), while each user i ∈ U selfishly decides its sensing time ti to
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maximize (6.1) for the given value of R. Since no rational user is willing to provide service
for a negative utility, user i shall set ti = 0 when R≤ κi∑ j 6=i∈U t j.
User-Centric Model:
In this model, the platform announces a set Γ = {τ1,τ2, . . . ,τm} of tasks for the
users to select. Each τ j ∈ Γ has a value ν j > 0 to the platform. Each user i selects a subset
of tasks Γi ⊆ Γ according to its preference. Based on the selected task set, user i also has
an associated cost ci, which is private and only known to itself. User i then submits the
task-bid pair (Γi,bi) to the platform, where bi, called user i’s bid, is the reserve price user
i wants to sell the service for. Upon receiving the task-bid pairs from all the users, the
platform selects a subset S of users as winners and determines the payment pi for each
winning user i. The utility of user i is
u˜i =

pi− ci, if i ∈S ,
0, otherwise.
(6.3)
The utility of the platform is
u˜0 = v(S )− ∑
i∈S
pi, (6.4)
where v(S ) = ∑τ j∈∪i∈S Γi ν j.
Our objective for the user-centric model is to design an incentive mechanism sat-
isfying the three desirable properties in Section 1.1. Note that in this specific incentive
mechanism design, we also consider Profitability. The platform should not incur a deficit.
In other words, the value brought by the winners should be at least as large as the total
payment paid to the winners.
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6.4 Incentive Mechanism Design
6.4.1 Design for the Platform-Centric Model
We model the platform-centric incentive mechanism as a Stackelberg game [46], which
we call the MSensing game. There are two stages in this mechanism: In the first stage,
the platform announces its reward R; in the second stage, each user strategizes its sensing
time to maximize its own utility. Therefore the platform is the leader and the users are the
followers in this Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, both the platform and the users are players.
The strategy of the platform is its reward R. The strategy of user i is its working time ti.
Let t = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) denote the strategy profile consisting of all users’ strategies. Let t−i
denote the strategy profile excluding ti. As a notational convention, we write t = (ti, t−i).
Note that the second stage of the MSensing game itself can be considered a non-
cooperative game, which we call the Sensing Time Determination (STD) game. Given the
MSensing game formulation, we are interested in answering the following questions:
Q1: For a given reward R, is there a set of stable strategies in the STD game such that no
user has anything to gain by unilaterally changing its current strategy?
Q2: If the answer to Q1 is yes, is the stable strategy set unique? When it is unique, users
will be guaranteed to select the strategies in the same stable strategy set.
Q3: How can the platform select the value of R to maximize its utility in (6.2)?
The stable strategy set in Q1 corresponds to the concept of Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game
theory [46].
Definition 6.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A set of stra- tegies (tne1 , t
ne
2 , . . . , t
ne
n ) is a Nash Equilib-
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rium of the STD game if for any user i,
u¯i(tnei , t
ne
−i)≥ u¯i(ti, tne−i),
for any ti ≥ 0, where u¯i is defined (6.1).
The existence of an NE is important, since an NE strategy profile is stable (no
player has an incentive to make a unilateral change) whereas a non-NE strategy profile is
unstable. The uniqueness of NE allows the platform to predict the behaviors of the users
and thus enables the platform to select the optimal value of R. Therefore the answer to Q3
depends heavily on those to Q1 and Q2. The optimal solution computed in Q3 together with
the NE of the STD game constitutes a solution to the MSensing game, called Stackelberg
Equilibrium.
User Sensing Time Determination:
Based on the definition of NE, every user is playing its best response strategy in an
NE. From (6.1), we know that ti ≤ Rκi because u¯i will be negative otherwise. To study the
best response strategy of user i, we compute the derivatives of u¯i with respect to ti:
∂ u¯i
∂ ti
=
−Rti
(∑ j∈U t j)2
+
R
∑ j∈U t j
−κi, (6.5)
∂ 2u¯i
∂ t2i
=−2R∑ j∈U \{i} t j
(∑ j∈U t j)3
< 0. (6.6)
Since the second-order derivative of u¯i is negative, the utility u¯i is a strictly concave function
in ti. Therefore given any R > 0 and any strategy profile t−i of the other users, the best
response strategy βi(t−i) of user i is unique, if it exists. If the strategy of all other user
j 6= i is t j = 0, then user i does not have a best response strategy, as it can have a utility
arbitrarily close to R, by setting ti to a sufficiently small positive number. Therefore we
are only interested in the best response for user i when ∑ j∈U \{i} t j > 0. Setting the first
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derivative of u¯i to 0, we have
−Rti
(∑ j∈U t j)2
+
R
∑ j∈U t j
−κi = 0. (6.7)
Solving for ti in (6.7), we obtain
ti =
√
R∑ j∈U \{i} t j
κi
− ∑
j∈U \{i}
t j. (6.8)
If the RHS (right hand side) of (6.8) is positive, is also the best response strategy of user i,
due to the concavity of u¯i. If the RHS of (6.8) is less than or equal to 0, then user i does not
participate in the mobile sensing by setting ti = 0 (to avoid a deficit). Hence we have
βi(t−i)=

0, if R≤ κi∑ j∈U \{i} t j;√
R∑ j∈U \{i} t j
κi − ∑
j∈U \{i}
t j, otherwise.
(6.9)
These analyses lead to the following algorithm for computing an NE of the SDT
game.
Algorithm 8: Computation of the NE
1 Sort users according to their unit costs, κ1 ≤ κ2 ≤ ·· · ≤ κn;
2 S ←{1,2}, i← 3;
3 while i≤ n and κi < κi+∑ j∈S κ j|S | do
4 S ←S ∪{i}, i← i+1;
5 end
6 foreach i ∈U do
7 if i ∈S then tnei = (|S |−1)R∑ j∈S κ j
(
1− (|S |−1)κi∑ j∈S κ j
)
;
8 else tnei = 0;
9 end
10 return tne = (tne1 , t
ne
2 , . . . , t
ne
n )
Theorem 6.1. The strategy profile tne = (tne1 , . . . , t
ne
n ) computed by Algorithm 8 is an NE of
the STD game. The time complexity of Algorithm 8 is O(n logn).
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Proof. We first prove that the strategy profile tne is an NE. Let n0 = |S |. We have the fol-
lowing observations based on the algorithm: 1)κi ≥ ∑ j∈S κ jn0−1 , for any i 6∈S ; 2)∑ j∈S tnej =
(n0−1)R
∑ j∈S κ j
; and 3)∑ j∈S \{i} tnej =
(n0−1)2Rκi
(∑ j∈S κ j)
2 for any i ∈S . We next prove that for any i 6∈S ,
tnei = 0 is its best response strategy given t
ne
−i. Since i 6∈ S , we have κi∑ j∈U \{i} tnej =
κi∑ j∈S tnej . Using 1) and 2), we have κi∑ j∈S t
ne
j ≥ R. According to (6.9), we know that
βi(tne−i) = 0.
We then prove that for any i ∈S , tnei is its best response strategy given tne−i. Note
that κi <
∑ij=1 κ j
i−1 according to Algorithm 8. We then have
(n0−1)κi = (i−1)κi+(n0− i)κi <
i
∑
j=1
κ j +
n0
∑
j=i+1
κ j,
where κi ≤ κ j for i+1≤ j ≤ n0. Hence we have κi < ∑i∈S κin0−1 . Furthermore, we have
κi ∑
j∈U \{i}
tnej = κi ∑
j∈S \{i}
tnej =κi
(n0−1)2Rκi(
∑ j∈S κ j
)2 <R.
According to (6.9),
βi(tne−i) =
√
R∑ j∈U \{i} tnej
κi
− ∑
j∈U \{i}
tnej
=
(n0−1)R
∑ j∈S κ j
− (n0−1)
2Rκi(
∑ j∈S κ j
)2 = tnei .
Therefore tne is an NE of the STD game.
We next analyze the running time of the algorithm. Sorting can be done in O(n logn)
time. The while-loop (Lines 3-5) requires a total time of O(n). The for-loop (Lines 6-9)
requires a total time of O(n). Hence the time complexity of Algorithm 8 is O(n logn).
The next theorem shows the uniqueness of the NE for the STD game.
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Theorem 6.2. Let R> 0 be given. Let t¯ = (t¯1, t¯2, . . . , t¯n) be the strategy profile of an NE for
the STD game, and let S¯ = {i ∈U |t¯i > 0}. We have
1) |S¯ | ≥ 2.
2) t¯i =

0, if i 6∈ S¯ ;
(|S¯ |−1)R
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
(
1− (|S¯ |−1)κi∑ j∈S¯ κ j
)
, otherwise.
3) If κq ≤max j∈S¯ {κ j}, then q ∈ S¯ .
4) Assume that the users are ordered such that κ1 ≤ κ2 ≤ ·· · ≤ κn. Let h be the largest
integer in [2,n] such that κh <
∑hj=1 κ j
h−1 . Then S¯ = {1,2, . . . ,h}.
These statements imply that the STD game has a unique NE, which is the one computed by
Algorithm 8.
Proof. We first prove 1). Assume that |S¯ |= 0. User 1 can increase its utility from 0 to R2
by unilaterally changing its sensing time from 0 to R2κ1 , contradicting the NE assumption.
This proves that |S¯ | ≥ 1. Now assume that |S¯ | = 1. This means t¯k > 0 for some k ∈U ,
and t¯ j = 0 for all j ∈ U \ {k}. According to (6.1) the current utility of user k is R− t¯kκk.
User k can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its sensing time from t¯k to
t¯k
2 , again
contradicting the NE assumption. Therefore |S¯ | ≥ 2.
We next prove 2). Let n0 = |S¯ |. Since we already proved that n0 ≥ 2, we can use
the analysis at the beginning of this section (6.7), with t replaced by t¯, and S replaced by
S¯ . Considering that ∑ j∈U t¯ j = ∑ j∈S¯ t¯ j, we have
−Rt¯i
(∑ j∈S¯ t¯ j)2
+
R
∑ j∈S¯ t¯ j
−κi = 0, i ∈ S¯ . (6.10)
Summing up (6.10) over the users in S¯ leads to n0R−R = ∑ j∈S¯ t¯ j ·∑ j∈S¯ κ j. Therefore
134
we have
∑
j∈S¯
t¯ j =
(n0−1)R
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
. (6.11)
Substituting (6.11) into (6.10) and considering t¯ j = 0 for any j ∈ U \ S¯ , we obtain the
following:
t¯i =
(n0−1)R
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
(
1− (n0−1)κi
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
)
(6.12)
for every i ∈ S¯ . This proves 2).
We then prove 3). By definition of S¯ , we know that t¯i > 0 for every i ∈ S¯ . From
(6.12), t¯i > 0 implies
(n0−1)κi
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
< 1. Therefore we have
κi <
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
|S¯ |−1 ,∀i ∈ S¯ . (6.13)
(6.13) implies that
max
i∈S¯
κi <
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
|S¯ |−1 . (6.14)
Assume that κq ≤max j∈S¯ {κ j} but q 6∈ S¯ . Since q 6∈ S¯ , we know that t¯q = 0. The
first-order derivative of u¯q with respect to tq when t = t¯ is
R
∑ j∈S¯ t¯ j
−κq=
∑ j∈S¯ κ j
n0−1 −κq > maxi∈S¯ {κi}−κq ≥ 0. (6.15)
This means that user q can increase its utility by unilaterally increasing its sensing time
from t¯q, contradicting the NE assumption of t¯. This proves 3).
Finally, we prove 4). Statements 1) and 3) imply that S¯ = {1,2, . . . ,q} for some
integer q in [2,n]. From (6.13), we conclude that q ≤ h. Assume that q < h. Then we
have κq+1 <
∑q+1j=1 κ j
q , which implies
∑qj=1 κ j
q−1 −κq+1 > 0. Hence the first order derivative of
u¯q+1 with respect to tq+1 when t = t¯ is
∑qj=1 κ j
q−1 −κq+1 > 0. This contradiction proves q = h.
Hence we have proved 4), as well as the theorem.
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Platform Utility Maximization
According to the above analysis, the platform, which is the leader in the Stackelberg
game, knows that there exists a unique NE for the users for any given value of R. Hence
the platform can maximize its utility by choosing the optimal R. Substituting (6.12) into
(6.2) and considering ti = 0 if i 6∈S , we have
u¯0 = λ log
(
1+ ∑
i∈S
log(1+XiR)
)
−R, (6.16)
where Xi =
(n0−1)
∑ j∈S κ j
(
1− (n0−1)κi∑ j∈S κ j
)
.
Theorem 6.3. There exists a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium (R∗, tne) in the MSensing
game, where R∗ is the unique maximizer of the platform utility
u¯0 = λ log
(
1+ ∑
i∈S
log(1+XiR)
)
−R,
over R ∈ [0,∞),S and tne are given by Algorithm 8 with the total reward set to R∗.
Proof. The second order derivative of u¯0 is
∂ 2u¯0
∂R2
=−λ
∑i∈S
X2i
(1+XiR)2
Y +
(
∑i∈S
Xi
(1+XiR)
)2
Y 2
< 0, (6.17)
where Y = 1+∑i∈S log(1+XiR). Therefore the utility u¯0 defined in (6.16) is a strictly
concave function of R for R ∈ [0,∞). Since the value of u¯0 in (6.16) is 0 for R= 0 and goes
to −∞ when R goes to ∞, it has a unique maximizer R∗ that can be efficiently computed
using either bisection or Newton’s method [13].
6.4.2 Design for the User-Centric Model
Auction theory [80] is the perfect theoretical tool to design incentive mechanisms for the
user-centric model. We propose a reverse auction based incentive mechanism for the user-
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centric model. An auction takes as input the bids submitted by the users, selects a subset
of users as winners, and determines the payment to each winning user.
Auctions Maximizing Platform Utility
Our first attempt is to design an incentive mechanism maximizing the utility of
the platform. Now designing an incentive mechanism becomes an optimization problem,
called User Selection problem: Given a set U of users, select a subsetS such that u˜0(S )
is maximized over all possible subsets. In addition, it is clear that pi = bi to maximize
u˜0(S ). The utility u˜0 then becomes
u˜0(S ) = v(S )− ∑
i∈S
bi. (6.18)
To make the problem meaningful, we assume that there exists at least one user i such that
u˜0({i})> 0.
Unfortunately, as the following theorem shows, it is NP-hard to find the optimal
solution to the User Selection problem.
Theorem 6.4. The User Selection problem is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove the NP-hardness of the optimization problem by giving a polynomial time
reduction from the NP-hard Set Cover problem:
INSTANCE: A universe Z = {z1,z2, . . . ,zm}, a family C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} of sub-
sets of Z and a positive integer s. QUESTION: Does there exist a subset C ′ ⊆ C of size s,
such that every element in Z belongs to at least one member in C ′?
We construct a corresponding instance of the User Selection problem as follows:
Let Γ be the task set corresponding to Z, where there is a task τ j ∈ Γ for each z j ∈ Z.
Corresponding to each subset Ci ∈ C , there is a user i ∈U with task set Γi, which consists
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of the tasks corresponding to the elements in Ci. We set ν j to n for each task τ j and ci to 1
for each user i ∈U . We prove that there exists a solution to the instance of the Set Cover
problem if and only if there exists a subsetS of users such that u˜0(S )≥ nm− s.
We first prove the forward direction. Let C ′ be a solution to the Set Cover instance.
We can select the corresponding set S of users as the solution to the mechanism design
instance. Clearly, u˜0(S ) = nm− |S | ≥ nm− s. Next we prove the backward direction.
Let S be a solution to mechanism design instance. We then have u˜0(S ) ≥ nm− s. The
only possibility that we have such a value is when the selected user set covers all the
tasks, because s ≤ m. Therefore the corresponding set C ′ is a solution to the Set Cover
instance.
Since it is unlikely to find the optimal subset of users efficiently, we turn our atten-
tion to the development of approximation algorithms. To this end, we take advantage of the
submodularity of the utility function.
Definition 6.2 (Submodular Function). Let X be a finite set. A function f : 2X 7→ R is
submodular if
f (A ∪{x})− f (A )≥ f (B∪{x})− f (B),
for any A ⊆B ⊆X and x ∈X \B, where R is the set of reals.
We now prove the submodularity of the utility u˜0.
Lemma 6.1. The utility u˜0 is submodular.
Proof. By Definition 6.2, we need to show that
u˜0(S ∪{i})− u˜0(S )≥ u˜0(T ∪{i})− u˜0(T ),
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for anyS ⊆T ⊆U and i ∈U \T . It suffices to show that v(S ∪{i})−v(S )≥ v(T ∪
{i})− v(T ), since the second term in u˜0 can be subtracted from both sides. Considering
v(S ) = ∑τ j∈∪i∈S Γi ν j, we have
v(S ∪{i})− v(S ) = ∑
τ j∈Γi\∪ j∈S Γ j
ν j (6.19)
≥ ∑
τ j∈Γi\∪ j∈T Γ j
ν j (6.20)
= v(T ∪{i})− v(T ). (6.21)
Therefore u˜0 is submodular. As a byproduct, we proved that v is submodular as well.
When the objective function is submodular, monotone and non-negative, it is known
that a greedy algorithm provides a (1−1/e)-approximation [108]. Without monotonicity,
Feige et al. [41] have also developed constant-factor approximation algorithms. Unfortu-
nately, u˜0 can be negative.
To circumvent this issue, let f (S ) = u˜0(S )+∑i∈U bi. It is clear that f (S ) ≥ 0
for any S ⊆ U . Since ∑i∈U bi is a constant, f (S ) is also submodular. In addition,
maximizing u˜0 is equivalent to maximizing f . Therefore we design an auction mechanism
based on the algorithm of [41], called Local Search-Based (LSB) auction, as illustrated in
Algorithm 9. The mechanism relies on the local-search technique, which greedily searches
for a better solution by adding a new user or deleting an existing user whenever possible. It
was proved that, for any given constant ε > 0, the algorithm can find a set of usersS such
that f (S )≥ (13 − εn) f (S ∗), whereS ∗ is the optimal solution [41].
How good is the LSB auction? In the following we analyze this mechanism using
the four desirable properties described in Section 1.1 as performance metrics.
• Computational Efficiency: The running time of the Local Search Algorithm is O(1ε n
3m logm)
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Algorithm 9: LSB Auction
1 S ←{i}, where i← argmaxi∈U f ({i});
2 while there exists a user i ∈U \S such that f (S ∪{i})> (1+ εn2 ) f (S ) do
3 S ←S ∪{i};
4 end
5 if there exists a user i ∈S such that f (S \{i})> (1+ εn2 ) f (S ) then
6 S ←S \{i}; go to Line 2;
7 end
8 if f (U \S )> f (S ) then S ←U \S ;
9 foreach i ∈U do
10 if i ∈S then pi← bi;
11 else pi← 0;
12 end
13 return (S , p)
[41], where evaluating the value of f takes O(m) time and |S | ≤ m. Hence our mech-
anism is computationally efficient.
• Individual Rationality: The platform pays what the winners bid. Hence our mechanism
is individually rational.
• Profitability: Due to the assumption that there exists at least one user i such that
u˜0({i}) > 0 and the fact that f (S ) strictly increases in each iteration, we guarantee
that u˜0(S )> 0 at the end of the auction. Hence our mechanism is profitable.
• Truthfulness: We use an example in Figure 6.2 to show that the LSB auction is not
truthful. In this example, U = {1,2,3}, Γ= {τ1,τ2,τ3,τ4,τ5}, Γ1 = {τ1,τ3,τ5}, Γ2 =
{τ1,τ2,τ4}, Γ3 = {τ2,τ5}, c1 = 4, c2 = 3, c3 = 4. Squares represent users, and disks
represent tasks. The number above user i denotes its bid bi. The number below task τ j
denotes its value ν j. For example, b1 = 4 and ν3 = 1. We also assume that ε = 0.1.
We first consider the case where users bid truthfully. Since f ({1}) = v(Γ1)− b1 +
∑3i=1 bi = (5+1+4)−4+(4+3+4) = 17, f ({2}) = 18 and f ({3}) = 14, user 2 is first
selected. Since f ({2,1}) = v(Γ2∪Γ1)−(b2+b1)+∑3i=1 bi = 19>
(
1+ 0.132
)
f ({2}) =
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18.2, user 1 is then selected. The auction terminates here because the current value of
f cannot be increased by a factor of (1+ 0.19 ) via either adding a user (that has not been
selected) or removing a user (that has been selected). In addition, we have p1 = b1 = 4
and p2 = b2 = 3.
We now consider the case where user 2 lies by bidding 3+ δ , where 1 ≤ δ < 1.77.
Since f ({1}) = 17+δ , f ({2}) = 18 and f ({3}) = 14+δ , user 1 is first selected. Since
f ({1,2}) = 19 > (1+ 0.19 ) f ({1}), user 2 is then selected. The auction terminates here
because the current value of f cannot be increased by a factor of (1+ 0.19 ) via either
adding a user or removing a user. Note that user 2 increases its payment from 3 to 3+δ
by lying about its cost.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3
4 3 4
5 3 1 2 4
(a) Users bid truthfully.
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3
4 3+δ 4
5 3 1 2 4
(b) User 2 lies by bidding 3+ δ , where
1≤ δ < 1.77.
Figure 6.2: Example showing the untruthfulness of the Local Search-Based Auction mech-
anism, where U = {1,2,3}, Γ = {τ1,τ2,τ3,τ4,τ5}, Γ1 = {τ1,τ3,τ5}, Γ2 = {τ1,τ2,τ4},
Γ3 = {τ2,τ5}. Squares represent users. Disks represent tasks. The number above user i
denotes its bid bi. The number below task τ j denotes its value ν j. We also assume that
ε = 0.1.
MSensing Auction
Although the LSB auction mechanism is designed to approximately maximize the
platform utility, the failure of guaranteeing truthfulness makes it less attractive. Since our
ultimate goal is to design an incentive mechanism that motivates smartphone users to partic-
ipate in mobile phone sensing while preventing any user from rigging its bid to manipulate
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the market, we need to settle for a trade off between utility maximization and truthfulness.
Our highest priority is to design an incentive mechanism that satisfies all of the four desir-
able properties, even at the cost of sacrificing the platform utility. One possible direction is
to make use of the off-the-shelf results on the budgeted mechanism design [20, 131]. The
budgeted mechanism design problem is very similar with ours, with the difference that the
payment paid to the winners is a constraint instead of a factor in the objective function.
To address this issue, we can intuitively plug different values of the budget into the bud-
geted mechanism and select the one giving the largest utility. However, this can potentially
destroy the truthfulness of the incentive mechanism.
Now we present a novel auction mechanism that satisfies all four desirable proper-
ties. The design rationale relies on Myerson’s well-known characterization [103].
Theorem 6.5. ([131, Theorem 2.1]) An auction mechanism is truthful if and only if:
• The selection rule is monotone: If user i wins the auction by bidding bi, it also wins by
bidding b′i ≤ bi;
• Each winner is paid the critical value: User i would not win the auction if it bids
higher than this value.
Based on Theorem 6.5, we design our auction mechanism, which is called MSens-
ing auction. Illustrated in Algorithm 10, the MSensing auction mechanism consists of two
phases: the winner selection phase and the payment determination phase.
The winner selection phase follows a greedy approach: Users are essentially sorted
according to the difference of their marginal values and bids. Given the selected users S ,
the marginal value of user i is vi(S ) = v(S ∪{i})− v(S ). In this sorting the (i+ 1)th
user is the user j such that v j(Si)−b j is maximized overU \Si, whereSi = {1,2, . . . , i}
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Algorithm 10: MSensing Auction
1 // Phase 1: Winner selection
2 S ← /0, i← argmax j∈U
(
v j(S )−b j
)
;
3 while bi < vi andS 6=U do
4 S ←S ∪{i};
5 i← argmax j∈U \S
(
v j(S )−b j
)
;
6 end
7 // Phase 2: Payment determination
8 foreach i ∈U do pi← 0;
9 foreach i ∈S do
10 U ′←U \{i}, T ← /0;
11 repeat
12 i j← argmax j∈U ′\T
(
v j(T )−b j
)
;
13 pi←max{pi,min{vi(T )−(vi j(T )−bi j),vi(T )}};
14 T ←T ∪{i j};
15 until bi j ≥ vi j or T =U ′;
16 if bi j < vi j then pi←max{pi,vi(T )};
17 end
18 return (S , p)
and S0 = /0. We use vi instead of vi(Si−1) to simplify the notation. Considering the
submodularity of v, this sorting implies that
v1−b1 ≥ v2−b2 ≥ ·· · ≥ vn−bn. (6.22)
The set of winners are SL = {1,2, . . . ,L}, where L ≤ n is the largest index such that vL−
bL > 0.
In the payment determination phase, we compute the payment pi for each winner
i ∈S . To compute the payment for user i, we sort the users in U \{i} similarly,
v′i1−bi1 ≥ v′i2−bi2 ≥ ·· · ≥ v′in−1−bin−1, (6.23)
where v′i j = v(T j−1 ∪{i j})− v(T j−1) denotes the marginal value of the jth user and T j
denotes the first j users according to this sorting over U \ {i} and T0 = /0. The marginal
value of user i at position j is vi( j) = v(T j−1∪{i})−v(T j−1). Let K denote the position of
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the last user i j ∈U \{i}, such that bi j < v′i j . For each position j in the sorting, we compute
the maximum price that user i can bid such that i can be selected instead of user at jth
place. We repeat this until the position after the last winner in U \ {i}. In the end we set
the value of pi to the maximum of these K+1 prices.
We will prove the computational efficiency (Lemma 6.2), the individual rational-
ity (Lemma 6.3), the profitability (Lemma 6.4), and the truthfulness (Lemma 6.5) of the
MSensing auction in the following.
Lemma 6.2. MSensing is computationally efficient.
Proof. Finding the user with maximum marginal value takes O(nm) time, where computing
the value of vi takes O(m) time. Since there are m tasks and each winner should contribute
at least one new task to be selected, the number of winners is at most m. Hence, the while-
loop (Lines 3–6) thus takes O(nm2) time. In each iteration of the for-loop (Lines 9–17), a
process similar to Lines 3–6 is executed. Hence the running time of the whole auction is
dominated by this for-loop, which is bounded by O(nm3).
Note that the running time of the MSensing Auction, O(nm3), is very conserva-
tive. In addition, m is much less than n in practice, which makes the running time of the
MSensing Auction dominated by n.
Before turning our attention to the proofs of the other three properties, we would
like to make some critical observations: 1) vi( j)≥ vi( j+1) for any j due to the submodularity
of v; 2) T j =S j for any j < i; 3) vi(i) = vi; and 4) v′i j > bi j for j ≤ K and v′i j ≤ bi j for
K+1≤ j ≤ n−1.
Lemma 6.3. MSensing is individually rational.
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Proof. Let ii be user i’s replacement which appears in the ith place in the sorting over
U \{i}. Since user ii would not be at ith place if i is considered, we have vi(i)−bi≥ v′ii−bii .
Hence we have bi ≤ vi(i)− (v′ii − bii). Since user i is a winner, we have bi ≤ vi = vi(i). It
follows that bi ≤min
{
vi(i)− (v′ii−bii),vi(i)
}≤ pi. If ii does not exist, it means i is the last
winner in U . We then have bi ≤ vi(U \{i})≤ pi, according to Line 16.
Lemma 6.4. MSensing is profitable.
Proof. Let L be the last user j ∈U in the sorting (6.22), such that b j < v j. We then have
u˜0 =∑1≤i≤L vi−∑1≤i≤L pi. Hence it suffices to prove that pi≤ vi for each 1≤ i≤ L. Recall
that K is the position of the last user i j ∈U \{i} in the sorting (6.23), such that bi j < v′i j .
When K < n−1, let r be the position such that
r = arg max
1≤ j≤K+1
min
{
vi( j)− (v′i j −bi j),vi( j)
}
.
If r ≤ K, we have
pi = min
{
vi(r)− (v′ir −bir),vi(r)
}
= vi(r)− (v′ir −bir)< vi(r) ≤ vi,
where the penultimate inequality is due to the fact that bir < v
′
ir for r ≤ K, and the last
inequality relies on the fact that T j−1 =S j−1 for j ≤ i and the decreasing marginal value
property of v. If r = K+1, we have
pi = min
{
vi(r)− (v′ir −bir),vi(r)
}
= vi(r) ≤ vi.
Similarly, when K = n−1, we have
pi ≤ vi(r)≤ vi,
for some 1≤ r ≤ K. Thus we proved that pi ≤ vi for each 1≤ i≤ K.
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Lemma 6.5. MSensing is truthful.
Proof. Based on Theorem 6.5, it suffices to prove that the selection rule of MSensing is
monotone and the payment pi for each i is the critical value. The monotonicity of the
selection rule is obvious as bidding a smaller value can not push user i backwards in the
sorting.
We next show that pi is the critical value for i in the sense that bidding higher pi
could prevent i from winning the auction. Note that
pi = max
{
max
1≤ j≤K
(
vi( j)− (v′i j −bi j)
)
,vi(K+1)
}
.
If user i bids bi > pi, it will be placed after K since bi > vi( j)− (v′i j−bi j) implies v′i j−bi j >
vi( j)− bi. At the (K + 1)th iteration, user i will not be selected because bi > vi(K+1). As
K+1 is the position of the first loser overU \{i} when K < n−1 or the last user to check
when K = n−1, the selection procedure terminates.
The above four lemmas together prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6. MSensing is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and
truthful. 
6.5 Evaluation of Incentive Mechanisms
To evaluate the performance of our incentive mechanisms, we implemented the
incentive mechanism for the platform-centric model, the Local Search-Based auction, de-
noted by LSB, and the MSensing auction, denoted by MSensing. In order to reduce the
running time of MSensing, we applied the lazy update algorithm [97]. We denote the
MSensing auction with the lazy update as MSensing-L. The idea of the lazy update algo-
rithm is that we revaluate the marginal value of each user only when necessary. We keep
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a list of users sorted in a non-increasing order according to the difference between their
marginal values and bids. Before searching for the user with the largest difference between
its marginal value and bid, we revaluate the marginal value of the first user in the list. If
the new value is the same as the old one, it is guaranteed that the first user still provides
the largest difference of the marginal value and the bid, due to the submodularity of v.
Otherwise, we revaluate all the users in the list and sort them according to the new value.
Performance Metrics: The performance metrics include running time, platform util-
ity, and user utility in general. For the platform-centric incentive mechanism, we also study
the number of participating users.
Simulation Setup
We varied the number of users (n) from 100 to 1000 with the increment of 100. For
the platform-centric model, we assumed that the cost of each user was uniformly distributed
over [1,κmax], where κmax was varied from 1 to 10 with the increment of 1. We set λ to
3, 5, and 10. For the user-centric model, we varied the number of tasks (m) from 100 to
500 with the increment of 100. We set ε to 0.01 for LSB. We also made the following
assumptions. The value of each task is uniformly distributed over [1,5]. The number of
tasks of each user is uniformly distributed over [1,10]. The cost ci is ρ|Γi|, where ρ is
uniformly distributed over [1,5].
All the simulations were run on a Linux machine with 3.2 GHz CPU and 16 GB
memory. Each measurement is averaged over 100 instances.
Evaluation of the Platform-Centric Incentive Mechanism
Running Time: We first evaluate the running time of the incentive mechanism and show
the results in Figure 6.3. We observe that the running time is almost linear in the number
of users and less than 2×10−4 seconds for the largest instance of 1000 users. As soon as
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the users are sorted andS is computed, all the values can be computed using closed-form
expressions, which makes the incentive mechanism very efficient.
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Figure 6.3: Running time
Number of Participating Users: Figure 6.4 shows the impact of κmax on the number
of participating users, i.e., |S |, when n is fixed at 1000. We can see that |S | decreases as
the costs of users become diverse. The reason is that according to the while-loop condition,
if all users have the same cost, then all of them would satisfy this condition and thus partic-
ipate. When the costs become diverse, users with larger costs would have higher chances
to violate the condition.
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Figure 6.4: Impact of κmax on |S |
Platform Utility: Figure 6.5 shows the impact of n and κmax on the platform utility.
We set λ to 3, 5, and 10. In Figure 6.5(a), we fixed κmax = 5. We observe that the platform
utility is almost linear in n and the slope becomes higher as λ is larger. Also, we have
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higher utility when λ is larger, which is expected. In Figure 6.5(b), we fixed n = 1000.
With the results in Figure 6.4, it is expected that the platform utility decreases as the costs
of users become more diverse.
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Figure 6.5: Platform utility
User Utility: We randomly picked a user (ID = 31) and plot its utility in Figure 6.6.
We observe that as more and more users are interested in mobile phone sensing, the utility
of the user decreases since more competitions are involved.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 10000
1
2
x 10−4
Number of users
u
31
Figure 6.6: Impact of n on u¯i
Evaluation of the User-Centric Incentive Mechanism
Running Time: Figure 6.7(a) shows the running time of different auction mechanisms pro-
posed in Section 6.4.2. We fixed m= 200. We can see that LSB has the best efficiency while
MSensing has the worst. Both MSensing and MSensing-L are linear in n, as we proved in
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Lemma 6.2. After using lazy update, we can dramatically improve the time efficiency of
MSensing. As shown in 6.7(b), the time improvement of MSensing-L over MSensing is
roughly around 60%.
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Figure 6.7: Running time
Platform Utility: Now we show how much platform utility we need to sacrifice to
achieve the truthfulness compared to LSB. As shown in Figure 6.8, we can observe that
the platform utility sacrifice is not severe compared to the mechanism with the best-known
platform utility approximation. We also observe that when the number of users becomes
larger, the gap between MSensing-L and LSB becomes smaller.
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Figure 6.8: Platform utility
Truthfulness: We also verified the truthfulness of MSensing by randomly picking
two users (ID = 944 and ID = 427) and allowing them to bid prices different from their
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true costs. We illustrate the results in Figure 6.9. As we can see, user 944 achieves its
optimal utility if it bids truthfully (b944 = c944 = 10) in Figure 6.9(a) and user 427 achieves
its optimal utility if it bids truthfully (b427 = c427 = 15) in Figure 6.9(b).
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Figure 6.9: Truthfulness of MSensing
6.6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this work, we have designed incentive mechanisms that can be used to motivate
smartphone users to participate in mobile phone sensing, which is a new sensing paradigm
allowing us to collect and analyze sensed data far beyond the scale of what was previ-
ously possible. We have considered two different models from different perspectives: the
platform-centric model where the platform provides a reward shared by participating users,
and the user-centric model where each user can ask for a reserve price for its sensing ser-
vice.
For the platform-centric model, we have modeled the incentive mechanism as a
Stackelberg game in which the platform is the leader and the users are the followers. We
have proved that this Stackelberg game has a unique equilibrium, and designed an efficient
mechanism for computing it. This enables the platform to maximize its utility while no
user can improve its utility by deviating from the current strategy.
For the user-centric model, we have designed an auction mechanism, called MSens-
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ing. We have proved that MSensing is 1) computationally efficient, meaning that the win-
ners and the payments can be computed in polynomial time; 2) individually rational, mean-
ing that each user will have a non-negative utility; 3) profitable, meaning that the platform
will not incur a deficit; and more importantly, 4) truthful, meaning that no user can im-
prove its utility by asking for a price different from its true cost. Our mechanism is scalable
because its running time is linear in the number of users.
Discussion
For the Platform-Centric model, we assumed that the users have the knowledge of
other users’ cost. As a future research topic, we are interested in the case where the cost
information of other users is not available. Instead, each user knows only the cost distribu-
tion function. This distribution function can be obtained based on the statistical data in the
smartphone market and the technical specifications of smartphones. For example, the mar-
ket share of iPhone is 19.4% in 2011 according to Gartner [52]. Hence it is very reasonable
to assume that the probability that a users cost is equal to that of an iPhone is 0.194. With
the cost distribution function, we will reformulate the utility functions for both users and
the platform. Under the new Stackelberg game formulation, we will study the existence
and the uniqueness, if possible, of the NE in the WTDG. Our ultimate goal is to compute
the Stackelberg Equilibrium of the Stackelberg game with incomplete information.
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Part III
Security and Privacy
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Chapter 7
Being Smarter: How to Cope with a Smart Jammer
Wireless networks are highly vulnerable to jamming attacks, since jamming attacks are
easy to launch. Attacks of this kind usually aim at the physical layer and are realized
by means of a high transmission power signal that corrupts a communication channel, as
shown in Figure 7.1.
7.1 Introduction
In this work, we are interested in defending against smart jammers, who can quickly
learn the transmission pattern of the users and adjust their jamming strategies so as to
exacerbate the damage. Since jammers need to consider transmission cost, transmitting
with the maximum power may not be the optimal strategy. As a first step along this line,
we study the battle between a single user (a transmitter-receiver pair) and a single smart
jammer (a malicious transmitter). This problem arises, for example, in military operations,
where one radio station transmits data to another in a hostile environment. In this paper,
we aim to derive the optimal power control for the user in the presence of a smart jammer.
Game theory is a natural tool to model and address this problem. Jamming defense
can be considered a game, where both the user and the jammer are players. Previous
works [2, 3] have been done on this topic by proving the existence of Nash Equilibria and
computing a Nash Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the status where no player has
an incentive to change its strategy unilaterally so as to increase its own utility. However,
Nash Equilibrium is not the best solution to the problem studied in this paper, because
the rationality of Nash Equilibrium is based on the assumption that all players take actions
simultaneously. In our model, the jammer is intelligent in the sense that it can quickly learn
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Figure 7.1: Jamming in wireless networks
the user’s transmission power and adjust its transmission power accordingly. Stackelberg
game serves the purpose of modeling this scenario. In this game, players, including one
leader and one follower, are in a hierarchical structure 1. The leader takes actions first, and
then the follower takes actions accordingly. Similar to the Nash Equilibrium in the standard
game, there is Stackelberg Equilibrium in this game. Different from the Nash Equilibrium,
Stackelberg Equilibrium is the optimal strategy of the leader, given the fact that the follower
would take actions according to the leader’s strategy, together with the optimal strategy of
the follower corresponding to the leader’s optimal strategy.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the power control
problem in the presence of a smart jammer. As an initial step, we consider a single user
and a single jammer (the more challenging scenario with multi users/jammers is a subject of
future research). Both the user and the jammer can adjust their transmission power levels.
We consider both the single-channel model and the multi-channel model. We model the
power control problem with a smart jammer as a Stackelberg game [133], called Power
1There could be more than one follower. Since we only consider one follower in this paper, we refer the
readers to [46] for more details.
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Control with Smart Jammer (PCSJ) game. In this game, the user is the leader and the
jammer is the follower. The user is aware of the jammer’s existence and has the knowledge
of jammer’s intelligence, based on which the user chooses an optimal strategy so as to
maximize its own utility, while the jammer plays its best response strategy given the user’s
strategy. For the single-channel model, we derive closed-form expressions for the jammer’s
best response strategy and the user’s optimal strategy, which together constitute the unique
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). For the multi-channel model, we design an algorithm for
computing the jammer’s best response strategy, given the user’s strategy. We also develop
two algorithms to approximate the user’s optimal strategy and thus the SE strategies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 7.2, we briefly describe
the related works. In Section 7.3, we introduce the system model and the Stackelberg game
formulation. In Section 7.5.1, we study the PCSJ game under the single-channel model. In
Section 7.5.2, we study the PCSJ game under the multi-channel model. In Section 7.6, we
present numerical results. We conclude this paper in Section 7.7.
7.2 Related Work
Due to the importance of jamming defense, wireless network jamming has been
extensively studied in the past few years. Many jamming defense mechanisms have been
proposed on both the physical layer [86, 87, 107, 154, 155] and the MAC layer [120, 121]
to detect jamming, as well as to avoid it. Spread spectrum technologies have been shown
to be very effective to avoid jamming. With enough bandwidth or widely spread signals, it
becomes harder to detect the start of a packet quickly enough in order to jam it.
Since jamming activities can be considered as a player (the jammer) playing against
another player (the user), game theory is an appropriate tool to deal with this kind of
problem. Many previous works have studied jamming defense with game theory formula-
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tions [2, 3, 85, 124, 151, 171]. In [2], Altman et al. studied the jamming game in wireless
networks with transmission cost. In this game, both the user and the jammer take the power
allocation on channels as their strategies. The utility of the user is the weighted capacity
minus transmission cost. The utility of the jammer is the negative of the user’s weighted ca-
pacity minus transmission cost. The authors proved the existence and uniqueness of Nash
Equilibrium. In addition, they provided analytical expressions for the equilibrium strate-
gies. In [3], the same group of authors extended the jamming problem to the case with
several jammers. The difference from [2] is that they did not consider transmission cost
and they considered SINR and −SINR as the utility values for the user and the jammers,
respectively. They showed that the jammers equalize the quality of the best sub-carriers for
transmitter on as low level as their power constraint allows, meanwhile the user distributes
its power among these jamming sub-carriers. In [124], Sagduyu et al. considered the
power-controlled MAC game, which includes two types of players, selfish and malicious
transmitters. Each type of user has a different utility function depending on throughput
reward and energy cost. They also considered the case where the transmitters have in-
complete information regarding other transmitter’s types, modeled as probabilistic beliefs.
They derived the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategies for different degrees of uncertainty,
and characterized the resulting equilibrium throughput of selfish nodes.
The jamming problems have also been studied in cognitive radio networks [85, 151,
171]. The anti-jamming game in this scenario is often modeled as a (stochastic) zero-sum
game, where the sum of the utility values of the jammer(s) and the secondary user is zero.
In [171], Zhu et al. assumed the transition between idle and busy states of the channel
to be Markovian. They considered a single secondary user and a single jammer in the
cognitive radio system. The strategy of the user is the channel selected to transmit on,
while the strategy of the jammer is the channel selected to jam. The utility of the user
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is 1 if the selected channel is not occupied by the primary user and not jammed by the
jammer. They considered mixed strategies and proved the conditions for the uniqueness
of the Nash Equilibrium. They also showed that the secondary user can either improve
its sensing capability to confuse the jammer or choose to communicate under states where
the available channels are less prone to jamming, in order to improve its utility value.
In [85], Li and Han studied the problem of defending primary user emulation attack, which
is similar to the jamming attack in wireless networks. There is only one jammer and one
or multiple secondary users in their models. The strategy of each secondary user is the
channel selected to transmit on, while the strategy of the jammer is the channel selected to
jam. The utility of each secondary user is a reward if it senses a channel and the jammer
is not jamming. They computed the unique Nash Equilibrium and analyzed the efficiency.
In [151], Wu et al. first investigated the case where a secondary user can access only one
channel at a time and then extended to the scenario where secondary users can access all
the channels simultaneously. For the former case, the secondary user uses channel hopping
as its defense strategy. The utility of the secondary user is equal to a communication gain,
if the transmission is successful, minus cost and a significant loss when jammed. They
found an approximation to the Nash Equilibrium by letting the user and jammers iteratively
update their strategies against each other. For the latter case, the secondary user could
allocate power to several channels. The utility of the secondary user is equal to the total
number of successful transmissions. They showed that the defense strategy from the Nash
Equilibrium is optimal.
In all the previous works on jamming defense, the authors assumed that the users
and the jammers take actions simultaneously. In this paper, we study the power control
problem in the presence of a smart jammer, which has more power compared to the jammer
model studied before. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address this problem.
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7.3 System Model
In this section, we present the system model and formulate the problem to be stud-
ied.
System Model
Our system consists of a user (i.e., a transmitter-receiver pair), and a jammer (i.e.,
a malicious transmitter), as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The user (jammer, respectively) has
control over its own transmission power. This problem arises, for example, in military
operations, where one radio station transmits data to another radio station in a hostile envi-
ronment. We consider two models in this paper: single-channel model and multi-channel
model.
Single-channel model: Let P denote the transmission power of the user and J denote
the transmission power of the jammer. In addition, we assume that the user and the jammer
transmit with cost E and C per unit power. As in [3, 124], we adopt SINR as the reward
of the user in our model. Hence, the utility of the user is
us(P,J) =
αP
N+βJ
−EP, (7.1)
and the utility of the jammer is
vs(P,J) =− αPN+βJ −CJ, (7.2)
where N is the background noise on the channel, and α > 0 and β > 0 are fading channel
gains of the user and the jammer, respectively. Note that we have omitted power constraint
in this model. If power constraint is added, we can still derive closed-form expressions
for the SE. However, the corresponding analysis is more complicated, involving ad-hoc
discussions of many cases. Hence, we choose to concentrate on this model, which allows
us to to emphasize the main contributions without excessive ad-hoc analysis.
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Multi-channel model: We assume that there are n available channels. Let αi ∈ (0,1]
and βi ∈ (0,1] denote the fading channel gains of the user and the jammer on channel i,
respectively. Let Pˆ > 0 and Jˆ > 0 denote the total transmission power of the user and the
jammer, respectively. Let Pi and Ji denote the transmission power allocated to channel i by
the user and the jammer, respectively. Let P=(P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) and J=(J1,J2, . . . ,Jn) denote
the transmission power vectors of the user and the jammer, respectively. P is feasible if
∑ni=1 Pi ≤ Pˆ, and J is feasible if ∑ni=1 Ji ≤ Jˆ. LetP = {(P1,P2, . . . ,Pn)|Pi ≥ 0,∑ni=1 Pi ≤ Pˆ}
and J = {(J1,J2, . . . ,Jn)|Ji ≥ 0,∑ni=1 Ji ≤ Jˆ} denote the sets of feasible power vectors of
the user and the jammer, respectively. Similarly to the single-channel model, we assume
that the user and the jammer transmit with cost E and C per unit power. The utility of the
user is
um(P,J) =
n
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi
−E
n
∑
i=1
Pi. (7.3)
The utility of the jammer is
vm(P,J) =−
n
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi
−C
n
∑
i=1
Ji. (7.4)
In this paper, we deal with a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the user’s trans-
mission power and adjust its transmission power accordingly to maximize its utility. The
user’s transmission power can be accurately learned using physical carrier sensing and lo-
cation knowledge. We are interested in determining the transmission power of the user
such that its utility is maximized, in the presence of a smart jammer. We call this problem
the power control problem with a smart jammer.
7.4 Stackelberg Game Formulation
In our model, the jammer is smart and can adjust its transmission power based on
the user’s transmission power. Based on this fact, we model the power control problem in
the presence of a smart jammer as a Stackelberg game, called Power Control with Smart
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Jammer (PCSJ) game. In this game, both the user and the jammer are players, of which
the user is the leader, and the jammer is the follower. The strategy of each player is its
transmission power. The utility of the user (resp. the jammer) is defined in (7.1) (resp.
(7.2)) for the single-channel model and (7.3) (resp. (7.4)) for the multi-channel model.
7.5 PCSJ Game
7.5.1 PCSJ under Single-Channel Model
In this section, we study the PCSJ game under the single-channel model. First, we compute
the best response strategy of the jammer, for a given strategy of the user. Then we compute
the optimal strategy of the user, based on the knowledge of the best response strategy of
the jammer.
Jammer’s Best Response Strategy
Assume that the user’s strategy P is given. Then the jammer’s best response strategy
can be computed by solving the following optimization problem.
max
J≥0
vs(P,J) =− αPN+βJ −CJ. (7.5)
Thus we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1. Let P be a given strategy of the user. Then the corresponding optimal strategy
of the jammer is
J(P) =

0, P≤ CN2αβ ,√
αβP
C −N
β , P >
CN2
αβ .
(7.6)
Proof. To find the maximum value of vs(P,J), we differentiate vs(P,J) with respect to J
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and set the resulting derivative equal to 0,
0 =
∂vs(P,J)
∂J
=
αβP
(N+βJ)2
−C. (7.7)
Considering the constraint J ≥ 0, we have jammer’s optimal strategy in (7.6).
User’s Optimal Strategy
The user is aware of the existence of the jammer and knows that the jammer will
play its best response strategy to maximize its own utility. Therefore, the user can derive
the jammer’s strategy based on Lemma 7.1. To compute the user’s optimal strategy, we
solve the following optimization problem.
max
P≥0
us(P,J(P)) =
αP
N+βJ(P)
−EP, (7.8)
where J(P) is given in (7.6).
The optimal strategy of the user is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 7.2. The optimal strategy of the user is
PSE =

αC
4βE2 , E ≤ α2N ,
CN2
αβ ,
α
2N < E ≤ αN ,
0, E > αN .
(7.9)
Proof. Plugging (7.6) into the objective function (7.8), we have
us(P,J(P)) =

(αN −E)P, P≤ CN
2
αβ ,√
αCP
β −EP, P > CN
2
αβ .
(7.10)
Hence us(P,J(P)) is a linear function in P for 0≤P≤ CN2αβ , and is a strictly concave function
in P for P > CN
2
αβ . Note that the derivative of us(P,J(P)) with respect to P in the range
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P > CN
2
αβ is given by
∂us(P,J(P))
∂P
=
1
2
√
αC
βP
−E. (7.11)
Setting equation (7.11) to 0, we obtain P = αC4βE2 .
To compute the maximum value of (7.10), we consider three disjoint cases.
Case-1: E ≤ α2N . We can verify that CN
2
αβ ≤ αC4βE2 . As illustrated in Figure 7.2(a),
us(P,J(P)) achieves its maximum value of αC4βE when P =
αC
4βE2 .
Case-2: α2N < E ≤ αN . We can verify that CN
2
αβ >
αC
4βE2 . As illustrated in Fig-
ure 7.2(b), us(P,J(P)) achieves its maximum value of
(α−EN)CN
αβ when P =
CN2
αβ .
Case-3: E > αN . In this case, we also have
CN2
αβ >
αC
4βE2 . As illustrated in Fig-
ure 7.2(c), us(P,J(P)) achieves its maximum value of 0 when P = 0.
This proves the lemma.
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Figure 7.2: User’s utility function for different values of E
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Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1. The strategy pair (PSE ,JSE) is the Stackelberg Equilibrium of the PCSJ
game, where
PSE =

αC
4βE2 , E ≤ α2N ,
CN2
αβ ,
α
2N < E ≤ αN ,
0, E > αN ,
and
JSE =

α
2E−N
β , E ≤ α2N ,
0, E > α2N .
Remark. Note that the user needs to have the knowledge of β to compute PSE .
This can be achieved as follows: The user randomly selects its initial transmission power
P[0] > 0. It then keeps increasing its transmission power to P[i] until the received jamming
signal is non-zero. For example, it can set P[i] = 2i×P[0] for i > 0. The received jamming
signal can be measured by taking advantage of the delay in jamming’s decision making.
According to (7.6), we have βJ(P[i]) =
√
αβP[i]
C −N. Hence we have β =
C(βJ(P[i])+N)
2
αP[i] ,
where βJ(P[i]) is the received jamming signal.
Comparison with Nash Equilibrium
Now we study the impact of the jammer’s intelligence on the utility values of both
players.
We show that the utility values of both the user and the jammer at the SE of the
PCSJ game are at least as high as those at the NE of the PCRJ game.
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Lemma 7.3. There exists a unique NE (PNE ,JNE) in the PCRJ game when the jammer
does not have intelligence to learn the user’s strategy. In addition,
(PNE ,JNE) =

( αCβE2 ,
α/E−N
β ), E ≤ αN ,
(0,0), E > αN ,
(7.12)
us(PNE ,JNE) = 0, (7.13)
and
vs(PNE ,JNE) =

C
β
(
N− 2αE
)
, E ≤ αN ,
0, E > αN .
(7.14)
Proof. We consider two disjoint cases:
Case-1: E ≤ αN . If J = α/E−Nβ , the value of (7.1) is 0, for any P. However, in
order to have J = α/E−Nβ , we must have P =
αC
βE2 according to (7.7). Thus the NE is
(PNE ,JNE) = ( αCβE2 ,
α/E−N
β ).
We now prove the uniqueness of NE in this case. Assume to the contrary that there
exists another NE (P′,J′). We first use contradiction to prove that J′ = JNE . If J′ > JNE ,
P′ = 0 according to (7.1). However, if P′ = 0, we must have J′ = 0 according to (7.2),
contradicting to the assumption that J′ > JNE > 0. If J′ < JNE , (7.1) becomes a strictly
increasing function of P. Hence the user can increase its utility by unilaterally increase its
transmission power, contradicting the NE assumption (P′,J′). Thus we have proved that
J′ = JNE . Since J′ is a function of P′ according to (7.7), we have P′ = PNE .
Case-2: E > αN . The derivative of (7.1) with respect to P is
α
N+βJ
−E < 0,
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for any J≥ 0. Hence P= 0 is the unique optimal strategy for the user. Since vs(0,J)=−CJ,
J = 0 is the unique optimal strategy for the jammer. The NE is then (PNE ,JNE) = (0,0).
Combining (7.12), (7.1) and (7.2), we get (7.13) and (7.14).
Lemma 7.3 leads to the following important theorem, as stated in the 3rd paragraph
of this section.
Theorem 7.2. Let (PSE ,JSE) be the SE of the PCSJ game, and (PNE ,JNE) be the NE of the
PCRJ game. Then we have
us(PSE ,JSE) ≥ us(PNE ,JNE), (7.15)
vs(PSE ,JSE) ≥ vs(PNE ,JNE). (7.16)
Proof. It is clear that us(PSE ,JSE)≥ us(PNE ,JNE). For the jammer, it suffices to prove that
vs(PSE ,JSE)≥ vs(PNE ,JNE) when α2N < E ≤ αN . According to (7.14), we have
vs(PNE ,JNE) =
C
β
(
N− 2α
E
)
≤ C
β
(N−2N)
= −CN
β
= vs(PSE ,JSE)
The theorem is proved.
7.5.2 PCSJ under Multi-Channel Model
In this section, we study the PCSJ game under the multi-channel model.
Jammer’s Best Response Strategy
Given the user’s strategy P, the problem of power allocation for the jammer can be
formulated as a convex optimization problem as follows.
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max
J∈J
vm(P,J) =−
n
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi
−C
n
∑
i=1
Ji. (7.17)
In the following, Theorem 7.3 guarantees the existence of the jammer’s best re-
sponse strategy, and Theorem 7.4 computes the jammer’s best response strategy, when the
user’s strategy is given.
Theorem 7.3. Let P be user’s strategy. There exists a unique J(P) such that vm(P,J(P)) is
maximized.
Proof. Since vm(P, ·) is a continuous function on the compact set J , it can achieve its
maximum value at some J ∈J [140].
Without loss of generality, we assume that Pi > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Pi = 0 for
k < i≤ n. It is obvious that, in any optimal solution of the optimization problem (7.17), we
have Ji(P) = 0 for k < i ≤ n. Otherwise, we can increase the value of vm(P,J) by setting
Ji(P) = 0, contradicting the optimality of J. The optimization problem then becomes
max
J
vm(P,J) =−
k
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi
−C
k
∑
i=1
Ji (7.18)
s.t.
k
∑
i=1
Ji ≤ Jˆ,Ji ≥ 0, for all i ∈ [1,k].
The first order partial derivative of vm(P,J) with respective to Ji, for i ∈ [1,k], is
∂vm(P,J)
∂Ji
=
αiβiPi
(Ni+βiJi)2
−C, (7.19)
and the second order partial derivatives of vm(P,J) are
∂ 2vm(P,J)
∂Ji∂J j
=

− 2αiβ 2i Pi
(Ni+βiJi)3
, i = j,
0, i 6= j.
(7.20)
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The Hessian matrix is negative definite [14]: 52vm(P,J) ≺ 0, implying that the objec-
tive function (7.18) is strictly concave, and there is a unique solution to the optimization
problem.
Theorem 7.4. Let P be user’s strategy. We define pi(λ ) = ∑ki=1
[√
αiβiPi
C+λ −Ni
βi
]+
for λ ∈
[0,∞), where [x]+ = max{x,0}. Then the best response strategy of the jammer is J(P) =
(J1(P), J2(P), . . . ,Jn(P)), where
Ji(P) =


√
αiβiPi
C+λ0
−Ni
βi
+ , 1≤ i≤ k,
0, k+1≤ i≤ n,
(7.21)
and
λ0 =

0, pi(0)< Jˆ,
the unique root of pi(λ ) = Jˆ, otherwise.
(7.22)
In addition, J(P) can be computed in O(n logn) time. 
Proof. We convert the optimization problem (7.18) into a standard form of convex opti-
mization problem [14]:
min
J
f (J) =
k
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi
+C
k
∑
i=1
Ji (7.23)
s.t.
k
∑
i=1
Ji− Jˆ ≤ 0,
−Ji ≤ 0,∀i ∈ [1,k].
The first order partial derivative of f (J) with respective to Ji, for i ∈ [1,k], is
∂ f (J)
∂Ji
=− αiβiPi
(Ni+βiJi)2
+C, (7.24)
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and the second order partial derivatives of f (J) are
∂ 2 f (J)
∂Ji∂J j
=

2αiβ 2i Pi
(Ni+βiJi)3
, i = j,
0, i 6= j.
(7.25)
The Hessian matrix is positive definite [14]: 52 f (J) 0, implying that the objective func-
tion (7.23) is strictly convex.
Since the constraints of the optimization problem are also convex, we know that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [14] are necessary and sufficient for optimality.
We define the Lagrangian as
LJ(J,λ ) = vm(P,J)+λ0
(
k
∑
i=1
Ji− Jˆ
)
+
k
∑
i=1
λiJi, (7.26)
where λi ≥ 0, 0≤ i≤ k, are the Lagrange multipliers. The KKT conditions for the optimal
solution of (7.23) are given by
∂LJ(J,λ )
∂Ji
= 0,∀i ∈ [1,k], (7.27)
k
∑
i=1
Ji− Jˆ ≤ 0, (7.28)
−Ji ≤ 0,∀i ∈ [1,k], (7.29)
λi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [0,k], (7.30)
λ0
(
k
∑
i=1
Ji− Jˆ
)
= 0, (7.31)
−λiJi = 0,∀i ∈ [1,k]. (7.32)
Combining (7.27), (7.28), and (7.32), we have (7.21) and (7.22).
Our algorithm for computing J(P) is given in Algorithm 11. Lines 1–8 compute the
value of λ0 satisfying (7.22). Line 9 computes J(P) according to (7.21). When pi(0) < Jˆ,
Line 2 of Algorithm 11 computes λ0 = 0, which is consistent with the first case in (7.22).
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Algorithm 11: Computation of J(P)
input : The power vector P of the user
1 if pi(0)< Jˆ then
2 λ0← 0;
3 else
4 λ i0← αiβiPiN2i −C, for i← 1 to k ;
5 Sort {λ i0}ki=1 such that λ i10 ≤ λ i20 ≤ ·· · ≤ λ ik0 ;
6 Find r ∈ [1,k] such that pi(λ ir−10 )≥ Jˆ > pi(λ ir0 ), where λ i00 = 0;
7 λ0←
(
∑kj=r
√
αi j Pi j
βi j
/(
Jˆ+∑kj=r
Ni j
βi j
))2
−C;
8 end
9 Ji(P)←


√
αiβiPi
C+λ0
−Ni
βi
+ , 1≤ i≤ k,
0, k+1≤ i≤ n,
;
10 return J(P);
When pi(0)≥ Jˆ > 0, we have
[√
αiβiPi
C+λ −Ni
βi
]+
> 0 for at least one i ∈ [1,k]. Line 4 computes
the values {λ i0}ki=1, such that
√
αiβiPi
C+λ −Ni
βi
> 0 if and only if λ < λ i0. Line 5 sorts these values
such that λ i10 ≤ λ i20 ≤ ·· · ≤ λ ik0 . Hence pi(λ ) = ∑kj=l
√
αi j βi j Pi j
C+λ −Ni j
βi j
for λ ∈ [λ il−10 ,λ il0 ). This
also implies that pi(λ ik0 ) = 0, and pi(λ ) is strictly decreasing for λ ∈ [0,λ ik0 ]. Hence there is
a unique λ0 ∈ (0,λ ik0 ) such that pi(λ0) = Jˆ. Lines 6 and 7 compute this value.
Line 5 in Algorithm 11 takes O(k logk) time. The rest of the algorithm takes O(k)
time. Since k ≤ n, the running time of Algorithm 11 is O(n logn).
User’s Optimal Strategy
We first rigorously prove the existence of the user’s optimal strategy, which implies
the existence of SEs of the PCSJ game, and then design algorithms for approximating the
user’s optimal strategy.
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Lemma 7.4. Let {P[κ]} be a sequence in P converging to a point P¯ in P . Then the
sequence {J(P[κ])} converges to J(P¯).
Proof. To the contrary, assume that {J(P[κ])} does not converge to J(P¯). Since {J(P[κ])}
is contained in the compact set P , it must have a sub-sequence {J(P[sκ ])} converging
to a point J′ 6= J(P¯). Clearly {P[sκ ]} converges to P¯ since {P[κ]} converges to P¯. Hence
{(P[sκ ],J(P[sκ ]))} converges to (P¯,J′). Without loss of generality, we assume that {(P[κ],J(P[κ]))}
converges to (P¯,J′).
Since J(P¯) is the unique optimal strategy of the jammer for the strategy P¯ of the
user, we have
vm(P¯,J(P¯))− vm(P¯,J′)> 0. (7.33)
Define
3ε = vm(P¯,J(P¯))− vm(P¯,J′). (7.34)
Since vm(P,J) is a continuous function on P ×J , it is continuous at points
(P¯,J(P¯)) and (P¯,J′). Since {(P[κ],J(P¯))} converges to (P¯,J(P¯)), and {(P[κ],J(P[κ]))}
converges to (P¯,J′), there exists an integer K such that
|vm(P[κ],J(P¯))− vm(P¯,J(P¯))|< ε, when κ ≥ K, (7.35)
and
|vm(P[κ],J(P[κ]))− vm(P¯,J′)|< ε, when κ ≥ K. (7.36)
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Therefore, for all κ ≥ K, we have (using (7.35), (7.34), and (7.36))
vm(P[κ],J(P¯)) > vm(P¯,J(P¯))− ε (7.37)
= (vm(P¯,J′)+3ε)− ε (7.38)
> vm(P[κ],J(P[κ]))− ε+3ε− ε (7.39)
= vm(P[κ],J(P[κ]))+ ε. (7.40)
This is in contradiction with the assumption that J(P[κ]) is the best response strategy of the
jammer. This proves the lemma.
Lemma 7.5. um(P,J(P)) is a continuous function in P.
Proof. By (7.3), um(P,J) is continuous in the variables (P,J). From Lemma 7.4, J(P) is
continuous in P. Hence um(P,J(P)) is continuous in P.
Theorem 7.5. There exists PSE ∈P such that (PSE ,J(PSE)) is a Stackelberg Equilibrium
of the PCSJ game.
Proof. We know that um(P,J(P)) is a continuous function in P. Since the setP is compact,
um(P,J(P)) achieves its maximum at some point PSE ∈P [140]. This proves the theorem.
Based on the analytical results of the jammer’s best response strategy given user’s
strategy, the user can optimize its strategy P to maximize its utility um(P,J), being aware
that its decision will affect the jammer’s strategy. From the user’s prospective, its objective
is to solve the following optimization problem.
max
P∈P
um(P,J(P)) =
n
∑
i=1
αiPi
Ni+βiJi(P)
−E
n
∑
i=1
Pi, (7.41)
where Ji(P) is derived from Theorem 7.4.
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Although Theorem 7.5 proves the existence of an SE of PCSJ, computing an SE is
challenging. The reason is that the objective function in (7.41) is not concave.
Non-Concavity of um(P,J(P)): Define g(P) = um(P,J(P)). We use an example to
show that there exists P[1] and P[2] such that
g(P[1])+g(P[2])
2
> g
(
P[1]+P[2]
2
)
.
In this example, n= 2, α1 =α2 = 0.6, β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.2, N1 =N2 = 0.2, Pˆ= 10, Jˆ = 4, E =
0.1, and C = 1. We set P[1]= (4,3) and P[2]= (5,4). Using Algorithm 11 and the definition
of um(P,J(P)), we have g(P[1]) = 4.49089, g(P[2]) = 5.57603, and g
(
P[1]+P[2]
2
)
= 4.93331.
Hence we show that g(P
[1])+g(P[2])
2 > g
(
P[1]+P[2]
2
)
.
Algorithm 12: SE-SA
input : Algorithm parameters I, T , σ , and δ
1 Randomly initialize P, Pbest ← P;
2 repeat
3 for i← 1 to I do
4 Pnew← neighbor(P);
5 Randomly select r from (0,1);
6 if um(Pnew,J(Pnew))≥ um(P,J(P)) or r ≤ e(um(Pnew,J(Pnew))−um(P,J(P)))/T then
7 P← Pnew;
8 if um(Pnew,J(Pnew))> um(Pbest ,J(Pbest)) then
9 Pbest ← Pnew;
10 end
11 end
12 end
13 T ← σT ;
14 until T ≤ 1;
We propose two algorithms to approximate the optimal strategy of the user. The
first is simulated annealing [73], denoted by SE-SA and presented in Algorithm 12. The
second is a mesh-based hill-climbing algorithm, denoted by SE-MESH and presented in
Algorithm 13.
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Since simulated annealing has been widely used in the literature, we do not give
detailed description of SE-SA, and refer the readers to [57]. The algorithm finds a global
optimal solution with probability 1 when the number of iterations goes to infinity [57].
The algorithm parameters are as follows. T > 0 is the initial temperature. σ ∈ (0,1) is the
annealing parameter. I is the number of iterations to be performed at each temperature. δ is
the parameter used for generating perturbations. For any feasible power vector P ∈P , the
function neighbor(P) generates a perturbation P′ ∈P in the following way. For each i, let
P′i = [Pi+δi]+, where δi is a random number uniformly drawn from [−δ ,δ ]. If∑ni=1 P′i > Pˆ,
set P′i =
PˆP′i
∑ni=1 P
′
i
.
In SE-MESH, we first narrow down the searching spaceP to the points (δ1ε,δ2ε, . . . ,δnε)
on a mesh with space ε between lines. We then select the top t points that have highest
values of u(P,J(P)). Starting from each of these t points, we apply a searching strategy
similar to that used in SE-SA (Lines 3–12) except that only the point resulting in a higher
u(P,J(P)) is accepted in SE-MESH. In addition, for each point P, the searching process
terminates if we could not find a neighbor yielding higher u(P,J(P)) after I iterations.
Remark 1. The value of βi for 1≤ i≤ n to compute PSE can be computed similarly
using the method in Section 7.5.1 for each channel and compute βi.
Remark 2. SinceP is compact and um(P,J(P)) is a continuous function onP by
Lemma 7.5, um(P,J(P)) is uniformly continuous onP . Therefore, there exists a Lipschitz
constant L > 0, such that |um(P,J(P))− um(P′,J(P′))| ≤ L||P−P′|| [140]. Therefore, as
ε approaches zero, the solution computed by SE-MESH converges to the optimal solution.
More importantly, we have um(Pε ,J(Pε))≥ um(Popt ,J(Popt))−εnL, where Pε is the trans-
mit power computed by SE-MESH, Popt is optimal transmission power of the user, and n
is the dimension of P vector.
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Algorithm 13: SE-MESH
input : Algorithm parameters ε , t, I, and δ
1 Pbest ← 0;
2 LetP ′←{(δ1ε,δ2ε, . . . ,δnε)|δi ∈ Z∗,1≤ i≤ n}∩P , where Z∗ is the set of
nonnegative integers;
3 Compute u(P,J(P)) for each P ∈P ′;
4 LetP ′[1],P ′[2], . . . ,P ′[t] denote the top t power transmission vectors with highest
u(P,J(P));
5 for i← 1 to t do
6 P←P ′[i];
7 if um(P,J(P))> um(Pbest ,J(Pbest)) then
8 Pbest ← P;
9 end
10 cnt← 0;
11 while cnt < I do
12 Pnew← neighbor(P);
13 if um(Pnew,J(Pnew))≥ um(P,J(P)) then
14 P← Pnew;
15 cnt← 0;
16 if um(Pnew,J(Pnew))> um(Pbest ,J(Pbest)) then
17 Pbest ← Pnew;
18 end
19 else
20 cnt← cnt+1;
21 end
22 end
23 end
7.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we validate the theoretical insights of the PCSJ game through exten-
sive simulations.
Simulation Setup
For the single-channel model, five variables determine the players’ strategies and
their utility values, which are N, α , β , C, and E. Among these five variables, only α and
175
β , i.e., fading channel gains of the user and the jammer, may vary significantly due to the
change of players’ physical locations. Hence, we explore the relations of user and jammer’s
utility values with respect to different values of α and β . We set α and β to be in the range
of [0.1,0.9]. Moreover, let C = E = 1 (as in [2]), and N = 0.2.
For the multi-channel model, we have n ∈ [2,12] and Pˆ = Jˆ = 10. We assume that
αi is randomly distributed over (0,1] and βi is randomly distributed over (0,0.5], for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Same as the single-channel model, we have C = E = 1 and Ni = 0.2 for all
1≤ i≤ n. For the parameters of SE-SA, we set I = 1000, T = 100, σ = 0.6, and δ = 0.25.
For the parameters of SE-MESH, we set ε = 1, t = 100, I = 1000, and δ = 0.25.
We compare the SE of the PCSJ game with the following scenarios:
• Power Control with Standard Jammer (NE) [165]: The jammer set its power without
knowing the user’s. Thus both the user and the jammer set their power simultane-
ously.
• Random Power Control (RAND): Both the user and the jammer randomly set their
power, regardless of the existence of the other, as long as the power allocation is
feasible.
• Power Control While Being Unaware of Jammer’s Existence (UNAWARE): The user
maximizes its utility, without the knowledge of the smart jammer’s existence. The
smart jammer still maximizes it utility with its intelligence.
• Power Control with Misjudgement (MISJUDGE): The user assumes the intelligence
of the jammer, while the jammer is just a regular one using random transmission
power.
Result Analysis
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Figs. 7.3 and 7.4 show the results of the single-channel model. Specifically, Figs. 7.3(a)
and 7.3(b) show the impact of α on the players’ utility values with β = 0.5, for different
scenarios. We observe that SE leads to the highest utility values for the user. The fact
that the utility at SE is higher than that at NE is consistent with the results in [165]. Re-
call that α is the fading channel gain of the user. Therefore the larger α is, the closer the
transmitter is from the receiver. Hence, as α increases, user’s utility increases, as shown
in Figure 7.3(a), while jammer’s utility decreases, as shown in Figure 7.3(b). For the user,
both NE and MISJUDGE result in higher utility than both RAND and UNAWARE. It is
because the user prepares for the worst case where the jammer has intelligence. In RAND,
the user randomly sets its power, which results in a negative utility when α = 0.1,0.2 even
without the jammer. Therefore, the utility of the user in RAND is lower than that in UN-
AWARE when α = 0.1,0.2. However, when α > 0.2, the user’s utility in RAND is always
higher than that in UNAWARE, due to the unawareness of the jammer’s existence in UN-
AWARE. For the jammer, SE leads to the highest utility. Again, the higher utility in SE
compared to NE is consistent with the results in [165]. Compare to RAND, jammer’s utility
is higher in UNAWARE where jammer has intelligence. In addition, MISJUDGE is higher
than RAND, because the user assumes the existence of the jammer in MISJUDGE, but sets
power randomly in RAND. Another observation is that MISJUDGE results in higher utility
than UNAWARE when α ≥ 0.4. It is because good channel condition (i.e. large value of
α) makes the user transmit with the maximum power in UNAWARE.
Figs. 7.4(a) and 7.4(b) show the impact of β on the players’ utility values with
α = 0.5, for different scenarios. Again, SE leads to the highest utility values for the user.
Note that the jammer’s SE utility increases while the user’s SE utility decreases due to the
fact that the jammer’s influence on the receiver gets stronger as β increases. We also have
the similar observations about the relationship among different scenarios as in Figs. 7.3 and
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Figure 7.4: Impact of β on players’ utility values
Figs. 7.5 through 7.8 show the results of the multi-channel model. For SE-SA, three
parameters I, T , and σ need to be decided. Figure 7.5 shows um(P,J(P)) as a function of
the number of iterations with our parameter settings. Plugging I, T , and σ into Algo-
rithm 12, we know that there are dlogσ 1T e ∗ I = 10000 iterations in total. We observe that
the algorithm stops making improvement after 3000 iterations.
Figure 7.6 shows the comparison between SE-SA and SE-MESH. In particular,
Figure 7.6(a) shows the user’s utility and Figure 7.6(b) shows the running time. Although
SE-MESH performs a little better than SE-SA, the running time of SE-MESH grows ex-
ponentially in 1/ε . Actually, the running time of SE-MESH is dominated by the number
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Figure 7.5: Convergence of the simulated annealing algorithm
of mesh points we evaluate in Line 3 in Algorithm 13, which is Θ((n+ 1)Pˆ/ε). To have
a better idea on how this scales, we plot it as a function of n and ε in Figure 7.7. As we
can see, when n = 12, the number of mesh points is more than 10100 for ε = 0.1, which
is beyond the computability of current PC machines. Hence SE-SA is the recommended
approach.
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Figure 7.6: Comparison between SE-SA and SE-MESH
Figure 7.8 shows the impact of n on players’ utility values under the multi-channel
model. We observe that SE has the best performance for the user, followed by RAND at
the second and UNAWARE at the bottom. In general, the user’s utility increases when
there are more channels. The reason is that the user has a better chance to allocate power
to channels with better channel gains, i.e., αi. Another observation is that the jammer has
lower utility values in UNAWARE than SE when there are less than 7 channels, while
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higher utility values when there are more than 7 channels. This is because the number of
channel does not affect the jammer’s utility as much in UNAWARE as it does in SE. The
user will always only use the channel(s) with the best channel gain(s) if it is unaware of
the smart jammer’s existence. In contrast, the user has more flexible where there are more
channels in SE, with the knowledge of the jammer’s intelligence. Regarding the user’s
utility in MISJUDGE compared to other scenarios, we have the similar observations as in
the single-channel model. For the jammer, it has higher utility in UNAWARE than it does
in MISJUDGE. It is because unlike the single-channel model, where the user can transmit
with the maximum power at one channel, the user allocates power equally to channels with
the same condition under the multi-channel in UNAWARE. The even power distribution
allows the jammer to attack the channels with better channel conditions for the jammer and
thus to improve its utility. This advantage of the jammer is enhanced when the number of
channels increases.
7.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the problem of optimal power control in the presence
of a smart jammer, who can quickly learn the transmission power of the user and adjust its
transmission power to maximize the damaging effect. We have considered both the single-
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Figure 7.8: Impact of n on players’ utility values
channel and the multi-channel models. We modeled the problem as a Stackelberg game,
called PCSJ game. For the single-channel model, we proved the existence and the unique-
ness by giving the closed-form expressions for the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). For the
multi-channel model, we proved the existence and designed algorithms for approximating
an SE.
181
Chapter 8
Motivating Mobile Users for K-Anonymity Location Privacy
The past few years have witnessed a surge of location-based services (LBSs), including
Foursquare [43], Google Latitude [56], and Where [147]. LBS is an information and enter-
tainment service based on the geographical position of mobile devices. Take Foursquare,
one of the most popular LBSs, as an example. Users can check in at the participating
businesses in exchange for coupons or gaming rewards such as badges and mayorships. A
recent report finds that 74% of smartphone owners use LBSs as of February 2012, up from
55% in May 2011 [112]. With this proliferation comes a serious concern about location
privacy of mobile users. Beresford and Stajano [10] defined location privacy as the ability
to prevent other parties from learning one’s current or past location. LBS providers collect
information not only about where we go but what we do, who we know, and who we are.
As the Electronic Privacy Information Center reports [39], a third party may have access to
users’ location history without their explicit consents.
Several approaches have been proposed to protect the location privacy of mobile
users [81]. One of the most widely adopted approaches is k-anonymity [61]. The basic
idea of k-anonymity is to have a trusted proxy relay the communication between mobile
users and LBS providers. After receiving the location information from a mobile user, the
proxy adjusts the resolution of the location by returning a cloaking area containing at least
k−1 other mobile users. As a result, the adversary cannot distinguish one mobile user from
any other mobile user in the same cloaking area. Meanwhile, Beresford and Stajano [10]
proposed to frequently change pseudonyms for each user to protect its location privacy.
To prevent the adversary from linking the old and new pseudonyms of a mobile user, they
also introduced a new concept, called mix zone. A mix zone is a spatiotemporal region,
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inside which the mobile users change their pseudonyms and do not communicate with LBS
providers. Since a pseudonym change by an isolated mobile user can be trivially traced by
the adversary, the pseudonym change should occur with other mobile users.
To achieve k-anonymity, there must be at least k mobile users in the anonymity
set. However, not all mobile users are seriously concerned about their location privacy
[47, 71, 81]. Iachello et al. found through a survey [47] that privacy concerns were quite
light for people with a mobile, location-sensitive message service. In an interview with 55
people, Kassinen was surprised by the fact that the interviewees were not worried about
privacy issues with location-aware services [71]. In [81], Krumm easily convinced over
250 people from their institution to give up their GPS data and learnt that only 20% out of
97 do not want to share their location data outside their institution.
One way to supplement k-anonymity is to introduce dummy users [72]. But this
approach has many side effects including waste of resources, significant communication
overhead, and difficulty in constructing dummy users’ movement [10]. Another solution
is to make other mobile users inside the mix zone join the anonymity set. However, mix
zones induce a cost for mobile users in the anonymity set, because mobile users in a mix
zone cannot communicate [45]. In addition, they need to consume their own resource, in-
cluding CPU computation, memory, and batter power. Therefore it is necessary to provide
incentives for the mobile users to participate.
8.1 Introduction
In this work, we design auction-based incentive mechanisms for k-anonymity lo-
cation privacy. It is desirable for an auction to satisfy the following critical properties: 1)
Computational Efficiency: the auction can determine the winners and payments in polyno-
mial time; 2) Individual Rationality: each mobile user can expect a non-negative utility by
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participating in the auction; 3) Budget Balance: the auctioneer can run the auction with-
out deficit, i.e., the payment collected from the winning buyers is at least as large as the
payment paid to the winning sellers; and 4) Truthfulness: no mobile user can benefit from
cheating about its true valuation on the k-anonymity protection or its cost of participation.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• We are the first to design incentive mechanisms for motivating mobile users to assist
others achieving k-anonymity location privacy.
• We first consider the case where all mobile users have the same privacy degree re-
quirement and design an auction-based incentive mechanism.
• We then generalize the problem to the case where users’ degree requirements are
different and design a corresponding incentive mechanism.
• We also design an incentive mechanism for a more challenging case where mobile
users can also cheat about their requirements.
• We rigorously prove that these incentive mechanisms are computationally efficient,
individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we briefly re-
view the literature on location privacy protection, with the focus on the anonymity-based
approaches. In Section 8.3, we introduce k-anonymity and mix-zone location privacy pro-
tection techniques, formulate the incentive mechanism design as an auction, and present
the desirable properties that an auction should possess. In Section 8.4, we design an in-
centive mechanism for users with the same privacy degree requirement and an incentive
mechanism for users with different requirements and then another incentive mechanism to
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cope with the scenario where users can cheat about their requirements. In Section 8.5, we
evaluate the designed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations. We conclude
this work in Section 8.6.
8.2 Related Work
Location privacy concerns arise as more and more people give away their location
information to location-based service providers, without being aware of the risks if location
data leaks to an unscrupulous third party. There are many countermeasures proposed to
enhance location privacy. They can be generally classified into four categories: regulatory
strategies, privacy policies, anonymity, and obfuscation [81]. Since the objective of this
work is to design incentive mechanisms for anonymity-based approaches, we mainly focus
on the related work on anonymity-based location privacy protection.
Inspired by the concept of k-anonymity for data privacy, Gruteser and Grunwald
[61] introduced k-anonymity for location privacy. Instead of its real location, each mobile
user reports a cloaking area, which includes the mobile user itself and at least k−1 other
mobile users. To prevent the adversary from inferring the identity by learning the pattern of
a user’s activity, Beresford and Stajano [10] proposed to frequently change the pseudonyms
assigned to each user. They further introduced the concept of mix zone to make the old and
new pseudonyms unlinkable. In [72], Kido et al. proposed a new anonymous communi-
cation technique to protect the location privacy of users. The idea is that each mobile user
generates dummy users and sends them along with its true location to the LBS provider.
This approach introduces significant communication overhead. In addition, it is difficult
and costly for users to construct dummies with realistic behaviors. In [53], Gedik and Liu
designed a framework and algorithms to allow mobile users to specify their degree require-
ments. Chow et al. [22] developed the first distributed algorithm for k-anonymity location
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privacy. Xu and Cai [153] extended k-anonymity to continuous LBS and proposed to use
entropy to measure the anonymity degree.
Since the size, shape, and location of the mix zone or the cloaking area directly
affect the size of the anonymity set and thus the degree of anonymity, there have been
considerable efforts on developing techniques and algorithms to enhance location privacy
[45, 88, 139, 144]. In [45], Freudiger et al. studied the mix zone placement problem to
maximize the achieved location privacy, under cost constraint. In [88], Liu et al. proposed
a new metric to quantify the system’s resilience to privacy attacks and designed heuristic
algorithms to deploy mix zones to maximize the new metric. In [139], Vu et al. designed
a mechanism based on locality-sensitive hashing to compute the cloaking areas, which pre-
serves both locality and k-anonymity. In [144], Wang et al. introduced the concept of
Location-aware Location Privacy Protection and developed algorithms to compute cloak-
ing areas with minimum sizes such that the privacy requirements of users are satisfied.
Incentive mechanisms have been adopted to provide incentives for mobile users to
participate in different protocols and schemes at the cost of their own resources, includ-
ing P2P networks [55], routing [143, 148], cooperative communication [157], and mobile
sensing [38, 163]. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to design incentive
mechanisms for k-anonymity-based location privacy protection.
8.3 System Model
K-Anonymity and Mix Zone: A straightforward method to protect location pri-
vacy is to hide the real identity and associate the location data with a pseudonym. To further
reduce the probability of being identified by an adversary, Beresford and Stajano [10] pro-
posed to have each user frequently change its pseudonyms. However they also pointed
out that if the spatial and temporal information is sufficient, an adversary can still link the
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old and new pseudonyms, which defeats the purpose of the frequent pseudonym change.
Meanwhile, inspired by the concept of k-anonymity for data privacy, Gruteser and Grun-
wald [61] considered k-anonymity for location privacy. The location information is called
k-anonymous, if and only if it is indistinguishable from the location information of at least
k− 1 other users. Instead of its real location, the mobile user reports a two-dimensional
area, called cloaking area, which contains the mobile user itself and at least k− 1 other
mobile users.
a
b
c
de
f Mix 
Zone
Figure 8.1: Mix zone: after entering mix zone, a, b, and e change their pseudonyms such
that an adversary can observe only c, d, and f existing the mix zone.
Combining the ideas of frequently changing pseudonyms and k-anonymity, Beres-
ford and Stajano [10] introduced the concept of mix zone, as shown in Figure 8.1. In a
mix zone, users receive new, unused pseudonyms and do not report their location infor-
mation. These users together form an anonymity set. In this case an adversary cannot
distinguish a user from any other user, and thus cannot link users entering the mix zone
with those exiting. There are several techniques to create such a mix zone: 1) Turning off
the transceivers of mobile nodes; 2) Encryption; 3) Using a proxy to relay communication;
and 4) Exploiting regions that are out of the adversary’s coverage [45].
Auction Formulation: Assume that there are a setU b = {Ub1 ,Ub2 , . . . ,Ubn } of n≥ 1 mobile
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users concerned about their location privacy and a set U s = {U s1,U s2, . . . ,U sm} of m ≥ 1
mobile users interested in joining the anonymity set. Each mobile user Ubi ∈ U b desires
ki-anonymity and has a valuation vi ≥ 0 on the location privacy protection. Here ki is the
location privacy degree requirement of Ubi , which is the requirement of U
b
i on the size of
the anonymity set. Each seller U sj ∈U s has a cost c j ≥ 0 of participating in the anonymity
set, which is for example related to the energy consumption, data usage, and temporary
service connection lost inside the mix-zone.
We model the k-anonymity auction as a single-round sealed-bid double auction. In
this auction, users in U b are buyers, users in U s are sellers, and the central authority is
the auctioneer, e.g., the middleware proposed in [10] and the wireless carrier in cellular
networks. For ease of exposition, we refer both buyers and sellers as agents when we do
not distinguish them specifically. Buyers offer prices for the desired k-anonymity privacy,
while sellers offer prices for participating in the anonymity set. Following the terminology
in auction theory, the price offered by a buyer is referred as bid, and the price offered by a
seller is referred as ask. Since the auction is sealed-bid, the price offered by each agent is
private to the agent itself, and no agent is aware of the prices offered by others. Let bi ≥ 0
denote the bid of Ubi . Note that bi is not necessarily equal to vi. Let a j ≥ 0 denote the ask
of U sj . Similarly, a j is not necessarily equal to c j. At the beginning of the auction, buyers
submit their bids and sellers submit their asks to the auctioneer. Given as input the bids
from the buyers and the asks from the sellers, the auctioneer determines the winning buyer
set W b and the winning seller set W s, such that |W b|+ |W s| ≥ ki for each Ubi ∈ W b. In
addition, the auctioneer decides the payment pbi charged to each buyer U
b
i ∈ U b and the
payment psj paid to each seller U
s
j ∈ U s. Obviously, pbi = 0 for each Ubi ∈ U b \W b and
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psj = 0 for each U
s
j ∈U s \W s. The utility of buyer Ubi is defined as
ubi =

vi− pbi , if Ubi ∈W b,
0, otherwise.
Similarly, the utility of seller U sj is defined as
usj =

psj− c j, if U sj ∈W s,
0, otherwise.
We assume that agents are rational and try to maximize their own utilities.
8.4 Auction Design
Auction with Same Degree Requirement
In this section, we assume that the privacy degree requirements of all the buyers are
the same, i.e., ki = k for all Ubi ∈U b. We design an auction, called KASD (K-Anonymity
Auction with Same Degree Requirement).
Algorithm 14: KASD
1 pbi ← 0 for i← 1 to n; psj← 0 for j← 1 to m;
2 if n+m≥ k+2 then
3 if n≥ k+1 then
4 W b← {Ub1 ,Ub2 , . . . ,Ubn−1};
5 pbi ← bn for i← 1 to n−1;
6 else if ak−n+2 ≤ (n−1)bnk−n+1 then
7 W b← {Ub1 ,Ub2 , . . . ,Ubn−1};
8 pbi ← bn for i← 1 to n−1;
9 W s← {U s1,U s2, . . . ,U sk−n+1};
10 psj← ak−n+2 for j← 1 to k−n+1;
11 end
12 end
The pseudocode of KASD is illustrated in Algorithm 14. For ease of exposition,
we assume that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ ·· · ≥ bn and a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ·· · ≤ am. The auctioneer first checks
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whether the total number of buyers and sellers is at least k+ 2. Here we need two more
agents than the degree requirement, because one of the buyers and one of the sellers need
to be sacrificed to guarantee the truthfulness. If the number of buyers is more than k, the
buyers themselves can achieve k-anonymity without the help of the sellers. Otherwise, the
auctioneer checks whether it is possible to find k−n+1 sellers as winners. In either case,
the first n− 1 buyers become the winning buyers and each of them pays a payment of bn.
In the latter case, the first k− n+ 1 sellers become the winning sellers and each of them
receives a payment of ak−n+2.
We now prove that KASD satisfies four properties mentioned in Section 1.1. Specif-
ically, we prove that KASD is computationally efficient (Lemma 8.1), individually rational
(Lemma 8.2), budget-balanced (Lemma 8.3), and truthful (Lemmas 8.4 and 8.5).
Lemma 8.1. KASD is computationally efficient. 
Proof. To ease the exposition, we have assumed that buyers are sorted in a nonincreasing
order according to their bids and sellers are sorted in a nondecreasing order according to
their asks. Sorting the buyers and the sellers takes O(n logn+m logm) time. The rest of
KASD takes linear time. Hence KASD takes O(n logn+m logm) time.
Lemma 8.2. KASD is individually rational. 
Proof. Each winning buyer Ubi ∈ W b pays pbi = bmin(U b). When it bids truthfully, i.e.,
bi = vi, its utility is ubi = vi− pbi ≥ vi− bi = 0. Each winning seller U sj ∈ W s receives
psj = ak−n+2. When it asks truthfully, i.e., a j = c j, its utility is u
s
j = p
s
j− c j ≥ a j− c j = 0.
Therefore KASD is individually rational for both buyers and sellers.
Lemma 8.3. KASD is budget-balanced. 
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Proof. If no winner is selected, the auctioneer does not need to pay any seller. If n≥ k+1,
the total payment collected from the winning buyers is pb = ∑n−1i=1 p
b
i = (n− 1)bn ≥ 0.
Since there is no winning seller, the profit of the auction is nonnegative. If n < k+ 1,
the total payment collected from the winning buyers is still pb = (n− 1)bn. The total
payment paid to the winning sellers is ps = (k−n+1)ak−n+2. The profit of the auctioneer
is pb− ps = (n−1)bn− (k−n+1)ak−n+2 ≥ (n−1)bn− (k−n+1) (n−1)bnk−n+1 = 0.
Lemma 8.4. KASD is truthful for the buyers. 
Proof. For any buyer Ubi , let p
b
i and u
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
bids truthfully, i.e., bi = vi. Let p˜bi and u˜
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when
it cheats, i.e., bi 6= vi. Throughout the proof, we assume that Ubi is in front of others after
the tie-breaking to simplify the description. We prove that ubi ≥ u˜bi for any bi 6= vi. Due
to the assumption that the buyers are sorted, we have bmin(U b) = bn and Ubmin(U
b) =Ubn .
Assume that n+m≥ k+2. Consider the following two cases:
• Case 1: n≥ k+1
There are two possible outcomes when Ubi bids truthfully, winning or losing. If it
wins, we have pbi = bmin(U
b) and ubi = vi− pbi ≥ 0 by Lemma 8.2. Note that bidding
bi > vi will not affect the outcome of the auction and thus result in u˜bi = vi− p˜bi = vi−
pbi = u
b
i . We have the same conclusion when U
b
i bids bmin(U
b \{Ubi })≤ bi < vi. By
bidding bi < bmin(U b\{Ubi }), Ubi will become the only loser, which makes its utility
u˜bi = 0≤ ubi . If it loses by bidding truthfully, its utility is ubi = 0. This also implies that
vi < bmin(U b\{Ubi }). It is obvious that bidding bi < vi or vi < bi < bmin(U b\{Ubi })
will not affect the outcome of the auction. By bidding bi ≥ bmin(U b \ {Ubi }), Ubi
can become a winner. However, its utility becomes u˜bi = vi− pbi = vi− bmin(U b \
{Ubi })< 0 = ubi .
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• Case 2: n < k+1
If Ubi wins by bidding its true valuation, we have a similar argument as in Case
1. If it loses by bidding its true valuation, there could be two subcases. Subcase 1:
vi < bmin(U b\{Ubi }). We then have a similar argument as in Case 1. Subcase 2: vi≥
bmin(U b \{Ubi }), but ak−n+2 > (n−1)bnk−n+1 . In this case, bidding bi ≥ bmin(U b \{Ubi })
will not affect the outcome of the auction. If it bids bi < bmin(U b \ {Ubi }), the
condition (Line 6) will not hold either. It still loses the auction, and its utility is
u˜bi = 0.
Based on the analyses of Cases 1 and 2, we conclude that Ubi maximizes its utility
by bidding truthfully.
Lemma 8.5. KASD is truthful for the sellers. 
Proof. For any seller U sj , let p
s
j and u
s
j be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
asks truthfully, i.e., a j = c j. Let p˜sj and u˜
s
j be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
cheats, i.e., a j 6= c j. Throughout the proof, we assume that U sj is in front of others after the
tie-breaking to simplify the description. We prove that usj ≥ u˜sj for any a j 6= c j. Note that
sellers will be involved in the auction only when n < k+1.
If U sj wins by asking its true cost, we have p
s
j = ak−n+2 and u
s
j = p
s
j− c j ≥ 0 by
Lemma 8.2. It is obvious that asking a j < c j or c≤ a j ≤ ak−n+2 will not affect the outcome
of the auction. By asking a j > ak−n+2, U sj will become a loser, and its utility is u˜
s
j = 0≤ usj.
If U sj loses by asking its true cost, its utility is u
s
j = 0. There could be two subcases.
Subcase 1: c j > ak−n+2. In this case, it is obvious that asking a j > c j or ak−n+2 < a j < c j
will not affect the outcome of the auction. By asking a j ≤ ak−n+2, U sj may become a
winner, but its utility is u˜sj = p˜
s
j − c j = ak−n+2− c j < 0 = usj. Subcase 2: c j ≤ ak−n+2,
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but ak−n+2 >
(n−1)bn
k−n+1 . In this case, asking a j ≤ ak−n+2 will not affect the outcome of the
auction. If it asks a j > ak−n+2, the condition (Line 6) will not hold either. It still loses the
auction, and its utility is u˜si = 0 = u
s
j.
We are ready to give the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 8.1. KASD is computationally efficient, individually rational, budget balanced,
and truthful. 
Proof. Lemmas 8.1–8.5 together prove this theorem.
At first sight of KASD, one may argue that two possible changes can improve the
outcome of the auction, in terms of the auctioneer’s profit and the number of total winners.
First, instead of only checking whether ak−n+2 ≤ (n−1)bnk−n+1 is satisfied, we keep searching
for the value of l, 0 ≤ l ≤ min{n− 2,m− k+ n− 2}, such that the auctioneer’s profit is
maximized under the constraint ak−n+l+2 ≤ (n−l−1)bn−lk−n+l+1 . Second, if the condition (Line 6)
is not satisfied, we should keep searching for the value of l until ak−n+l+2 ≤ (n−l−1)bn−lk−n+l+1 .
Unfortunately, making any of these two changes to KASD can devastate its truthfulness, as
shown in the following examples.
Assume we make the first change. An example is given in Figure 8.2. In this
example, there are 3 buyers {1,2,3} and 3 sellers {a,b,c}. In addition, v1 = 12, v2 = 11,
v3 = 2, ca = 1, cb = 2, and cc = 5. Assume that k = 3. When all agents report truthfully, as
shown in Figure 8.2(a), we compare two pairs (3,b) and (2,c). We choose the pair (3,b),
since it results in a profit of 2 compared to a profit of 1 by choosing pair (2,c). Thus seller
b is one of the losers, and its utility is 0. Now assume that seller b asks 4 instead of 2, as
shown in Figure 8.2(b). In this case, we will choose the pair (2,c), since it results in a profit
of 1 compared to a profit of 0 by choosing pair (3,b). Seller b now becomes a winner and
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 1 2 3 
a b c 
12 11 2 
1 2 5 
(a) Agents report truthfully
 
1 2 3 
a b c 
12 11 2 
1 4 5 
(b) Seller b asks 4 instead of 2
Figure 8.2: Profit maximization may devastate the truthfulness
receives a payment of 5. Thus its utility is 5−2 = 3. Seller 2 increases its utility from 0 to
3 by cheating about its ask. This shows that the change we made to KASD allows agents to
manipulate the outcome of the auction.
 
1 2 3 
a b c 
9 8 1 
1 2 4 
(a) Agents report truthfully
 
1 2 3 
b a c 
9 8 1 
2 3 4 
(b) Seller a asks 3 instead of 1
Figure 8.3: Increasing the number of winners may devastate the truthfulness
We then examine the second change. A corresponding example is shown in Fig-
ure 8.3. In this example, there are 3 buyers {1,2,3} and 3 sellers {a,b,c}. In addition,
v1 = 9, v2 = 8, v3 = 1, ca = 1, cb = 2, and cc = 4. Assume that k = 3. When all agents
report truthfully, as shown in Figure 8.3(a), the pair (3,b) already satisfies the condition
(Line 6). As a result, seller a is the only winner and receives a payment of 2. Thus its
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utility is 2−1= 1. Now assume that seller a asks 3 instead of 1, as shown in Figure 8.3(b).
The condition (Line 6) does not hold for the pair (3,a). We thus move on to the pair (2,c),
which satisfies the condition. As a result, seller a is still a winner, but receives a payment
of 4. Its utility becomes 4− 1 = 3. Seller a increases its utility from 1 to 3 by cheating
about its ask. This shows that KASD with the above change is not truthful.
The above two examples show that our incentive mechanism KASD cannot be triv-
ially improved along the lines discussed above. While it is impossible to satisfy the system
efficiency without sacrificing the four properties [104], the design of incentive mechanisms
satisfying these four properties but with larger total valuations of the agents remains an
important future research topic.
Auction with Different Degree Requirements
In this section, we design an auction for the case where the privacy degree require-
ments of buyers are different. We call this auction KADD (K-Anonymity Auction with
Different Degree Requirements).
The pseudocode of KADD is illustrated in Algorithm 15. For ease of exposition,
we assume that a1 ≤ a2 ≤ ·· · ≤ am. The auctioneer divides the buyers into q groups,
U bλ1,U
b
λ2
, . . . ,U bλq , according to their degree requirements, such that λg < λg′ for any 1 ≤
g < g′ ≤ q. For any buyer Ubi ∈ U bλg , ki = λg. The auctioneer first checks how many
groups can be self-supporting without the help of sellers. It computes the maximum value
of x, 1 ≤ x ≤ q, such that | ∪xg=1U bλg| ≥ λx + 1. These self-supporting buyers are always
winning buyers, and each of them needs to pay a payment of bmin(∪xg=1U bλg). With the
value of x computed, the auctioneer then decides which of the remaining groups should
be considered potential winning buyers. The intuition is to select the groups such that
the possible payment to each necessary seller is maximized. This selection maximizes the
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probability of the auction’s success. If the payment satisfies the sellers, who are necessary
to achieve ki-anonymity for each potential winning buyer, these potential winning buyers
win the auction. Each winning buyer Ubi pays a payment of bmin(U
b
ki ).
If the payment could not satisfy the sellers, they become losers.
If there is a tie while determining Ubix , the buyer with the minimum ID would be
chosen.
We now prove that KADD satisfies four properties mentioned in Section 1.1: com-
putational efficiency (Lemma 8.6), individual rationality (Lemma 8.7), budget balance
(Lemma 8.8), and truthfulness (Lemmas 8.9 and 8.10).
Lemma 8.6. KADD is computationally efficient. 
Proof. The initialization phase (Line 1) can be finished in O(n+m) time. Dividing the
buyers into groups and sorting the groups take O(n logn) time. Sorting the sellers takes
O(m logm) time. Finding the largest x in Line 3 takes O(n) time. If x does not exist, finding
y (Line 5) takes O(n) time if we keep track of bmin(U bλg) for 1≤ g≤ q while grouping the
buyers. Similarly, determining the winning buyers (Line 8) can be done in O(n) time if we
keep track of Ubmin(U
b
λg) while grouping the buyers. It is obvious that Lines 10 and 11 can
be finished in O(m) time once api+1 is known. If x < q, the analysis is similar as above.
Therefore KADD takes O(n logn+m logm) time.
Lemma 8.7. KADD is individually rational. 
Proof. Each winning buyer Ubi ∈W b pays pbi = bmin(U bki ) or pbi = bmin(∪xg=1U bλg) if it is in
the self-supporting groups. When it bids truthfully, i.e., bi = vi, its utility is ubi = vi− pbi ≥
vi−bi = 0. Each winning seller U sj ∈W s receives psj = api+1. When it asks truthfully, i.e.,
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Algorithm 15: KADD
1 pbi ← 0 for i← 1 to n; psj← 0 for j← 1 to m;
2 Group U b into U bλ1,U
b
λ2
, . . .U bλq , such that λg < λg′ for any 1≤ g < g′ ≤ q, and let
nλg ← |U bλg| for 1≤ g≤ q;
3 Find the largest x such that ∑xg=1 nλg ≥ λx+1;
4 if x does not exist then
5 y← arg max
1≤y≤q
∑yg=1
(
nλg−1
)
bmin(U bλg)
λy−∑yg=1(nλg−1)
;
6 pi ← λy−∑yg=1(nλg−1); τ ←
∑yg=1
(
nλg−1
)
bmin(U bλg)
pi ;
7 if pi+1≤ m and api+1 ≤ τ then
8 W b←∪yg=1
{
U bλg \{Ubmin(U bλg)}
}
;
9 pbi ← bmin(U bλg) for Ubi ∈U bλg \{Ubmin(U bλg)} and 1≤ g≤ y;
10 W s← {U s1,U s2, . . . ,U spi};
11 psj← api+1 for j← 1 to pi;
12 end
13 else
14 W b←
{
∪xg=1U bλg
}
\
{
Ubmin(∪xg=1U bλg)
}
;
15 pbi ← bmin(∪xg=1U bλg) for Ubi ∈W b;
16 if x < q then
17 y← argmaxx+1≤y≤q X+Y
λy−
(
∑yg=1 nλg−y+x−1
) , where
X = bmin(∪xg=1U bλg)
(
∑xg=1 nλg−1
)
and Y = ∑yg=x+1
(
nλg−1
)
bmin(U bλg);
18 pi ← λy−
(
∑yg=1 nλg− y+ x−1
)
; τ ← X+Ypi ;
19 if pi+1≤ m and api+1 ≤ τ then
20 W b←W b∪
{
∪yg=x+1U bλg \{Ubmin(U bλg)}
}
;
21 pbi ← bmin(U bλg) for Ubi ∈U bλg \{Ubmin(U bλg)} and x+1≤ g≤ y;
22 W s← {U s1,U s2, . . . ,U spi};
23 psj← api+1 for j← 1 to pi;
24 end
25 end
26 end
197
a j = c j, its utility is usj = p
s
j− c j ≥ a j− c j = 0. Therefore KADD is individually rational
for both buyers and sellers.
Lemma 8.8. KADD is budget-balanced. 
Proof. When no winner is selected, the proof is trivial. If x = q or x < q but the con-
dition in Line 19 does not hold, the total payment collected from the winning buyers is
pb =∑Ubi ∈W b p
b
i =
(
|∪xg=1U bλg|−1
)
bmin(∪xg=1U bλg)≥ 0. Since there is no winning seller,
the profit of the auction is nonnegative. Otherwise, the total payment collected from the
winning buyers is pb = piτ . The total payment paid to the winning sellers is ps = piapi+1.
The profit of the auctioneer is pb− ps = pi(τ−api+1)≥ 0.
Lemma 8.9. KADD is truthful for the buyers. 
Proof. For any buyer Ubi , let p
b
i and u
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
bids truthfully, i.e., bi = vi. Let p˜bi and u˜
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
cheats, i.e., bi 6= vi. Throughout the proof, we assume that Ubi is in front of others after the
tie-breaking to simplify the description. We prove that ubi ≥ u˜bi for any bi 6= vi.
We first prove the case where Ubi is not in any of the self-supporting groups. Assume
that Ubi wins by bidding bi = vi. By Lemma 8.7, we have u
b
i ≥ 0. It implies that vi ≥
bmin(U bki \ {Ubi }). It is clear that bidding bi > vi or bmin(U bki \ {Ubi }) ≤ bi < vi will not
affect the outcome of the auction. Thus we have u˜bi = u
b
i . If U
b
i bids bi < bmin(U
b
ki \{Ubi }),
it will lose the auction, which makes its utility u˜bi = 0≤ ubi .
Assume that Ubi loses by bidding bi = vi and its utility u
b
i = 0. We consider two
cases vi < bmin(U bki \{Ubi }) and vi ≥ bmin(U bki \{Ubi }). For the former case, it is clear that
bidding bi < vi or vi < bi < bmin(U bki \ {Ubi }) will not affect the outcome of the auction.
Thus we have u˜bi = u
b
i . Even if U
b
i wins the auction by bidding bi ≥ bmin(U bki \{Ubi }), its
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utility is u˜bi = vi− p˜bi = vi−bmin(U bki \{Ubi })< 0 = ubi . For the latter case, it is clear that
bidding bi > vi or bmin(U bki \ {Ubi }) ≤ bi < vi will not affect the outcome of the auction.
Thus we have u˜bi = u
b
i . If U
b
i bids bi < bmin(U
b
ki \{Ubi }), it will certainly lose the auction.
Thus we have u˜bi = u
b
i as well.
The case where Ubi is in one of the self-supporting groups can be proved similarly by
replacingU bki with ∪xg=1U bλg . Therefore Ubi maximizes its utility by bidding truthfully.
Lemma 8.10. KADD is truthful for the sellers. 
Proof. For any seller U sj , let p
s
j and u
s
j be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
asks truthfully, i.e., a j = c j. Let p˜sj and u˜
s
j be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
cheats, i.e., a j 6= c j. Throughout the proof, we assume that U sj is in front of others after the
tie-breaking to simplify the description. We prove that usj ≥ u˜sj for any a j 6= c j. Note that
sellers will be involved in the auction only when pi+ 1 < m and api+1 ≤ τ . Since the first
condition is independent of sellers’ asks, we focus only on the case where it always holds.
Assume that U sj wins the auction by asking a j = c j. It implies that c j ≤ api+1 and
usj ≥ 0 by Lemma 8.7. It is clear that asking a j < c j or c j < a j ≤ api+1 will not affect the
outcome of the auction. Thus we have u˜sj = u
s
j. If U
s
j asks a j > api+1, then U
s
j will be placed
at the position after pi , which makes U sj one of the losers. Thus we have u˜
s
j = 0≤ usj.
Assume that U sj loses the auction by asking a j = c j. One of two possible reasons
is that api+1 > τ . If c j ≤ api+1, U sj cannot win the auction no matter how much its ask is.
If c j > api+1, U sj may win the auction by asking a j < api+1. However, its payment will be
p˜sj ≤ api+1 and utility will be u˜sj = p˜sj−c j ≤ api+1−c j < 0 = usj. The other reason for U sj ’s
lost is that api+1 ≤ τ and c j > api+1. In this case, we have a similar argument as in the
second case for the first reason.
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Theorem 8.2. KADD is computationally efficient, individually rational, budget balanced,
and truthful. 
Proof. Lemmas 8.6–8.10 together prove this theorem.
We next consider a more challenging scenario, where buyers can also cheat about
their privacy degree requirements. This type of auction is called multidimensional private
type auction in auction theory [111]. The multidimensional private type gives the buyers
more possibilities to manipulate the outcome of the auction. There are few papers concern-
ing about multidimensional private type auction design [40, 93], and they are all essentially
single-sided auctions. To the best of our knowledge, there is no related work on the de-
sign of multidimensional private type double auction. The fact that our auction has the
constraint on the total number of winning buyers and sellers makes the design even more
difficult.
Algorithm 16: KADD+
1 pbi ← 0 for i← 1 to n; psj← 0 for j← 1 to m;
2 kmax←maxUbi ∈U b ki;
3 if n+m≥ kmax+2 then
4 if n≥ kmax+1 then
5 W b← {Ub1 ,Ub2 , . . . ,Ubn−1};
6 pbi ← bn for i← 1 to n−1;
7 else if ak−n+2 ≤ (n−1)bnkmax−n+1 then
8 W b← {Ub1 ,Ub2 , . . . ,Ubn−1};
9 pbi ← bn for i← 1 to n−1;
10 W s←
{
U s1,U
s
2, . . . ,U
s
kmax−n+1
}
;
11 psj← akmax−n+2 for j← 1 to kmax−n+1;
12 end
13 end
To overcome these difficulties, we need to decouple buyers’ degree requirements
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and bids as much as possible. In addition, we also need to make buyers have little control
over the degree requirement considered by the auctioneer. We illustrate our auction de-
signed specifically for this scenario in Algorithm 16, which is called KADD+. In order to
weaken the buyers’ control over the privacy degree requirement considered by the auction-
eer, we select the maximum ki among the buyers and proceed the auction in a way similar
to KASD. We assume that buyers are single-minded. For any Ubi ∈W b, if |W b|+ |W s|< ki,
its utility is ubi = 0.
We now prove the properties of KADD+.
Theorem 8.3. KADD+ is computationally efficient, individually rational, budget balanced,
and truthful. 
Proof. The computational efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance of KADD+
can be proved similarly as in Lemmas 8.1 to 8.3. We focus on truthfulness.
For any buyer Ubi , let p
b
i and u
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
bids truthfully, i.e., bi = vi. Let p˜bi and u˜
b
i be its payment and utility, respectively, when it
cheats, i.e., bi 6= vi. Throughout the proof, we assume that Ubi is in front of others after the
tie-breaking to simplify the description. We prove that ubi ≥ u˜bi for any bi 6= vi and k′i 6= ki.
Assume that Ubi wins by bidding bi = vi. We then have u
b
i ≥ 0, since KADD+ is
individually rational. It also implies that vi ≥ bmin(U b \ {Ubi }). Obviously, if Ubi bids
bi > vi or bmin(U b \{Ubi })≤ bi < vi, the outcome of the auction will not be affected. Thus
we have u˜bi = u
b
i in this case. If U
b
i bids bi < bmin(U
b \{Ubi }), it will lose the auction and
have utility u˜bi = 0≤ ubi . If Ubi reports k′i < ki or ki < k′i ≤ kmax, the outcome of the auction
will not change. If Ubi reports k
′
i > kmax and the condition in Line 7 still holds, then p˜
b
i = p
b
i
and thus u˜bi = u
b
i . If the condition does not hold, then u˜
b
i = 0≤ ubi .
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Assume that Ubi loses by bidding bi = vi. We then have u
b
i = 0. There are two
possible cases: vi < bmin(U b \ {Ubi }) and the condition in Line 7 does not hold. For the
former case, bidding bi < vi or vi < bi < bmin(U b \ {Ubi }) will not affect the outcome of
the auction. By bidding bi ≥ bmin(U b \ {Ubi }), Ubi may win the auction, but its utility is
u˜bi = vi− p˜bi < 0 = ubi . In addition, reporting any value of ki cannot make Ubi a winner in
this case. For the latter case, the only possible way that Ubi can make the condition hold
is to report k′i < kmax, under the condition that Ubi is the only player for whom ki = kmax.
However, even Ubi wins the auction, the total winners will be k
′
i < ki, which makes u˜
b
i =
0 = ubi .
Therefore each buyer maximizes its utility by bidding and reporting degree require-
ment truthfully. The truthfulness for sellers can be proved similarly as in Lemma 8.5.
8.5 Performance Evaluation
Simulation Setup
In the simulations, we varied both n and m from 50 to 150 with an increment of 10.
The valuation vi of buyer Ubi and the cost c j of seller U
s
j were uniformly distributed over
(0,1]. For KASD, k was varied from 20 to 120 with an increment of 20. For KADD and
KADD+, ki was uniformly distributed over [2,k], where k was varied from 20 to 120 with
an increment of 20. For each setting we randomly generated 10000 instances and averaged
the results. All the simulations were run on a Linux machine with 3.2 GHz CPU and 16
GB memory.
The performance metrics include running time, number of winning buyers, and
profit of the auctioneer. The reason we picked the number of winning buyers as a per-
formance metric is that winning buyers are the agents who really desire location privacy
after all. For each of these performance metrics, we evaluated the impact of n, m, and k.
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Figure 8.4: Running time of KASD
While evaluating the impact of n (resp. m), we fixed m = 100 (resp. n = 100) and chose k
to be 20 and 120. While evaluating the impact of k, we fixed n = 50 and m = 100.
Simulation Results
Running Time: Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 plot the running time of KASD and
KADD, respectively. Since KADD+ has very similar curves as KASD, we omit the il-
lustration to save space. Specifically, Figure 8.4(a) and Figure 8.5(a) show the impact of n,
and Figure 8.4(b) and Figure 8.5(b) show the impact of m. For KASD, we observe that the
running time of k = 120 drops dramatically to the level of k = 20 when n > 120. This is
because the auctioneer needs not consider the sellers to satisfy the winning buyers’ degree
requirements. Thus the two cases where k = 20 and k = 120 are essentially equivalent
when n > 120. When k = 20, the auctioneer needs only to spend time determining win-
ning buyers, since n is always greater than k. Thus the auction finishes extremely fast. For
KADD, we observe that the running time of k= 120 starts to drop down when n= 120. The
reason is that the auctioneer needs not consider the sellers to satisfy all the buyers in some
instances. Comparing KADD to KASD, we note that KADD takes more time than KASD.
This is as expected, because KADD has more calculations than KASD, although both of
them have the same theoretical time complexity.
203
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 1500
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
n
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
 
k = 20
k = 120
(a) Impact of n
50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 1500
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
m
R
un
ni
ng
 ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
 
k = 20
k = 120
(b) Impact of m
Figure 8.5: Running time of KADD
Number of Winning Buyers: Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7 show the number of win-
ning buyers returned by KASD and KADD, respectively. One obvious observation is that
when n > k the number of winning buyers is always n− 1. This is consistent with our
theoretical analysis. Another observation is that the number of winning buyers increases
when there are more sellers participating in the auction. This is because the probability that
the conditions (Line 6 in Algorithm 14 and Lines 7 or 19 in Algorithm 15) are satisfied
becomes higher. The last observation is that the curves for the impact of k have an upside
down S shape. The reason is that the probability that the conditions are satisfied drops
dramatically when k ≥ n.
Profit: Figure 8.8 and Figure 8.9 show the profit of different auctions. In particular,
Figure 8.8 shows the profit of KASD, and Figure 8.9 shows the profit of KADD and KADD+
side by side. For KASD, we first observe that the results of the impact of m and the impact
of k are consistent with the results in Figure 8.6(b) and Figure 8.6(c). However, the results
of the impact of n are quite different from the results in Figure 8.6(a), especially when
k = 20. The reason is that when n grows, the value of bn becomes smaller on average, since
all the values of bi are randomly distributed in a fixed range (0,1]. The rate of the decrease
in the value of bn outweighs the increase in the value of n− 1. For k = 120, the profit is
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Figure 8.7: Number of winning buyers of KADD
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Figure 8.8: Profit of KASD
close to 0 when n ≤ 100, dramatically increases when 100 < n ≤ k, and then decreases
when n > k. The reason for the first segment is that the condition (Line 6 in Algorithm 14)
can hardly be satisfied. When 100 < n ≤ k, fewer and fewer sellers are needed, but more
and more buyers pay their payments. However, when n > k, the situation is equivalent to
that of k = 20.
For the case where buyers have different degree requirements, we compared the
profit returned by KADD and KADD+. We aimed to evaluate how much profit will be
sacrificed in order to guarantee that buyers have no incentives to cheat on ki. As shown in
Figure 8.9, KADD and KADD+ almost generate the same profit as long as n≥ k. However,
when n < k, KADD+ barely generates any profit while the profit generated by KADD is
relatively large and increases with the number of sellers. The reason for this difference is
that we consider buyers in a finer granularity for KADD.
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8.6 Conclusion
In this work, we have designed incentive mechanisms for motivating mobile users
to assist others achieving k-anonymity location privacy. As the first step, we have con-
sidered the case where mobile users have the same privacy degree requirement. We have
further generalized it to the case where the degree requirements are different. We have
also studied a more challenging case where mobile users can cheat about not only their
valuations but also their degree requirements. We have designed an auction-based incen-
tive mechanism for each of these cases and proved that all the auctions are computational
efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Game theory provides a fruitful set of tools for examining strategic interactions among two
or more entities. Network problems can be well modeled and addressed using game theory.
Devices in networks, for instance, computers and mobile phones, usually belong to differ-
ent individuals, who make their decisions independently and selfishly. In this dissertation,
we applied game theory to coping with selfish behavior in networks. In general, we studied
three problem domains: 1) resource allocation, 2) incentive mechanism, and 3) security.
Specifically, for the domain of resource allocation, we first studied the selfish rout-
ing problem in networks with fair queuing on links. We modeled the problem as a game,
and proved the existence of Nash Equilibria. In addition, we designed an algorithm follow-
ing the nature of game course, and rigorously bounded the converge speed to a Nash Equi-
librium. The second problem we studied is the relay assignment problem in cooperative
networks. We designed an integrated scheme for optimally assigning relays to maximize
the total capacity. To avoid system performance degradation due to the selfish relay selec-
tions by the source nodes, we propose a payment mechanism for charging the source nodes
to induce them to converge to the optimal assignment. To prevent relay nodes from manip-
ulating the relay assignment by reporting transmission power untruthfully, we propose a
payment mechanism to pay them for providing relaying service. We also show that HERA
is budget-balanced, meaning that the payment collected from source nodes is no smaller
than the payment paid to relay nodes. The last problem studied in this domain is the channel
allocation problem in non-cooperative networks. We first observed that the network may
result in an oscillation, where nodes keep changing their channel allocations back and force
trying to improve their utilities. To avoid the possible oscillation, we designed a charging
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scheme to influence players’ behavior. We proved that, under the charging scheme, the
network is guaranteed to converge to an NE. We also proved that the system performance
in an NE is at least (1− r¯h) of the system performance in the optimal solution, where r¯ is the
maximum number of radios equipped on wireless devices and h is the number of available
channels. Finally, we designed a localized algorithm for players to find an NE.
For the domain of incentive mechanism design, we designed incentive mechanisms
for encouraging wireless devices to serve as relays in cooperative networks, and recruiting
smartphones for crowdsourcing. For the former problem, we designed an auction-based
scheme, which is proved to be efficient, individual-rational, budget-balanced, and, most
importantly, truthful. For the latter problem, we considered two system models from two
different perspectives: the platform-centric model where the platform provides a fixed re-
ward to participating users, and the user-centric model where users can have their reserve
prices for the sensing service. For the platform-centric model, we designed an incentive
mechanism using a Stackelberg game. We presented an efficient algorithm to compute
the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and
none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy.
For the user-centric model, we designed an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is
computationally efficient, individually-rational, profitable and, more importantly, truthful.
For the domain of security, we analyzed how a user can defend against a smart jam-
mer, who can quickly learn about the user’s transmission power and adaptively adjust its
own transmission to maximize the damage. We considered both the single-channel model
and the multi-channel model. For the single-channel model, we derived closed-form ex-
pressions for the jammer’s best response strategy and the user’s optimal strategy, which
together constitute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). For the multi-channel model,
we designed an algorithm for computing the jammer’s best response strategy, given the
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user’s strategy. We also developed two algorithms to approximate the user’s optimal strat-
egy and thus the SE strategies. Another problem we studied is motivating mobile users
to participate in k-anonymity location privacy protection. We first considered different
cases, including the case where all mobile users have the same privacy degree requirement,
the case where users’ degree requirements are different, and the case where mobile users
can also cheat about their requirements. We carefully design an auction-based incentive
mechanism for each case and rigorously proved that these incentive mechanisms are com-
putationally efficient, individually rational, budget-balanced, and truthful.
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